ANDREW MWENDA'S BLOG

When Kagame disproves critics.

2012-01-02T04:38:00.000-08:00

SUNDAY, 01 JANUARY 2012 10:11 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Because he has little pecuniary interest in power and no messianic image of himself, Kagame will easily retire in 2017

Since his press engagement in Kampala, President Paul Kagame has come under increasing attack from some people accusing him of being unclear about his intention to retire in 2017. Kagame has previously said people should be free to debate term limits. However, he has said repeatedly he will not accept to be a beneficiary of such a constitutional amendment. In spite of this, critics remain unconvinced.

Kagame has positioned his presidency as different from what has happened in most of Africa. Many of the actions he has taken set him apart from most of his contemporaries – thus disproving the prejudices of his critics. Therefore, nothing will validate his critics’ argument against him – that he is another power hungry African despot – than if he were to renege on the issue of term limits.

Will Kagame remove term limits and remain president after 2017? If we follow precedent across Africa and all other countries where presidents have come to power through guerrilla movements – from Angola, Mozambique, North Korea and China to Vietnam, such leaders die in office. Uganda, Eritrea and Ethiopia seem on course to prove this. For most reasonable people therefore, it is only natural to suspect that Kagame will follow suit.

Second, if one looks at the structural conditions in Rwanda – a dominant ruling party, a very large poor and semi-literate rural population; a small educated urban middle class; a weak and poorly developed civil society and the absence of a strong opposition make removing term limits a walk in the park. In such circumstances, most reasonable people would again be forgiven to suspect that Kagame will not leave in 2017. Therefore, if Kagame is going to leave power, the explanation has to come from his character. I am willing to bet that come 2017, he will not run for president.

Kagame has not exhibited a high thirst for the presidency like most people in his position would have. For example, when the RPF captured power in 1994, everyone would have expected Kagame to take over as president. He was the general who had commanded the armies that had captured power. The RPF mounted pressure on him to become president. He refused. Prime Minister designate at the time, Faustine Twagiramungu, led a delegation of all the other political parties to the Arusha Accords to petition Kagame to be president. He still refused.

I do not know of a successful general who wrestled power into his hands and everyone in the country wanted him to take it and he refused – not Napoleon Bonaparte, Fidel Castro, Samora Machel, George Washington, Hoh Chi Minh, Yoweri Museveni or Mao Tse Tung. In fact Kagame was not even interested in becoming the vice president, a position hastily created and which he accepted as a compromise to put in place a government. Rwanda had spent almost two weeks without a government because Kagame was refusing to be president. If he could afford to play second fiddle for six years, he can afford to leave power in 2017.

Therefore, for many Rwandans and people who know Rwanda, the biggest risk is not that Kagame will stay. The risk is that when he leaves, how much of what he has put in place will survive. Kagame – notwithstanding his one million and one imperfections as a human being and as a leader – towers above Rwanda as a moral colossus. His determination to insist that government should not only serve the privileges of the powerful but should also (and in equal measure) serve the interests of the ordinary person is something that will be difficult to sustain without him. His determined and relentless fight against corruption is another.

Without Kagame’s personal character and leadership ability and focus, it is not clear that a lot of what has happened in Rwanda under him can be sustained. This is largely because while individual leaders can make things happen, it is institutions that make things last. Yet institutions – their capabilities, traditions and norms – take generations to build. And once built, they are susceptible to reversal.

Kagame has helped put in place public and private institutions in Rwanda. He has helped endow them with particular capabilities which have allowed that country to punch above its weight. Yet as he plans to retire in 2017, there is not much evidence inside RPF, other political parties, or Rwanda’s bureaucracy that all these capacities will automatically survive and continue to thrive. As someone knowledgeable about Rwanda, I am always shocked (not surprised) at how many wrong things private and public officials in Rwanda are willing to do but for fear of Kagame.

Let me not be misunderstood to be saying that it is only Kagame who does the right thing in Rwanda. Indeed, he would have achieved very little if he had not built a strong team and instilled in it a sense of discipline, determination, focus and purpose that one finds in Rwanda’s public life. But it is not obvious that without him these qualities can be easily sustained. This is because there are many forces in Rwanda who would prefer a more relaxed moral code in the public sector – some genuinely as a way to promote elite co-optation, others for self aggrandisement.

If Kagame were the mainstream power hungry ruler, there are many choices he would already have made to protect his power. For example, he would have promoted patronage, allowed corruption, bought and sold favours to groups and individuals whose support he desires, made unprincipled compromises and given dubious concessions. Yet in most of his decisions and actions, he has demonstrated a consistent pattern of always placing his country’s national interest above his personal aggrandisement.

Across most contemporary Africa and the world, leaders base their legitimacy on trading favours among elites hence corruption. But Kagame has sought to base his legitimacy almost entirely on the performance of his government in improving the social-economic condition of his people and delivering public goods and services to them. Those are not traits of a leader desirous to stay in power for its own sake. Because he has little pecuniary interest in power, and because he does not possess a messianic image of himself, Kagame easily relinquish the presidency.

Commission of enquiry a mockery of justice.

2012-01-02T04:34:00.000-08:00

MONDAY, 26 DECEMBER 2011 08:03 BY ANDREW MWENDA

A section of the public and critics have lately been saying Andrew Mwenda has changed. I don't agree with them, and records of my publications going back in time bear me witness. Throughout my career, I have cherished the key cornerstones of journalism - truth and accuracy, fairness and balance. I hereby reproduce some of the pieces I did back in time highlighting the position I have taken on contentious issues involving allegations of corruption. I hope this article and many more to come will guide the debate on whether I have changed at all.

This article was published in the Sunday Monitor on March 7, 2004

So the commission of inquiry into corruption in the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) became a theatre for personal fights and recriminations instead of helping us grasp the political and institutional sources of Corruption! It was apparent from the beginning that lady justice Julie Sebutinde is not a credible or reliable investigator. Why? She plays too much to the gallery. Although she became popular because of how she handled the inquiry into corruption in the police force, Sebutinde did a great dis-service to the cause of justice and due process in this country.

She declared the police officer who appeared before guilty before she could even hear their case. Sebutinde would hurl insults at them, shut down their lawyers and throw tantrums at any witness who tried to defend them. Yes, the accused police officers could have been evil men but they were entitled to due process. The public angry with, an incompetent and corrupt police force cheered Sebutinde on, and she almost became a goddess. President Yoweri Museveni, seeking to gain political advantage, played to the gallery, too calling Sebutinde "my girl"

Ssebutinde made many pronouncements that Karim Hirjr had murdered his friend Kiddu that made headlines. But she still refused pleas from Karim to appear before her commission and defend himself.

Later she wrote a report recommending that Brig. Jim Muhwezi be investigated for the murder of Lt. Shalita, yet the Brigadier’s name during the proceedings of her commission, was never called before Sebutinde to answer to these allegations.

It is this lack of impartiality that she brought into the URA investigation. She accused Jack Bigirwa of stealing money from URA to build a house in Bushenyi. Bigirwa built the house in 1984, URA was created in 1992, and he joined it in 1994. She insulted Elly Rwakakooko, shouted down Steven Akabway, no one escaped her cobra bite. Her rants and recriminations against people who appeared before her were detestable in both matter and manner; and they are a classic example of how public anger can be exploited to undermine the cause of justice.

I raised this issue during the police probe mainly on radio one’s spectrum programme, and later in articles in The Monitor. I was told that the Commission of Inquiries' Act allows the commission to adopt its own modus operandi, However, I still reject Sebutinde's style because the spirit of the law would certainly not have been to undermine the principles of natural justice that someone should not be a judge in their own case, or a prosecutor and judge in the same case. Sebutinde was carried away by public acclaim and she turned herself into a public avenger against the police, and later a public executioner of people's reputations.

However, the URA probe was going to be different because she was given the respected James Kahooza, and little known Fawn Cousens, as commissioners. Their strength of character was going to expose Sebutinde. And they did! Kahooza and Cousens did not reject the entire report by Sebutinde, but only parts of it and they stated their concerns in writing. Neither Sebutinde nor the Solicitor General, Mr. Tibaruha, has answered these issues. Instead, Sebutinde went on personal attacks against her fellow commissioners accusing them of conflict of interest. Sebutinde argues that Kahooza had a conflict of interest because his son works with URA and has used his job to accumulate wealth illigetimately.

She further says that Kahooza's wife has a company that sup- plies food to the URA and is shielded from paying taxes, Sebutinde further says that Cousens has a conflict of interest because she applied for a job in the URA, and that URA Commissioner General, Aslund Ann brit, recommended her to the commission. On this basis, Sebutinde tells us that Kahooza and Cousens reject- ed parts of her report because guilt and vested interest drive them.

I find this position opportunistic and hypocritical. If Sebutinde knew all this, why didn't she write to the minister who appointed her asking the two to be removed from the commission? I have had opportunity to read the Sebutinde report into URA and there is not a single reference in her report regarding this conflict of interest by Cousens and Kahooza. Why did she keep this vital information from the public until the two refused to sign her report? I find Sebutinde's revelations of conflict of interest against Kahooza and Cousens bordering on blackmail itself a criminal offence.

Sebutinde tells us that she knew bad things about Kahooza and Cousens but kept this information to herself. What for? To buy their silence so that she can arrogate herself power to single-handedly write the commission's report. The nation must wake up to this fraud. We trust and respect our judges in this country. There is something in law called aiding and abating a crime, Assuming that Sebutinde's allegations against her colleagues are true, and given that she kept this vital information to herself until Cousens and Kahooza disagreed with her, was she not trying to aid and abate their unethical conduct in return of their compliance?

Equally important, Sebutinde has made no effort whatsoever to answer the objections raised by Cousens and Kahooza, regarding the procedure of the commission and the contents of her report. She has rather chosen to raise matter external to the report and investigation. What does this tell us about the lady justice? Just like in the police probe and report, Sebutinde picked issues off the street and smuggled them into her report on URA which were never called upon to give their defence, I know Kahooza would never sign unto such fraud, and he refused as did Cousens. Fate, so the saying goes, is a great joker; it always laughs last!

These commissions of inquiry have been political vehicles to legitimise an extremely corrupt system by demonstrating to an unsuspecting public that some- thing is being done. This politicised and pedestrian approach to fighting corruption will not help Uganda. Year, 2000! A policeman, with a wife and four children in, Kampala is paid Shs 70,000 per month. It cannot help him survive even for a week. He takes a bribe to make ends meet. Who is being immoral here the government, which pretends to employ the policeman, or the policeman who makes a genuine attempt to feed his family? Whose morality are we talking about?

Take URA for example. The wages in that organization, were set in 1994 at II have never been revised. People are promoted on the basis of tribe, supporting The Movement or third term rather than on demonstrated competence and probity. The president constantly writes lists of people (he calls them cadres) to be hired by the organization. The URA does not offer long term career rewards, job insecurity is high. Under such circumstances, it is illusory to expect staff to pursue corporate goals. Instead, they pursue Individual maximization - steal as fast and as much as you can before you loose your job. These are the political and institutional sources of corruption that we need to deal with Sebutinde like commissions seek to name and shame the corrupt. That will not help.

Post 9/11 America and post genocide Rwanda

2012-01-02T04:30:00.001-08:00

Post 9/11 America and post genocide Rwanda
MONDAY, 05 DECEMBER 2011 06:17 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Who should lecture the other about how to exercise restraint in the face of severe security threats?

Last week, I was invited by Rwanda’s minister of foreign affairs, the pleasant Louise Mushikiwabo, to attend a public lecture by United States permanent representative to the United Nations, Susan Rice, at the Kigali Institute of Science and Technology. She gave a great speech, highlighting the tragedy of genocide Rwandans faced in 1994 and the courage and resilience with which they have reconstructed their lives, their public institutions, their economy and their international standing. Most of her speech – possibly 85 percent – was filled of praise of what Rwandans have achieved.

However, towards to the end of her speech, Ms Rice said that “friends should also speak frankly to friends” adding that “the political culture in Rwanda remains comparatively closed. Press restrictions persist. That civil society activists, journalists and political opponents of the government often fear to organise peacefully and speaking out. Some have been harassed. Some have been intimidated by late-night callers. Some have simply disappeared.” This part of the speech was out of sync with the first part where every achievement she mentioned was accompanied with real-life examples backed with facts and figures. Here, she made assertions without any effort to substantiate them.

First, I have a problem with western leaders when they come lecturing to their African counterparts on how to manage their countries as if our leaders are children. Indeed I had always wondered whether an African leader visiting the US would be allowed to speak like that to an American president until I had coffee with the former assistant secretary of state for African affairs, Chester Crocker in Washington DC.

Crocker told me of how he took Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe to meet then President Ronald Reagan in the late 1980s. According to Crocker, Mugabe proceeded to lecture Reagan on the faults of American policy towards Nicaragua. The CIA was funding a terrorist organisation, The Contra rebels, to wreck havoc on the population in an effort to overthrow the Sandinista government. Mugabe told Reagan that policy was wrong for world peace. “It was the last time Mugabe met an American president,” Crocker told me, suggesting that Mugabe was discourteous. I told Crocker that most American and Western European diplomats do exactly that when dealing with African leaders. Mugabe may have learnt the behaviour from them. Croker looked a little unhinged at this unexpected rebut.

Rwanda has many problems – I can list a million without thinking. Yet as Ms Rice concluded her speech, I felt she was pandering to claims of international human rights organisations and a few dissidents without reference to facts or context. More importantly, the view by people in the West and their African-elite cheerleaders that our systems are primitive and theirs saintly is not only wrong but has also been the basis of many misdirected attempts to usurp our sovereignty – with disastrous results. Yet judged by US standards, Rwanda has demonstrated greater flexibility, tolerance, accommodation and understanding than America in the face of similar dangers.

On 9/11 2001, the US lost two and a half buildings, four planes and only 3,000 people in a country of 300m i.e. 0.001 percent of its population. In response to this, the US declared the “world had changed” and then proceeded to behave like a bull in a china shop. It imposed onerous rules and regulations on its own population and on all countries all over the world that make some of Stalin’s practices seem benign. It began wire-tapping everyone’s phone without court sanction, invaded and occupied two countries (Afghanistan and Iraq) tens of thousands of miles away and is still there a decade later. It began bombing Pakistan and killing innocent civilians in what it calls collateral damage. It now carries out assassinations of alleged Al Qaeda leaders almost on a daily basis. It has imposed draconian rules in every airport around the world where people are finger-printed, photographed, X-rayed, undressed and indecently touched and humiliated.

The US also arrogated itself power to open everyone’s bank account anywhere in the world to its scrutiny. It officially began to run torture chambers at Abu Gren and Guantanamo Bay. It outsourced some of the torturing to its brutal allies in the Middle East, suspended many civil liberties at home and began jailing people, including US citizens, without trial. It bombed headquarters of media organisations that criticised its actions, jailed without trial and tortured journalists who reported such actions – all in the name of ensuring that not a single life is lost to terrorism again. The US has insisted that it cannot have any discussion with its enemies – it exports death to them.

In doing this, we must remember that America actually has strong institutional traditions, extraordinary intellectual resources, the best technology anyone can master, its defence budget is larger than the defence budgets of the rest of the world combined and its economy is the largest. These endowments should make America a more sober, calm, mature, confident and responsible player on the global scene as opposed to being paranoid. While some of its actions after 9/11 are justifiable in a free and democratic society, most are actually Stalinist and unjustifiable.

Yet in spite of all the above observations and criticisms regarding its response to 9/11, I still believe – by and large – in the greater moral good of America, the richness of its democratic process, the creativity of its institutional designs, the depth of its intellectual traditions and the profound goodness, generosity and humanity of its people. Indeed, I bring forth some of these criticism only to show that ensuring the security of a nation and its people is a very complex exercise that can make the actions of the most well intentioned state and leaders look draconian, unfair, brutal and unacceptable. Indeed, the first presidential order Barak Obama signed upon entering the Oval Office was to close Guantanamo Bay because he claimed George Bush was being wrong. His first term is nearing an end at this torture chamber is still running. Therefore Bush was not monster after all as Obama had tried to portray him. The issues must be more complex.

Let us now visit Rwanda, a poor country with very young, weak and fragile institutions, a poorly developed human resource base, limited technology, a poor economy amidst abject poverty of its people. Only 17 years ago, this country lost one million people (not 3,000) – almost 13 percent of the total population of the country (not 0.001 percent). Unlike America where the enemy was a foreigner from distant lands and could be controlled through border security, in Rwanda the enemy was the citizen where neighbour killed neighbour and a father killed his children and wife. It is a country where mass murder was organised by the state, mobilised by the mass media and executed by millions of ordinary citizens. And unlike America, Rwanda did not lose only four planes and two and a half buildings – it lost an entire country and 60 percent of its GDP.

As Rice concluded her speech with her carefully rehearsed qualifications about the need for economic reform to be in tandem with political reform, I was lost. I asked myself what a poor country like Rwanda would do to protect itself against the recurrence of such a catastrophe. If media mobilised for genocide, what restrictions are justifiable to limit future abuses? If political parties appealed to ethnic extremism and were willing to commit genocide to gain power, what should be done to avoid this behaviour in future? Given my own predilection to its values, my first country of reference was America. However, as pointed out above, America is an example of what any nation should NOT do when under threat. If Rwanda behaved like the US, it would have turned into a prison with roadblocks in every village and torture chambers in every locality. Neither could I turn to Britain because it has not been much different from America.

I know that the political system in Rwanda and the civic space and the mass media have many limitations upon them. Many of the limitations are products of lack of human resource capacity, a factor that Rice ignored. Some are self imposed by individuals and groups because of their experiences, something many commentators ignore. And others are imposed on society by the state justifiably and sometimes unjustifiably. I also know that for every limitation on political freedoms by the state in Rwanda, there are contestations over them. Rwanda is not a static society. It is fairly vibrant with different forces vying for increasing state control and others for greater freedoms. This is healthy as, to quote that ancient Greek philosopher, Heracleitus, strength is generated by the tension between opposites.

Kwame Nkrumah – that great hero of the African peoples – once said that “Those who would merely judge us by the heights we have achieved would do better to remember the depth from which we started.” Any judgement of Rwanda therefore has to begin from this basis. Celebrated American political scientist, Robert Dahl, once argued that democracy has two aspects; one is contestation, the other is participation. Contestation refers to how freely the political opposition contest for power from those holding it. Participation inquires into how many groups participate in politics and determine who the rulers should be.

Let us look a Rwanda on these two scores. According to the 2003 Rwandan constitution, no political party – regardless of how many votes it gets – can hold more than 50 percent of cabinet positions. The constitution also says that the president of the country and the speaker of parliament cannot come from the same party. Although the constitution does not require the president of the senate to come from a different political party from that of the president of the country, over the last seven years, the president of the senate has always come from outside of the president’s party. The current president of the senate, Damacen Ntarikuriryayo was President Paul Kagame’s leading challenger in the last election. And it is also until two months ago that for the first time since 1994 that the prime minister of Rwanda comes from the same political party as the president.

This constitutional innovation and the accompanying political practices were shaped by the experience of the early 1990s. The opening up of political space in 1990 generated a high level of political contestation in Rwanda and as a result stimulated the emergence of extremist political parties. These factors led genocide. Many Rwandans think that these extreme political positions were born of the winner-take-all system that existed then. Therefore, the 2003 constitution innovated ways to stop control of government by one group. This has reduced the appetite for extremist political contestation because every party knows that regardless of its majority, it will have to work with other parties in cabinet. So it is not good to antagonise your potential allies through extremely polarised positions.

More importantly, Rwanda has a Political Parties’ Forum whose chairmanship rotates among the different parties every month regardless of their electoral strength. Political parties meet regularly through this forum and discuss and harmonise major policy positions before going public. Because of this forum, political parties in Rwanda are less polarised and policy contestation is less heated compared to elsewhere.

Many observers of Rwanda, ignorant of these political innovations and armed with a set of prejudices about politics in Africa think that there is no significant political contestation in that country. Indeed, it is their prejudice about Africa that makes them prey to misinformation from Rwandan dissidents many of whom are either genocidaires running from justice or corrupt former officials who cannot find space in the new society that is being built. Thus, sections of the international press, human rights organisations and particular sections of the academia that lost intellectual control over Rwanda after 1994 have made themselves spokesperson of these groups.

Political contestation among the major political parties in Rwanda is less polarised because of the aforementioned constitutional innovations and political practices. Any casual visit to Netherlands or Belgium, where no single party can command a governing majority will reflect the kind of political accommodation we see in Rwanda. Because for any party to rule in Belgium it has to mobilise not less than four to six coalition partners, political parties in that country are reluctant to adopt extremely hostile political positions to other parties lest they alienate potential allies. This makes their politics less polarised and more reconciliatory in their rhetoric.

This practice is very different from the US (and until recently the UK) where you have two dominant parties able to govern without need for coalition partners. Today, American politics is so polarised, it is difficult to build a consensus on anything unless and until there is a major security threat like 9/11.

As Ms Rice spoke, I wondered whether she knows the existence of over 60 newspapers and eleven radio stations with talk shows literally discussing anything under the sun in Rwanda. In fact the unethical and often blatantly criminal practices Rwandan journalists indulge would make News of the World seem like a very responsible newspaper. Yet News of the World was closed down by its own owner because of indulging in criminal and unethical conduct, something no Rwandan newspaper can suffer. Therefore, the absence of the kinds of restraints from shareholders, society and journalist associations that we see in Europe is the biggest challenge facing the mass media in Rwanda.

Again as Ms Rice called for more political accommodation in Rwanda, I asked myself who briefs her about the countries she visits. Listening to her was the commissioner general for correctional services, Paul Rwarakabije, the former overall commander of the FDLR, Rwanda’s leading rebel group and Jerome Ngendahimana, currently deputy commander of the reserve forces who was chief of intelligence in FDLR. In fact Ngendahimana’s, wife is a MP representing RPF in parliament. RPF has found the courage to reconcile with its enemies and work with them. Where America has been belligerent and uncompromising in its assassinations, arrests, torture and prosecution of its enemies, Rwanda has sought reconciliation, accommodation and moderation.

Can America accommodate any members of Al Qaeda if they surrendered and instead of jailing them in pursuit of justice integrate them into its democratic power structure? These questions kept racing in my head as I tried to establish the source of American hubris when it comes to lecturing others about best political practices. Who should have lecturing the other: America to Rwanda or vice versa?

Post 9/11 America and post genocide Rwanda

2012-01-02T04:30:00.000-08:00

Museveni's post election Black swan.

2012-01-02T04:26:00.000-08:00

TUESDAY, 20 DECEMBER 2011 05:36 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Why Besigye may have a chance at the presidency and how the President risks impeachment by parliament

Two things that seemed almost impossible and improbable at the end of March this year are increasingly becoming possible and probable as the year closes. One was that Forum for Democratic Change boss Kizza Besigye would never be President of Uganda (which was my position); the other was that the NRM-dominated Parliament would never impeach President Yoweri Museveni (which was the position of my critics) because he had effective control over it. Today, both scenarios are possible and probable. Both these changes show how indeterminate the future is.

At the end of March this year, Museveni was a very confident man. He had resoundingly defeated Besigye in what was perhaps the freest, fairest and least violence-ridden presidential election ever. Yes, he raided the Treasury and spent tonnes of public money on it. However, in the wider scheme of things, better a president who buys an election than one who kills for it. Wasn’t it King Philip 11 of Macedonia (father of Alexander the Great) who saw bribery and lies as humane substitutes to slaughter?

Similarly, at the end of March, Besigye looked like a spent force; his claims that he had been cheated of victory sounded like sour grapes. He had been beaten in his northern stronghold, failed to gain ground in Buganda, lost significant ground in Teso and the entire East and made no inroads in western Uganda. He had called upon his supporters to demonstrate against electoral fraud and no one turned up.

On the other hand, Museveni had not just won by 68% (up from 58% in 2006), his NRM party also swept the Parliamentary seats. Out of 375 elected seats, NRM had won 264. Of the 43 MPs elected as independents, 39 were allied to the party. If one added UPDF representatives to NRM, the ruling party’s parliamentary majority looked overwhelming and Museveni looked as secure as ever in his position. To many observers, this was going to be Museveni’s best five year term ever.

This was the context of Uganda at the beginning of April 2011 – a demoralised and apathetic opposition; a confident and seemingly impregnable Museveni and his party. But by the end of the month, the tables had turned. Demonstrations had rocked the entire country from Kampala to Mbale, Gulu, Masaka and the president’s home district of Mbarara. Besigye had re-emerged from virtual obscurity to become the main centre of attention leading the ‘Walk to Work’ campaign. What had happened in less than two months to change everything?

The genesis of Museveni’s dilemma was the way he approached the election campaign. Suspecting that Besigye had been given a lot of money by the late Libyan President Muammar Gadaffi, Museveni raided the national Treasury for Shs 600 billion and went on a spending spree. It was the most expensive election in Uganda’s history. After the election, I was the leading proponent of the view that the president had literary bought the election.

By December 2010, Afrobarometer polls were showing Museveni with a commanding lead of 67% and throughout the election campaign, all polls reflected this constant figure. On Election Day, he got 68% – meaning that Museveni’s money had little effect on his electoral arithmetic.

However, the spending spree had powerful implications on the economy whose long-term consequences he could have underestimated and some he could not have foreseen. For example, assuming that his strategic objective was to retain power, he may have realised that in the short term this required some fiscal irresponsibility i.e. excessive spending that could cause inflation. However, once he had achieved his strategic objective, he would re-establish prudent fiscal and monetary policy, bring inflation under control and have a comfortable five years.

However, the President seems to have been hit by what Nassim Nicolas Taleb calls a Black Swan – the impact of a large and unexpected event. Immediately after the election, Uganda suffered two major external shocks – the increasing price of crude oil in international markets and the appreciation of the dollar – both of which brought with them imported inflation. Then the effects of the drought that had started in December 2010 were beginning to bite in form of high food prices – the most critical driver of inflation.

Even before Museveni could re-establish control over the economy, these developments grievously hurt our already fragile fiscal and monetary positions. Indeed, they made it difficult for Museveni to regain control over inflation in the short term. To make matters worse (as if the gods were colluding to spoil the president’s renewed mandate), the effects of these shocks were most felt by urban consumers - the constituency that is most hostile to the government but equally the most strategically positioned to make demands on the State by organising civil disobedience.

It is in this context that ‘Walk to Work’ protests began – producing the law of unintended consequences. For example, the protests initially reduced the inflow of food into Kampala City, thus making inflation worse. As the protests spread from Kampala to other towns, they scared away investors and tourists, thereby reducing the inflows of foreign exchange and thereby worsening the position of the Shilling. This in turn forced portfolio investors to begin selling off their Ugandan treasury bills and bonds, further undermining the health of the local currency.

In the midst of all these developments – a seemingly failing economy and a political process out of touch with people’s concerns – the constituencies in favour of protests grew. The teachers went on strike over poor pay. The taxi drivers followed suit over fuel prices. Then traders closed their shops protesting the increasing price of the dollar. Lawyers downed their gowns in protest against government handling of the demonstrations. Beleaguered and disoriented, the government’s response to these challenges became shabbier. For example, it began charging protesters with treason, a very ridiculous thing at that.

It is in these circumstances that Besigye regained his political relevance. Sensing a weakness, Parliament also took advantage of the situation to openly challenge the Executive using alleged corruption in oil deals as an entry point. So, if Museveni does not re-assert his authority now, Parliament may run out of control. If this happens, it may even gain the confidence to try to impeach him. And if Besigye can rekindle the Walk to Work fire, it may give him a chance at the presidency.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Separating fact from fiction

2012-01-02T03:59:00.000-08:00

MONDAY, 28 NOVEMBER 2011 15:43 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

We cannot fight corruption using corrupt or unfair and unjust means

On the opposite page, Nicolas Rugaba Agaba criticises me for taking the now infamous oil bribery documents to President Yoweri Museveni. He insinuates that this compromised my investigation since the President has no will to fight corruption.

Museveni was one of several people and institutions with whom I shared these documents and tried to collaborate with in the investigation. Sadly, for purposes of confidentiality, I will not disclose some of the critical offices around the world that I collaborated with. But I can reveal a few: I shared the documents with the Nation Media Group in Nairobi, emailing them to Charles Onyango-Obbo on September 28th asking we collaborate in the investigation and publish the story simultaneously in The East African and The Independent?”

The East African is our competitor. Normally we would not share our stories with them. However, I felt this was a very important issue – so important that if we ould not crack it on our own, we should not be afraid to work with our competitors.

Secondly, using informal contacts, I shared the documents with police in London and Dubai. I also had a meeting with representatives of Global Witness at my office and shared the documents with them. We agreed on a joint investigation where, if we established their validity, we would publish the story concurrently in The Independent and on their website. Global Witness is based in London and is perhaps the world’s leading organisation in investigating corruption in the oil sector.

Therefore, even if Museveni had done nothing, he would not have stopped these other people and institutions from doing something. This insulated the investigation from the failures of anyone of the parties I was working with. I also knew that involving Museveni had costs. But it also had benefits. I had to weigh the two and the benefits outweighed the costs.

Rugaba-Agaba argues that by taking the documents to Museveni, I was doing what I always preach against i.e. taking every problem to the President. The people alleged to have received these bribes are ministers appointed directly by him. It was only fair that I give him the benefit of the doubt and he also helps me in the investigation using the infrastructure of the state. However, there was also a risk that if I went simply to the police and they botched up this high profile investigation, it could compromise my security. Throughout the investigation, I felt Museveni acted with utmost transparency and openness.

I told him that even if we do not prove the allegations, he can take a series of actions to protect the national interest. My source of these documents had told me that Tullow was paying these bribes in order to get Uganda government to accept international arbitration so that Heritage Oil does not pay the Capital Gains Tax due to URA. I recommended to the President three things to do in order to protect the national interest and he did all of them. Details of these are in my last week’s column. His subsequent actions and public pronouncements convinced me that he was being sincere.

I will partly concede to Rugaba-Agaba’s criticism that I am often unfair to Ugandan elites when I accuse them of intellectual mediocrity given our bad education system. The worst part of it is that our education system teaches students to memorise knowlege rather than to critique it. As a result, many Ugandans involved in public debate have a high propensity to be attracted to the obvious (which is often misleading) as opposed to the hidden (which is often the explanation); the simple but stupid (which is easy to believe) as opposed to the complex (which is demands greater intellectual energy to understant); and to being sentimental about public policy issues instead of being analytical.

We need to separate our personal biases from our professional work. As a person I too have biases against some public officials whom I suspect to be corrupt. But as an editor, I cannot rely on such personal biases to accept as valid any document accusing anyone of them of taking a bribe. Does one need to go to Harvard to learn this simple principle?

Assume a judge believes Joseph Kony is a mass murderer. If he is brought before him, his judgment has to be based on the evidence adduced by the prosecution convincing court beyond reasonable doubt that Kony is guilty. The judge is supposed to acquit Kony if he is convinced that the prosecution’s case is weak and unconvincing. To follow his personal bias instead of the evidence presented in court would be abuse of office/power.

The same applies to a doctor who believes Kony deserves to die because of what he has done. If they brought a wounded Kony to him, the doctor should treat the LRA leader diligently and save his life. If the doctor deliberately neglected him and left him to die (to suit his personal desires) he would have acted unprofessionally and would deserve to be charged with voluntary manslaughter.

Throughout this debate on the oil bribery scandal, I have been frustrated by the inability of our elites to make this simple distinction. This is not caused by bad education but lack of faith in fundamental values. Many of the senior NRM functionaries have used lies, deceit, forgeries and other unjust practices to stay in power. However, we cannot employ the same practices to advance the cause of justice and clean government.

If we believe in the principles of natural justice and in building a just and fair society, we need to subject those who disregard these values to our standard, not theirs. That is what distinguishes us from them. This is why I have always defended the right of those accused of corruption to a fair and just hearing in an impartial process.

I disagreed with those who censured Jim Muhwezi when they used forged and distorted documents to accuse him of corruption. I opposed the way Julia Sebutinde conducted the investigation into the police force and later into URA by condemning the people who appeared to testify before her during the hearings without hearing their case. My articles in The Monitor since 1998 are filled with this statement and restatement of values – that we cannot fight corruption using corrupt or unfair and unjust means.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Ssebutinde commissions solve nothing except..........

2012-01-02T03:55:00.000-08:00

THURSDAY, 15 DECEMBER 2011 08:17 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

A section of the public and critics have lately been saying Andrew Mwenda has changed. I don't agree with them, and records of my publications going back in time bear me witness. Throughout my career, I have cherished the key cornerstones of journalism - truthful and accuracy; fairness and balance. I hereby reproduce some of the pieces I did back in time highlighting the position I have taken on contentious issues involving allegations of corruption. I hope this article and many more to come will guide the debate on whether I have changed at all.

This article was published in the Daily Monitor of Wednesday, November 6, 2002

The Lady Justice Julia Sebutinde commission of inquiry into Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) has brought to the fore a number of salient issues. Like most commissions on corruption in Uganda, the investigation into URA focuses on an important, but small problem with the Tax authority. Thus although the critical problem with Uganda’s tax administration is political interference from mainly the chief executive, the: Ssebutinde investigation is focus on a public Ritual of naming and shaming individuals in order to appease the public.

Ssebutinde conducts her inquiry with ferocious zeal. She yells at the witness, insults and passes judgment on almost every one-long before writing her reports words like “you are a liar”, “all of you belong to Luzira”, “ he is a fraudster” etc are banded around and give hungry reporters and editors good headlines. To an angry public looking for a red herring, such public executions of people’s reputation make a lot of political capital, and a handsome public-profile rent for the lady justice.

We understand judges to be impartial and fair. That someone from the bench is therefore appointed to chair a commission of inquiry should be sign that justice and fairness to all is being thought. In fact the very essence of a judge is impartiality hearing two, often quarreling sides and deciding for one or the other party.

My own insight into Ssebutinde as a chair of this was born out of an interview I had with the former director of Criminal Investigations Department (CID). Chris Bakiza, when I called him about the information of the commission of inquiry into the police chaired by a judge, he happily said he looked forward to presenting his case before this “impartial” body so that the truth could come out. This was not to be, as Ssebutide turned the inquiry into a public humiliation enterprise against police officers.

The Uganda police force has tried its best to police this country amidst poor pay, political bashing by the president and constant budget cuts. They live in mortuaries, toilets and kitchens and waking up every morning to ensure that we are safe. The public humiliation to which Ssebutinde subjected them made a lot of headlines but did not improve their budget. Instead, it provided justification for the president to appoint an army officer to head the police and militarise it. It did not improve their welfare or professional efficiency, but as the president said the changes were to make the police vote “properly” in 2006.

This brings us the URA probe. A few days ago, former URA boss, Elly Rwakakoko was accused of taking a Shs. 55m bribe' from hotel mogul, Karun Hirji. The source of this accusation was the Special Revenue Protection Service (SRPS), a para-military outfit organised by the president at State House to fight tax evasion, Socialised through a culture of institutional methods of work, RwaKakoko fought running battles against SRPS and State House, seeking to secure the bureaucratic autonomy of his organisation against an illegal military outfit that sought to run a parallel show. He left URA but has remained an icon of Uganda's public service. Rwakakoko enjoys a rare reputation, as a man of great integrity and honour, and his opinion on, any matter in Uganda would be taken seriously by many.

Thus when an accusation of financial impropriety was raised against him, 1 was keen to hear his Side of tile story. He gave a sound explanation. Without calling him to testify before her commission, Ssebutinde, with characteristic gusto, "rejected" Rwakakoko's explanation out of hand. Doesn't Rwakakoko deserve the benefit of doubt from the lady justice! or the right to be heard? During; the police probe. Karim was accused of many things including murder; Karim applied to be allowed to testify. Sebutinde refused, saying she was not investigating him. Karim complained that so much was being said against him, that bad publicity was hurting his business, that he just wanted an opportunity to defend his name before the same commission. Ssebutinde turned him down. Today, Ssebutinde says: "He is not a bona fide- investor; he is a fraudster!'' This is a justice of the High Court of Uganda pronouncing herself about a man she has never allowed before any of her commissions.

Karim is not an angel. But doesn't he deserve fairness from a judge'! One of the principles of natural justice is that you should not be a judge and a prosecutor in the same case. Ssebutinde plays both roles in the commission. The other is that you should not make judgement of someone without hearing his or her side of the story Although the law on commissions of inquiry allows the chair to adopt his or her own style of inquiry, we expect better when the chair is a judge because we attach the virtues of impartiality and fairness to them.

I was listening to Ssebutmde question the URA Deputy Director General, Steven Akabway and it felt like she was talking to her houseboy She even yelled at Akabway, questioning his grasp of the English language and telling him that "if you don't understand English I can interpret for you."

Akabway is a highly respected public servant and to treat him with the kind of contempt as Sebutinde did was, to me, rude. Justice Ogola chaired the commission of inquiry into the banking industry, and everyone who appeared there felt listened to.

Indeed, some of the big stories from that commission reflect the kind of attitude that we need to guard against. Take the case of URA commissioner for administration. Jack Bigirwa. He was accused by Ssebutinde of building a "large mansion" in Sheema Bushenyi, and putting up a large coffee estate on his land, all courtesy of corruption in URA. Bigirwa built the said house in 1984 and the farm as far back as 1980. He has been slowly improving on both over the last 22 years Bigirwa is one of this country's largest coffee farmers and makes more money selling seedlings. He chairs the Uganda Coffee Farmers' Association and sits on the board of Uganda Coffee Development Authority (UCDA). He is also a successful fish farmer with numerous ponds at his farm and makes good money selling fish. I am not saying that Bigirwa may not have involved himself in financial impropriety at URA. l do not know. But you cannot accuse him of stealing money from URA (which was established in 1992 and he joined ill 1994) to build a mansion in Sheema which was around in 1984. ls it a crime to be rich'!

The fact that someone is perceived to be corrupt does not mean that we can manufacture evidence against him. Politicians can be excused for employing this approach as Winnie and Nathan Byanvima did in the Brig. Jim Muhwezi censure in 1998. They got a letter written in 1992 and used it as evidence of a wrong under a constitution written in 1995. They got a house on a Shs 240m unpaid mortgage and valued it at Shs. 900m and claimed it as an asset by Muhwezi. They then published these fictitious figures to whip up public sentiment and cause parliamentary mob justice.

These public rituals called "fighting corruption" only serve the regime and actually help entrench system that thrives on corruptIon Behind the charade to censure Muhwezi, for example, was President Yoweri Museveni himself seeking to sink an ally to win public favour and stabilise his regime. Winnie Byanyima would arrange night "strategy" meetings between the president and the petitioners. But they are politicians and not judges, and many politicians by their very profession are liars. I should therefore not be misunderstood to be saying that Muhwezi, Rwakakoko, Bigirwa or Karim are saints. I am saying they deserve to be heard, they should not be accused falsely, and they deserve impartiality from a judge. We should not therefore understand Ssebutinde's style as being accidental. It is a deliberate strategy employed by the regime to appease an angry public while masking the real problems of corruption in Uganda, and at the same time serve the interests of regime survival. Ssebutinde ' herself may not be coached on how to handle the investigations. Rather, the regime exploits her unfair style to win public favour, that there is a war against corruption. Her role is therefore not to solve the problems of the organisations that she investigates but to dupe the public that something is being done, and in the process buy political capital for the regime.

Who is Karuhanga fighting for?

2012-01-02T03:54:00.001-08:00

TUESDAY, 22 NOVEMBER 2011 11:22 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Without arbitration, Uganda has US$ 405m in its treasury. With arbitration, we have a 50 percent risk of losing it.

I read with great pain and frustration the Sunday Monitor interview with the western youth Member of Parliament (MP) Gerald Karuhanga about alleged bribes paid to ministers Sam Kutesa and Hillary Onek in the ongoing oil-bribes-saga. Asked why he thought the documents he tabled before parliament were genuine, Karuhanga said: “we saw some people trembling; if it was not true, why were they trembling?” First, the evidence came while making accusations in parliament. Second, is this really evidence of guilt? And I am told Karuhanga is a lawyer. If we accept this as a standard for our MPs to make policy and pass resolutions then we are doomed as a country.

I was even more surprised at the ignorance of Karuhanga when he talked about international arbitration. He alleged that when Onek was minister of Energy, he was against this arbitration; that when Onek was removed, his successors decided to go for arbitration. This suggests that Karuhanga believes international arbitration is good for Uganda. He does not even know that the arbitration has been brought against the government of Uganda by Heritage Oil.

Heritage is contesting a US$ 405m Capital Gains Tax (CGT) assessment by Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). Heritage invested about US$ 150m in oil exploration in Uganda. But when it was selling its shares, it was paid US$ 1.5billion i.e. its investment had acquired extra value (capital gain) of US$ 1.35billion. According to Ugandan law, this gain is taxed 30 percent when someone sells their asset.

Under the oil agreements, for any international oil company to sell its interest, it has to get approval from government. When Heritage sought this approval, government of Uganda asked URA to make a tax assessment hence the US$ 405m bill. Heritage contested this arguing that the capital gain was accrued on the London Stock Exchange where it is listed and is therefore not liable to pay the tax in Uganda. Uganda is saying the capital gain accrued on an asset that is a natural resource of the country. Heritage called for international arbitration to resolve the dispute.

I had heard allegations that Onek was attempting to give consent for Heritage to sell even before paying the taxes. It was also alleged that many government officials had been bribed to accept international arbitration. Uganda has lost all international arbitration cases. So I felt government should not accept it. I got information that top government officials were putting URA boss Allen Kagina, under pressure to withdraw her tax assessment. I called Kagina encouraging her to stand firm.

That is when I got documents showing that Tullow was paying the said bribes to make Uganda accept international arbitration. Why would Tullow pay bribes for Heritage to avoid tax liability? Under the oil agreements, if Tullow bought Heritage shares, it would be required to farm out (sell) its shares to a third company. If Tullow sold part of its shares, its tax liability would be above US$ 900 million. It seemed to me Tullow needed to use Heritage to create a precedent on CGT.

Although the bribes paid seemed to be too high, I reasoned that if Tullow can create a precedent that allows it to avoid paying US$ 900 million, then it is worth investing US$30 million in bribes. I needed to expose these bribes, but I could not establish the authenticity of the documents. If I had to make an error, I felt I should do it on the side of caution. However, I felt that what was strategically important for Uganda was to get government to insist that Heritage pays the CGT.

The person with ultimate power to do this was President Yoweri Museveni. Armed with the documents I had, I sought an appointment with him. When I showed them to him he was shocked. Like me, I felt the President believed them to be true. But what impressed me about his reaction was when he asked me: suppose they are forged? I told the President I could not confirm their authenticity. However, there were steps he could take that could insulate Uganda from a loss.

Thereafter, the President did three things: first, he revoked any consent of sale that Onek was alleged to have given to Heritage; second, he insisted that Heritage pays all the taxes before any discussions; third, he resisted international arbitration. He wrote a letter saying there should be no consent and if it has been given, he had revoked it. He refused to meet delegations from Heritage and Tullow until they had paid the taxes. He made strong public statements against arbitration.

These actions forced Tullow and Heritage to deposit the money on an escrow account in Standard Chartered Bank in the UK pending the results of the arbitration. I supported the President’s insistence that nothing happens until and unless the money is banked in a government account with Bank of Uganda. Tullow yielded and paid because it risked losing the Block. Heritage stood its ground and insisted on arbitration.

If I had any doubts, Museveni’s actions on this issue convinced me that he was genuinely protecting the national interest. It also showed me that he is a fair person because although he believed that the documents I had taken to him were true, he was not willing to take action without first verifying them. In fact I worked with him to hire an international investigative firm to do a parallel search – in case the police investigation got compromised. None of the firms we approached in UK, USA and South Africa could do the job because of the difficulty of accessing bank records. But his actions served the public interest that I sought.

Yet Karuhanga supports international arbitration. Without this arbitration, government of Uganda has US$ 405 million in its treasury. With arbitration, Uganda has a 50 percent risk of losing that money. If Onek was opposed to arbitration, then he was defending the national interest of Uganda. I do not know how Uganda was finally arm twisted to accept this arbitration. If we lost in this arbitration, the country will forsake both the US$ 405 million Heritage paid and the US$900m Tullow is supposed to pay. If Karuhanga supports arbitration, whose interest is he fighting for?

Shar

The paradox of Power.

2012-01-02T03:49:00.000-08:00

TUESDAY, 13 DECEMBER 2011 06:11 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

How politicians and civil servants use Museveni as a cover to make payments to claimants from which they earn huge commissions

At the height of his power, Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire appeared as if he was in complete control of the country and its people. Yet beneath this veneer lay an ugly reality: Mobutu was entrapped. Having personalized power, or created a myth thereof, evoking his name became a key to unlock access to power, privilege and wealth – but equally a cover for public officials to swindle public resources without taking personal responsibility.

A common story goes like this: Mobutu would ask his personal secretary for US$ 1m. The secretary would instead tell the State House comptroller that Mobutu had asked for US$ 2m. The comptroller would inform the governor of the central bank that the president wants US$ 3m. The governor would withdraw US$ 4m, pocket US$ 1m and pass on the rest to the other officials each of whom would nibble off their cut until Mobutu actually received the US$ 1m he had asked for – only 25 percent.

President Yoweri Museveni may be in a similar trap. The ongoing parliamentary investigation into the compensation of businessman Hassan Basajabalaba worth Shs 146 billion is a perfect example. For an entire week, every minister, governor, attorney general and top civil servant who appeared before the committee said they acted on the “president’s instructions.” Although this defense seems true, it is an excuse not an explanation for their behavior.

The background: Basajabalaba claims that he got sub-leases and management contracts for three markets – St Balikudembe, Shauriyako and Nakasero; and a lease to redevelop Constitutional Square. Museveni revoked these leases and contracts arbitrarily because vendors in these markets complained to him. But this had no force of law since only a court can revoke a title or contract. Indeed, the government disregarded court orders allowing Basajabalaba to evict these vendors. Yet Museveni’s action was consistent with the way many in Uganda’s chattering classes would want the country to be run i.e. by pandering to public sentiments rather than to laws, rules and regulations.

If Basajabalaba holds legitimate leases to these properties, I would defend his right to fair and just compensation. I have talked to a number of real estate moguls and dealers in Kampala and the estimated value of the above properties at market prices can go up to US$ 150m. Secondly, if one factors in the business opportunity foregone when government revoked the leases, Basajabalaba’s claim can easily exceed US$ 300m. This is because the business opportunity contained in the possession of an asset must exceed the value of that asset for anyone to feel attracted to invest in it. Thus, in asking for US$ 70m, Basajabalaba is actually being modest.

However, there is an audit report by KPMG to the Auditor General which shows that the leases and contracts Basajabalaba had were given illegally. If this is true, then Basajabalaba has no claim. And this shows that corruption in Uganda is not limited to the NRM but is a problem of the wider bureaucratic and political class. At the time these contracts and sub-leases were given to Basajabalaba, KCC was actually being managed by mayors from the opposition and an opposition dominated city council.

Before I read the KPMG report, I had almost been convinced that Basajabalaba had a legitimate claim. However, I felt that compensating him was very costly to the taxpayer. In a chance meeting with the president, I proposed to him that the government should let Basajabalaba retain his titles but put conditions on the leases or in a city development plan or policy. Under such lease conditions or city policy, Basajabalaba would be required to develop modern shopping malls whose standards would be set by KCC and this re-development would be given a specific timeframe e.g. seven years.

I proposed that part of the conditions on the lease or city policy should require Basajabalaba to sell space to existing vendors giving them first right of purchase. The government would place the necessary amount of money in Housing Finance Bank and DFCU as long term mortgage finance for vendors to borrow and buy condominium stalls in the new shopping malls. This would be a win-win solution for everyone - government, Basajabalaba, taxpayers and vendors.

I felt that the president liked my idea yet it never got anywhere. I was suspicious this proposal would never be accepted by the political and bureaucratic players in this country because it would have taken control of the money from their hands to banks. This would have minimized potential for corruption. In today’s Uganda, nothing works unless individuals within the system are going to profit from it.

There is a mistaken belief in this country that Museveni can order any minister or bureaucrat to pay and they oblige out of fear. I used to hold it too. However, the reality is different as I discovered. Over the years, Museveni has issued very many instructions to the ministries of finance, justice, local government, lands etc to pay different groups and individuals. The claimants have never been paid. Instead, civil servants easily frustrate him by hiding behind procedures. None of them has been fired for not paying.

Question: why was Basajabalaba’s claim processed quickly including giving him a central bank guarantee so that he can borrow from commercial banks? It seems very likely that Basajabalaba did not take home the entire Shs 146 billion. Instead, it is possible that many officials in Bank of Uganda, the ministries of lands, local government, finance, justice and officials of KCC pocketed something in exchange for their collaboration.

Only two people tried to stop this payment - the PS/ST finance, Chris Kasami and his deputy Keith Muhakanizi. They tried to insist on an audit before payment. However their requests fell on deaf ears as the payment was rushed for a central bank guarantee.

Basajabalaba was paid, not because Museveni directed, but because the president offered the best cover for others to make commissions. All these ministers, governors and civil servants are using the excuse of “orders from above” to hide behind the president’s directive as a protection against their own complicity is abusing public funds. Like Mobutu before him, the predator has become prey. Museveni may think he is in charge. Actually he has lost control over runaway theft by government officials.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Inside the American Dream.

2011-11-21T06:58:00.000-08:00

TUESDAY, 15 NOVEMBER 2011 13:03 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The folly and delusions of a nation that has forgotten the concerns of its ordinary citizens

And so it was that on Nov. 4, I flew to New York City from London via Amsterdam. Upon landing at JFK International Airport, I entered the longest queue in the history of international travel and immigration clearance; there, a hoard of not less 4,000 human beings snaked inside the terminal building waiting for clearance.

The process of entering this “free” country is possibly the most excruciating. First, you have to go through the most rigorous security checks at the port of boarding; in my case London.

Each passenger is individually taken out of the queue, questioned by a US government agent, documents thoroughly checked and finally cleared to go through security.

Going through security is itself another slow and agonising experience. Passengers have to remove everything piece by piece: wallets, handkerchiefs, watches, belts, shoes, laptops and iPads. They have to surrender any drinks or perfumes or lotion, enter a gigantic security X-machine, raise one’s hands in surrender as this piece of equipment takes a digital picture of your body, all your body.

And even then, with this ultra-modern technology, the process is not yet done. Once out of the machine, a security officer begins the process afresh, checking you slowly and meticulously by touching and feeling your body from shoulders to toes, emphasising areas around your pelvic region, literary feeling your dick – well because a Nigerian boy tried to use an underwear to blow up a plane. Funny that the security officials largely put in place measures to deal with past experiences rather than predict future ones. Why would the next terrorist use the methods that were used before and are therefore on the security radar screen? Anyway, after about 10 minutes, one is finally free to board the plane to visit America.

For most non-Americans, the agony of entering America today actually begins when applying for a visa. It takes a minimum three months to get an appointment online; as I write this article the nearest appointment for Kampala is in March 2012. Then one also has to fulfill cumbersome visa requirements: an invitation letter with a bank statement of your host to prove they can feed and house you; submit your own bank statements to show that you earn sufficient income at home etc. The visa application forms are clear that one is presumed a potential illegal immigrant into the US until they prove themselves otherwise. Although consular officials exempt me from all this (due to my regular travel to the US) most Ugandans go through it.

Then for your passport photo, you need a special size taken without your glasses if you wear them; otherwise the embassy will turn you away. And you have to submit your fingerprint and a picture of your eyes. The first time my fingerprint and picture were taken this way was when I was going to jail; the second was when I was applying for a visa to America and when I was entering the country. Now even at Entebbe airport, this process has begun. The world isn’t free anymore.

As I have been travelling to the US more than five times every year for the last five years, I have grown wary of what is happening to this country’s free spirit. Increasingly, I encounter a paranoid nation ruled by opportunistic politicians so desperate to cling onto or take a grab at power that they govern by pandering to public sentiments. Rather than lead on the basis of a set of values, they are instead led by public opinion, itself that changes every hour. And all the time, those who control the platforms of expression have perfected the art of selling fear to the population.

Americans are told from morning to evening that everyone hates them (and that everyone loves them at the same time). The politicians sing fear, the journalist repeat the chorus. All debate on terrorism is about fear and hence how to design even more draconian controls on how people travel. There is almost no debate to challenge the current obsession with tighter and ever tighter security arrangements.

In this free country with supposedly independent media, it is often difficult to distinguish the word of the government from the word of the journalist – one is a spokesperson of the other. It is also difficult to find people in academia and civil society who challenge these self aggrandising rules of the security system. Yet this is not a fear of death per se but rather a fear of a particular type of death – terrorism – that politicians and journalists have made a taboo even at the price of taking away peoples liberties.

For instance, over 115 Americans die daily in car accidents, that is over 43,000 per year. Over 2.9 million get injured in car accidents per year. Over 30,000 die per year of gunshot wounds. To date plane crashes – even with terrorists looming everywhere – hardly kill anyone in this country. So if it is the desire to protect life, surely, there should be a large campaign against drunk and other forms of reckless driving in America and there should be a large campaign against the Second Amendment on the right to keep and bear arms.

America’s response to protecting its citizens from another terrorist attack is disproportionate to the threat the country faces. The country is becoming one vast prison of fear; its freedom of speech greatly compromised by political correctness, its space for policy alternatives undermined by the hegemonic influence of a distorted free market ethic and the myth of “the American dream” and its politics polarised along this very narrow spectrum of policy ideas.

America today is almost a one party state and that one party is divided into two factions; one calling itself Republican, the other Democratic. The irony is that the two sides are increasingly finding it very difficult to compromise on almost nonexistent policy differences. In the battle for the American voter, each side sells fear perhaps because a paranoid population is easier to control than a free one.

Back to the queue to enter America at the JFK terminal: There, I watch hoards of humanity walking slowly and impatiently to the immigration desks; immigration officials painstakingly take their fingerprints, photograph the inside of their eyes, check their documents and finally stamp their passports. The unlucky ones are pulled out and taken to private rooms for questioning especially Muslim or anyone who writes articles critical of America. I suppose they keep such writers’ names in their databases so that when you are entering the country, you are taken care of.

I can feel the suppressed rage of all these non-American visitors to America – the sense that these procedures are far too out of proportion with the threat of terrorism. However, no one dares speak out for fear that the FBI may pick you out of the queue for questioning or that your visa might be cancelled. So when I attempt to share my irritation with a white couple next to me, they simply answer that all these excruciating processes are meant for our safety. An Australian businessman next to me interjects rejecting this defensive answer by announcing that this is his last time to America. “I just cannot stand this abuse of my rights anymore,” he says.

It is difficult not to imagine you are entering a Stalinist state, something akin to North Korea when you are entering the United States these days. The exception is that the flat screens on the walls have CNN reporting the trial of Michael Jackson’s former doctor. There, I watch Americans busy arguing and dissecting every bit of the trial – free, passionate and proud. This vibrancy of freewheeling debate brings back the America I dreamed of as a child, adored as teenager, embraced as an adult and are now growing to realize is only one aspect of that nation’s life.

But it is the America I want, not the one I am suffering. It also reflects the complexity of America’s political life – a combination of a growing Stalinism alongside Jeffersonian democracy; the existing sense of freedom but largely in entertainment, itself perhaps to divert Americans from loss of free debate about security.

The tragedy of America is the failure of its mass media, journalists, intellectuals and civil society to challenge the growing Stalinism of the security-industrial complex; the systematic dismantling of many individual liberties, the uncalled for intrusion into people’s privacy through wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance in the name of security.

Finally I leave the airport and begin driving to New York City. On radio, another heated debate about new regulations to govern city cabs; it is heated and polarizing but again reflects the America that I admire - an America of a free and proud people – vibrant and competitive. How has the concern over security blighted this once proud and courageous society to behave paranoid like cowards?

America is suffering from a crisis of leadership. It reflects Athens after the death of Pericles in 429BC. The democratic process produced a string of politicians who pandered to public sentiment. Unable to develop a vision for the city state, the leaders resorted to exchanging intellectual blows at the Ecclesia, or general assembly, in entertaining fashion to win popular approval rather than to provide solutions. Every intellectual argument would be cheered like the steady blows of boxers and wrestlers at the Olympic and Pethian games.

Thus, as philosophy gave way to oratory, Athens degenerated into mob justice. It was rule by the eloquent rather than the intelligent; sentiment overtook reason as the basis of decision making. Thus Athens went from one tragedy to another until, after 27 years of the Peloponnesian war it surrendered to Sparta. The defeat of Athens ended the democratic experiment and plunged the country into a tyranny of the council of 30 under Critius. And when the democrats wrestled power militarily back into their hands, their first objective was to kill Socrates – the one sane voice who stood consistently in opposition to the decisions of the mob.

As I drive to Manhattan, I encounter another ignored America: the Occupy Wall Street movement. For many years, the upper classes of this country have promoted the one-sided story of a prosperous nation and an invisible economy built on free market capitalism. It seems this message, more than the reality in people’s lives, has sustained the legitimacy of this arrangement for the last three decades.

In reality, however, even during the boom years of the Clinton administration, the real income of the average American has been declining, not growing. The vast majority of Americans have therefore enjoyed prosperity by association, not in their pockets. Instead, most of the growth in real incomes has gone to the top 20 percent of the population. The rest are kept hoping against hope that they too will benefit through the myths of the American dream. And because their incomes are not growing, the financiers of Wall Street decided to make them beneficiaries of this dream largely through credit – hence the rapid growth of consumer debt, now over 150 percent of an individual American’s annual income.

US democracy has been significantly undermined by these developments. For example, the top two percent control 20 percent of national income; the top 20 percent take 80 percent of total income. So 80 percent of Americans share only 20 percent of its income. The rich who take most of the benefits of growth have adeptly used the political process to block the benefits of a free market system from reaching those on the bottom of the ladder. Even my hero Frederic Von Hayek would not agree that a free market society should look like America.

The rich in America own the mass media and therefore control public opinion. They finance think tanks and therefore control the production of alternative policies. They fund universities and therefore control the production of knowledge. They pay for the campaigns of politicians to congress and the White House and therefore control power. And they hire lobbyists to promote the policies they want. The voice of the ordinary American is missing in almost every aspect of public life in this country as the rich goad themselves in opulence.

While in New York, I decided to use subway (underground train system) and that brings you face to face with the indifference of the rich to the concerns of the ordinary people of this wealthy nation. The tracks are littered with garbage and flowing with muddy water or sewage or both. The walls are peeling, the roofs leaking, the steel rusting, the wood rotting, the staircases breaking and the trains old and tired. Those who rule New York above drive in fancy cars and know little or nothing about the plight of the majority of their fellow citizens who use this subway – stuffy and smelly.

But why are most ordinary Americans content with the existing political system? Occupy Wall Street is not a big movement – I visited them and they are as few as it gets. Antonio Gramci had the answer in his famous concept of hegemony. The American political system has been extremely successful in “manufacturing the consent” (the phrase is from Noam Chomsky) of its citizens to the existing political and economic framework – largely using the power of propaganda (through the mass media), the production of knowledge (through the control of think tanks and universities) and the power of Christianity (by promising rewards in heaven).

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Wht Uganda Revenue authority is Wrong on Taxes.

2011-11-21T06:56:00.000-08:00

TUESDAY, 08 NOVEMBER 2011 07:37 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The new rules are regressive because they do not seek to get money from the thieves per se, but to tax those thieves who want to invest

In July this year, Uganda Revenue Authority introduced new rules on transferring or registering property (cars and houses). Under the new rules, anyone transferring ownership of a car or house worth more than Shs 50m is required to show the tax returns on the income used to buy such an asset. For example, if you bought a house for Shs 2.1 billion, URA says you needed to have earned Shs 3.0 billion and paid income tax of 30 percent i.e. Shs 900m. If you cannot show that you paid the tax, URA will insist you pay it before they approve the transfer of the property or asset into your names.

From a purely technical and even moral perspective, URA is doing the right thing. Many rich and powerful people in Uganda evade taxes with impunity. Secondly, Uganda is creaking under the weight of corruption. Public officials steal public funds and buy expensive pieces of real estate and luxury cars. Since most of their investments are done this way, the new rules are the best way to get some of the money back – when they are indulging themselves. Even if the money returned would be only 30 percent of what was stolen or evaded in taxes, it is still better than nothing.

There is also a vast number of Ugandans employed in the informal sector where they do legitimate business which URA has been unable to tax. These new rules will make it easy to tax this group – at the point when they are investing. Yet beyond these moral judgments, the new rules are likely to do more harm than good. One reason is that they target rich people who already have capacity to find new and creative ways to sidestep them. For example, URA officials responsible for giving tax clearance certificates are not angels; so they will pocket hefty bribes to help people under-declare the value of property and therefore pay less tax to the government.

Yet any good tax regime should not force taxpayers to take easy evasive action from their liability. Under the new regime, it is very likely that people may buy properties, sign sale agreements and transfer forms, get permanent powers of attorney or sign deeds of assignment, but not transfer the title into their names. With these documents, one’s claim to a given property would be guaranteed. And as every lawyer will tell you, you can also borrow against a property that is not in your names if the one in whose names it is gives you the powers of attorney to do so.

All these adaptations will render URA’s new rules unproductive but still keep the investment temple in the country on course. Indeed, businessmen and women will suffer some inconveniences resulting from the uncertainty of not being able to own valuable property in their names. Yet that may not be the most likely thing they will do. One suspects that if the new rules are rigorously enforced, they may force many people who cannot show their tax returns to export their capital out of the country. Other countries like Kenya and Rwanda where the real estate market is booming will only be happy to receive this money as an investment, a loss to Uganda.

All this is because URA is holding the tax stick from the wrong end of the equation i.e. at the place where the new rules have potential to stop people from investing. If one is a corrupt government official with stolen public funds worth Shs 6 billion, the best thing for Uganda may be to let him invest it in the country and tax the investment. For example, if such a thief built an apartment block, a student’ hostel or a hotel, URA can then spend the next 100 years collecting taxes on the resulting streams of income.

The new rules even lack the moral desire to penalize thieves. Instead, a thief willing to pay the taxes asked is allowed to enjoy the rest of the money with no further questions asked. So its moral appeal is lost. Instead, the new rules are regressive because they do not seek to get money from the thieves per se but to tax those thieves who want to invest. For instance, if someone stole money from government and spent it on a wedding worth a billion, URA will not ask them any questions. The same applies to when a one pays for a US$ 300,000 holiday with their family in Miami or purchases a US$ 250,000 Mont Blanc wrist watch. In this way the new rules reward profligate spenders and penalize investors.

Besides, hostility to dirty money is a wrong approach to economic policy; even rich countries position themselves to benefit from it. The Economist of 24th to 30th of September, for example, devoted 28 pages on the global economy and one of the major articles focused on reserve currencies. In this particular report, the Economist reported that one of the factors giving the US dollar its global strength is its role in black market operations. Of the 500 billion worth of US dollars held abroad, a significant share goes to grease the wheels of cross-border crime such as drug trafficking.

“Indeed, a reserve currency might almost be defined by its appeal to criminals”, The Special Report on the global economy in the Economist noted. “Of the 900 billion worth of Euro notes in circulation, one third by value comes in the form of the pink and purple 500 note. Cynics say it was issued to capture a share of the international black market from the American dollar for which the largest denomination is the 100 dollar note. An illegal stash of 500 euro notes would be lighter, easier to conceal, carry and count. The note was withdrawn by banks in Britain after police said its main use was in organized crime. That is a compliment of sorts to the euro. When Somali pirates or Russian gangsters begin to demand payment in yuan (Chinese currency), it will be the surest sign that economic power has shifted to China.”

When developed democracies make policies to attract dirty money, then you know why URA should be careful.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Stoking the fires of impunity.

2011-11-06T01:37:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 29 OCTOBER 2011 12:15 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Gaddafi’s pitiful death, the celebration of it, Obama’s speech and the looming tragedy of post “liberation” Libya

Fate is a great joker, it always laughs last. And it did last week at former Libyan ruler Muammar El Gaddafi. He suffered a gruesome death at the hands of the very people he had called rats and cockroaches and promised to annihilate. They picked him from a rat-hole with only one bodyguard and killed him like a petty thief.

I sat for hours glued on television that day watching this once all-powerful man with power over life and death being slapped, kicked and insulted by a band of unruly youths all of whom had been born and grown under his rule. His hair was disheveled, his face bleeding, his clothes soaked in blood, his dignity trampled upon and the aura around him gone. In life I despised Gaddafi, possibly more than any other ruler. As I watched his last minutes, being kicked around on the bonnet of a car, I felt sympathy for him – I almost cried. What had happened to this king of African kings?

Like many of his ilk, Gaddafi got the same death (or worse) than he had inflicted on myriads of his victims. Although he suffered the death he deserved, I wanted him to face the death he did not deserve – to die quietly in his bed. The irony is that in his death Gaddafi triumphed over those in Libya and their allies in the West who fought him. He had been a brutal and unforgiving tyrant who always scorned the rule of law, disregarded due process and always ran roughshod over his citizens’ rights. This was the reason many Libyans fought him and the justification NATO used to push for regime change.

In his death, Gaddafi succeeded in showing the world that the Libyans who fought him and their NATO allies who supported them are not any different from him – in fact they are worse. By killing him through mob justice, denying him the due process of the law, by humiliating him in public, stripping his corpse naked, then displaying it and kicking it, Gaddafi’s enemies exhibited the very trait that has sustained mass suffering and misery in the Arab world. It is sad that anywhere in the world that the West has had a hand, especially the Middle East, it has left behind a legacy of impunity.

Cognizant of this past, and wrongly thinking that US President Barack Obama has some basic values – or would at least pretend to – I hoped against hope that in his speech, he would condemn the way Gaddafi was treated after his capture. I had hoped Obama would rise above the prevailing popular mood, avoid pandering to public sentiment and state those values of fairness, justice, rule of law, respect for human dignity and decency that would have made people like Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela proud of him.

I hoped that Obama would say that although Gaddafi was an evil man, he should not have been killed the way he was: That upon his capture he should have been treated humanely precisely because he treated his opponents inhumanely; that he should have been taken to a court of law because he did not take his victims to one. Gaddafi needed to be shown the gentler and humane world which he had denied his victims. Instead, by acting like him, his opponents showed him the world as he knew it.

So I sat there, before the television set, watching Obama give his speech. Not once did he refer to the gruesome death at the hands of the mob that Gaddafi suffered. Instead, he acted as if everything was okay and congratulated “the people of Libya” for their “victory” which had closed a “dark chapter’ in their troubled history. He ignored the fact that they had treated a former head of state with utmost injustice. It was apparent that Obama, like David Cameron earlier in the day and the NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen, was giving a blind eye to the seeds of impunity in post-Gaddafi Libya.

If these so-called “pro-democracy” fighters in Libya can treat a former head of state the way they did to Gaddafi, how then have they been treating his underlings whom they have been capturing as they advanced from Benghazi to Misrata, from Tripoli to Sirte? Initially they lied that Gaddafi had been killed during a fire exchange between his defenders and their fighters. Then video pictures came of him alive in the hands of his captors. The NTC later claimed he had died of wounds inflicted on him before his capture. Then it turns out that he was captured uninjured.

The string of lies from the NTC aside, it was clear from the start that danger was looming in post-Gaddafi Libya. The so-called pro-democracy fighters do not have centralised command and control. There is no authority imposing discipline on their conduct. The NTC is a hastily organised assembly of Libyan dissidents and former Gaddafi loyalists i.e. a marriage of convenience. It sits in Benghazi talking democracy, the rule of law, due process - all the phrases the West loves to hear from its proxies. But without effective control over its troops, the NTC is sitting on a tinderbox.

That motley crowd of Kalashnikov-wielding unruly youths high on dope cannot be trusted to create a foundation for a stable democracy. Democracy cannot exist in anarchy; its first precondition is a stable political order; itself a product of the centralisation of the exercise of violence and coercion in the state. This is lacking in post-Gaddafi Libya.

The worst days for Libya are not behind it, but ahead. That country’s already fragile institutions are going to be undermined by the mindless call for democracy i.e. elections, multiparty politics, etc, even before a stable political dispensation has been established. Democracy is not a religion that can be taken anywhere and everywhere and work as Christianity or Islam would. On the contrary, it can be an extremely dangerous system of government when attempted in a situation where the state does not have monopoly over violence; where the army, police, prisons, judicial institutions and the bureaucracy are still fragile, weak or even nonexistent.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Lies and Blackmail undermining democracy.

2011-11-06T01:35:00.000-07:00

TUESDAY, 25 OCTOBER 2011 07:21 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The lack of basic values as the basis of politics in Uganda is the source of our country’s constant state of crisis.

“It is not easy to stand apart from mass hysteria, to argue against something that everyone – especially the most respected political leaders, academics and experts are saying and instead argue that they are mistaken or deluded.” Leo Tolstoy, 1897

Last week, public debate in Uganda was consumed by revelations that two ministers had received bribes worth US$30m from Tullow. The Youth Member of Parliament for Western region, Gerald Karuhanga, presented documents before the house purporting to be evidence of the bribes. Since then, most journalists and commentators have accepted them as true even without establishing their validity. In the process, attention has been diverted from the more substantive debate on how to force government to make public contracts it has signed with oil companies.

I am almost 99 percent sure that these documents are forgeries. I am also 70 percent convinced (based on about 30 percent evidence) that an international oil company actually paid bribes to some Ugandan officials and then forged these documents to divert attention and even investigations from itself to Tullow; but also to discredit Tullow so that its licenses and contracts with government of Uganda are not renewed. Parliament has directly fallen into its trap.

I was perhaps the first person to receive these documents. Initially I thought they are authentic; whoever forged them did a good Italian job. However, as a journalist I know that sources of information are not always neutral. All too often, they have interests to advance or to protect. The journalist always has to keep this at the back of their mind so that you are not used by individuals and groups to serve their interests – like destroying the reputation of rivals in business or politics.

In a country like Uganda where accusations of bribery of politicians and journalists are widespread, the most important quality a journalist needs is integrity. For example, in covering any story, a journalist should be impartial i.e. should not take a partisan side although he/she may take a value-based position. However, impartiality is like beauty in the eyes of the beholder. Each time you do a story you receive letters and telephone calls from your audience – some saying you were impartial, others you were biased or malicious or even bribed.

Therefore, impartiality is actually your integrity i.e. that you have a clear conscience and try to be as impartial as possible. Journalism is a public duty that interacts with many variables. The government wants to control you, the opposition to own you and the public (although it is never univocal) wants you to pander to their sentiments. If you stand firmly for your independence, you will constantly find yourself at conflict with each of these interested parties at different times; one day you are praised by the public, reviled by government. Another day you may be condemned by the opposition or the public but hailed by the government.

The lesson is that each interested party will only be happy with you if you publish information or arguments that serve their interest or agree with their biases, not necessarily because you publish the truths. Thus, you can publish false allegations that hurt someone, especially a public official that a section of the public hates, and you will be praised as a hero; the temptation to do this is so strong, resisting it requires a lot of integrity. Or you may write a story that is true but goes against the biases of a loud section of your audience and they will denounce you as a sell-out.

Journalists and editors therefore have to be value-driven and to uphold the principles of our profession; to be truthful and accurate and to be fair and balanced. Yet it is very difficult to uphold these values because you have to constantly fight your personal biases and desires from determining the way you report news.

For example, like many people in the public, I harbour a personal bias against a rich and powerful minister like Sam Kutesa, suspecting him of being corrupt. When I got these documents, they fed directly into my bias; the temptation to publish them immediately and expose him for what I suspect he is was very strong indeed. The Independent would have sold tens of thousands of copies, our reputation as a platform that exposes corruption would have soared and we would have been hailed as heroes who finally got concrete evidence that pinned this all-powerful minister.

It is difficult to resist this temptation. But it is right to resist it. I had to put myself in Kutesa’s shoes, a lesson I learnt from my lecturer at Makerere, Lee Dambert and ask: Suppose what I have is false information and it was me against whom it was being published; how would I feel? I tried to used private investigators, sent the documents to Nation Media Group in Nairobi and Global Witness in London and asked both that we do a joint investigation. I also took them to President Yoweri Museveni to have the state involved in the investigations to establish their validity.

I know that Kutesa has spent many years accusing me personally and Ugandan journalism generally of profiteering from selling falsehoods and deliberately damaging people’s reputations. On the few occasions I have talked to him, he has openly accused me and journalists generally of this profiteering. I hope that now he has learnt from this experience that there are journalists who are committed to serving the truth.

It can be a very frustrating process trying to establish the authenticity of a newsworthy allegation. Often you are afraid that your competitor will find the evidence before you; or you may find that the “evidence” you have are forgeries – a factor that kills your story. You also have to be careful in case someone is deliberately trying to use you to fight their wars or giving you misleading information to divert you from the actual story. That is why publishing a denial story (e.g. saying “we got such and such documents and investigated and found them false”) is not good journalism. You are giving legitimacy to the forgeries.

Journalistic principles and ethics are the moral framework within which our profession finds meaning to pursue its public objectives. The journalist has to constantly resist the temptation to appease public anger – just like he has to resist the temptation for bribes from the state and other interested parties. Many Ugandan journalists I have since talked to do not separate their personal biases and desires from how they think they should conduct their work. Others believe that they should always go along with the public mood. They did not seem to realise that using journalism to serve your biases or to appease the public is another form of corruption.

The presentation of the forged documents in Parliament last week produced mass hysteria; some people perhaps genuinely - and many certainly maliciously - were baying for the blood of the accused ministers. In such circumstances, those who believe in liberal democratic values needed to stand by the principles of natural justice: that no one should be accused falsely, no one should be a prosecutor and judge in the same case and no one should be condemned without being heard. Although parliamentary speech is protected by privilege, a member should not abuse this privilege and accuse another on the basis of forged documents.

My hostility to public sentiment was born of my early reading of the Bible when Jesus was brought before Pontius Pilate. The Roman governor actually found Jesus innocent and pleaded with the public to allow him set Jesus free. But the crowd kept chanting: “Crucify him, crucify him”. Pilate finally said he was handing over Jesus to appease the crowd, but tried to exonerate himself by saying his blood will not be on his hands to which the crowd shouted: “let it be on our hands.” Pilate failed to exercise leadership i.e. taking a principled stand even against public sentiment. Socrates was also killed by a democratic assembly.

Among the accused is Tullow. It is listed on the London Stock Exchange and is involved in oil exploration around the world. An editor has to be extremely careful before publishing damaging information about it because it can cause so much value of its shares to be wiped out. To justify such loss, the story has to be true or at least to have some level of truth before it is published – same for what is presented before Parliament.

My uncle Prof. William Banage introduced me to Karl Popper when I had just gone to university. I leant from Popper that it is not so much the truth of an assertion or the wisdom of a proposal that is likely to win public support. It is always the feeling that injustice has been done and that it must be rectified. I know that Uganda is suffocating under the weight of corruption; public officials steal with impunity and hence public goods and services are in shambles. The public is therefore looking for someone powerful to hang in order to appease their anger.

However, I do not agree that we all should embrace public emotions as the vehicle for managing state affairs. To use Karl Popper’s argument, public opinion is very powerful and liberals ought to regard any such power with some degree of suspicion. Popper pointed out that owing to its anonymity, public opinion is an irresponsible form of power, and therefore particularly dangerous from a liberal point of view. Liberals had always argued that by limiting the power of the state, the dangers of public opinion, exerted through the agency of the state, would be reduced.

John Stuart Mill argued in his essay “On Liberty,” that the biggest threat to individual liberty and freedom is not always the state but majorities willing to use the weight of numbers to suppress and regiment minorities. This is the case of public opinion in Uganda used to demonise homosexuals and actually plan to kill them for being who they are. So limiting the power of the state does not secure the freedom of the individual’s behaviour and thought from the direct pressure of public opinion. As Popper noted, “Here the individual needs the powerful protections of the state.”

For democracy therefore to protect individual liberty, it has to be rooted in a nation’s traditions and values. We have seen above the values and ethics of journalism and how they protect individuals from harm. Popper talked about “a moral framework” (corresponding to the institutional “legal framework”) of a society: “This would incorporate the society’s traditional sense of justice and fairness. This moral framework serves as the basis which makes it possible to reach a fair or equitable compromise between conflicting parties where this is necessary.”

I know many politicians in NRM and the opposition and many journalists who cherish these values of a liberal democratic society. The liberal idea was born to resist the tyranny of custom, the despotism of the state and the injustice of the mob. However, over the last week, most liberal-minded Ugandans went silent. The public mood is so charged that anyone who stands in opposition to it, to defend the truth would be accused of having been bought. Many people are afraid of being misunderstood, so they opted to keep silent in the face of lies and deceit. By yielding to blackmail from a particular but loud section of the public, most of Uganda’s professional journalists and liberals have allowed the suppression of free speech.

It seems those most willing to criticise Museveni are actually his duplicates. Museveni’s biggest failure has been to place his personal desire to stay in power above every principle or value we initially thought he held. So he has rigged elections when it served him and allowed corruption when it has suited his interests. His opponents behave the same way; they will accept as true forged documents as long as they satisfy their desire to show that someone is corrupt, not because they have been authenticated as being true. They will lie and vilify just to advance their interest. The lack of basic values as the basis of political action and debate in Uganda among both those in government and those opposed to them is the source of our country’s politics of constant crisis.

At The Independent, we have fought hard to wrestle democratic space from Museveni and gone to jail for it; we have effectively resisted pressures from the opposition to be their spokespersons and they have attacked us viciously for it. We are now resisting blackmail from a section of the public who accuse us of being compromised even when they know they are lying – simply to force us to agree with them. We will continue to defend our independence so that we can live up to our name, The Independent and to our values – telling the truth without fear or favour and doing so in a fair and balanced manner. To do otherwise would be to abdicate our responsibility, our cherished values and our promise to our readers.

Lies and Blackmail undermining democracy.

2011-11-06T01:34:00.001-07:00

Democracy and public goods and services.

2011-11-06T01:31:00.001-07:00

SATURDAY, 24 SEPTEMBER 2011 15:26 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The assumption behind a lot of literature on democracy is that people would care more about their welfare in elections

Africa’s poor performance at delivering public goods and services impersonally to anonymous citizens is often attributed to the continent’s democratic deficit. Democratic theory expects that if all citizens regardless of their income are given political equality through the one man one vote electoral system, and if the poor constitute a majority of voters in a given country, their preferences would be reflected in which people get elected and what public policies are adopted.

There is little evidence that this assumption is true. As Africa has democratised, the ability of its states to deliver public goods and services to citizens has not improved significantly. In fact, in some cases it has remained stagnant or even declined. This is partly because the poor participate in politics occasionally during elections. Elites who participate continually in the political process using the mass media, civil society and political parties effectively use such platforms to promote their own interests.

American political theorist, Robert Dahl, argued that democracy is defined by two things: Participation and contestation. Participation inquires into how many groups participate in politics and determine who the rulers should be. Contestation deals with how freely the political opposition contest for power from incumbents. Most debate on democracy in Africa has always focused on contestation and ignored participation – or at least the manner in which citizen participation is structured.

In a democratic system, the poor can exercise their power and drive state policy to serve their interest through political mobilisation or voting or both. Because most poor people in most of Africa are illiterate or semi-literate peasants, political mobilisation has been structurally difficult especially doing so around economic interests. All too often, it is mobilisation around identity that has been effective.

The assumption behind a lot of literature on democracy is that people would care more about their economic and welfare interests in elections. However, experience shows that voters in Africa (or even India and the USA) care more about their identity – be it religion, tribe or race – than their economic interest. Indeed, whenever people, especially poor people, confront a choice between their economic/welfare needs and their identity they tend to lean towards the latter. Why?

One reason is that often, the poor cannot mobilise themselves and lead the struggle for their own emancipation. They need people from another class – elites, to offer leadership and organised political expression. For example, it is Yoweri Museveni and his group of educated elites who went to Luwero to organise people’s resistance against the government of President Milton Obote.

If the poor were to vote on the basis of economic reasons, they would be voting as an economic category i.e. a class. If they vote on the basis of identity, they are voting on an ascription based on the circumstances of their birth; one is born to a particular tribe and cannot change that. However, you can be born poor and become rich. With ethnicity, there is no mobility. Class politics is always organised around economic issues and grievances – so it deals with prices, trade policy, social services etc. With ethnicity, even when there are economic demands, they are couched in the language of dignity and social justice.

The people who run for public offices and therefore represent the poor in such forums as parliament and other decision making and implementation offices are often educated elites, not the poor themselves. But if one’s economic and income status is different from that of the people voting for him or her, how does he/she create a common cause with the electorate? How does a rich man from Kampala convince ordinary villagers in Kumi that he is there to represent their interest and they should trust him?

It is here that ethnicity becomes very important. A rich Acholi businessman can argue that because he shares a common linguistic or cultural background with his fellow Acholi tribes-mates, then he is best positioned to represent them. By appealing to their shared cultural identity, he can convince them that he is one of them, and hence the legitimate voice of their interests. But because of the income differences between them, the best pitch for representation cannot be economic issues. So he will pitch his argument in the language of dignity for the tribe. Even if the burning issues are economic, he will present them in the language of social justice.

When political representatives are elected to represent such emotive ideals as “dignity”, then the democratic process will promote elite patronage rather than public services to citizens. This is what has happened in India, Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia etc. As democracy has consolidated in these countries, so has elite corruption and privilege.

In ethnically diverse societies, the democratic process tends to create the tragedy of commons – every ethnic group wants its own son or daughter at the eating table to represent them. Ordinary people are not excluded from the political process; they are integrated, not as rights-bearing citizens, but as clients of their powerful co-ethnics. By appointing influential pillars of opinion from a particular tribe, the president and the ruling party are able to capture their followers during elections.

Now, if a president can win an election by appointing a few Bakiga elites into his cabinet, that is much more cost effective than building a road to Kabale or building an effective and efficient healthcare or education system in that region. Delivering healthcare or education requires effective institutions (which take time to build) and costs a lot of money. Appointing a minister costs only a radio announcement.

Thus, as political contestation increases in ethnically diverse poor countries, the more ethnically polarised it gets, the more participation takes a clientelistic character and the more the political system’s ability to deliver public goods and services is compromised. In the early 1990s, Rwanda opened up to multiparty competition and this led to extreme levels of political mobilisation based on identity and equally high levels of contestation; the result was genocide. Post genocide Rwanda has significantly restricted political contestation yet equally promoted genuine political participation. Consequently, the delivery of public goods and services is more than in any post colonial African country I know.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Here is Rudasingwa's moral bankrupcy.

2011-11-06T01:28:00.000-07:00

WEDNESDAY, 19 OCTOBER 2011 06:43 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

A man who can admit to being a liar should not make claims and they are taken seriously

Former director of cabinet in Rwanda, Theogene Rudasingwa, was a major item on BBC World Service. He claimed that President Paul Kagame boasted to him that it was he (Kagame) who had ordered the shooting down of the plane carrying former President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1994. Rudasingwa further added that the shooting “caused” the genocide – never mind the genocide had been planned by Habyarimana long before he died.

On January 15, 1994, Gen. Romeo Dallaire sent a cable to the UN in New York giving a detailed account of these plans. Yet Rudasingwa claims that Kagame is liable for the crime of genocide.

Given his position, Rudasingwa’s allegations enjoyed some credibility especially among the uninformed. He said that he had spent many years telling lies on behalf of Kagame and apologised for it. BBC spent an entire day reporting this story and calling in “experts” (largely its own poorly informed editors) to give opinions. Not once did they question the credibility of a man who admitted to being a liar.

Africa has a parochial political class in both government and opposition. Like its counterparts all over the world, Africa’s elite class desires power not so much to serve the people but to access the privileges of public office. “The People” – even under seemingly democratic systems – are used as pawns in this life and death struggle for power. This perversion is even more dangerous compared to developed nations because the majority of “The People” in Africa are poverty stricken, illiterate and hungry peasants. Therefore, they are easy to manipulate and use as cannon fodder.

For example, the elite classes of America can be as crass, opportunistic and as manipulative of “the people” as the ones in Uganda. However, most voters there are fairly well educated and middle class with access to mass media. As Americans grow, they are inducted into the political process through a system of socialisation that imparts on them particular values and myths about their country. This allows America to define a national interest and hold some values within which political discourse takes place.

Consequently, there is a national consensus on Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, Israel etc. Consequently, Barack Obama and George Bush can disagree bitterly and even hate each other intensely. But their disagreement will not be on the definition of the problem but rather on how to approach it. They know going against a defined national interest will attract public opposition. This societal restraint explains the stability of the systems there; its absence in our nations explains the instability of our systems.

Worse still, Africa’s knowledge production and global media coverage is done largely by absentee experts sitting in London, New York and Paris, showing up occasionally for one week to do field reporting when there is a disaster like famine, war or Ebola. Indeed, most reporting on critical issues affecting Africa is done by young and inexperienced journalists fresh from college. They may be smart in the sense that they passed their exams well, but their knowledge of Africa is based on textbook theories written by their kin who do not speak an African language. Many of their lecturers are very smart but miss the nuances of our politics and have particular biases and prejudices about Africans that inform their understanding of our politics.

It is in this context that African elites like Rudasingwa find public platforms and fertile audiences to make outlandish claims and get away with it because their claims are not rigorously examined. This is made worse in Africa because a typical local journalist is himself/herself a victim of these slants – for his/her source of knowledge about his/her reality is drawn from the same textbooks and mass media outlets. That is why a man can admit to being a liar and still make claims that are taken seriously.

But let us even assume BBC was being Christian and was therefore recognising that Rudasingwa is now repenting. Rudasingwa is making these claims after he was arrested for corruption in Rwanda, prosecuted in courts of law and kicked out of government. He did not resign from government out of a sense of moral guilt to clear his conscience. Instead he seems a desperate man trying to use anything to get back at Kagame – for firing him.

But let us assume Rudasingwa told the truth: The BBC journalist could not even ask him what kind of person he is; to have known that his political party and its leader had caused the genocide in his country and yet he went on to serve as secretary general of the party, ambassador to the US and director of cabinet for more than a decade. It takes a dangerously callous and inhuman mind to be convinced of the culpability of your party and its leader in such a tragedy as the Rwanda genocide and then spend decades serving both in top positions, coming out to denounce the crime only after losing power and its associated privileges.

Clearly Rudasingwa has no moral sense. On the other hand, although Kagame has denied ever ordering the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane, he has stated before that he does not regret the former president’s death. In fact he said once on BBC’s Hard Talk that if he had a chance he would have killed Habyarimana, just like the former president would have done if he too had a chance. The two men were involved in a life and death civil war. It is simple common sense that each one of them must have wished or even plotted the other’s death.

Kagame had a stronger moral imperative to kill Habyarimana (just like Barack Obama had in killing Osama Bin Laden) because the former president was organising genocide of Kagame’s kin. Habyarimana’s fingerprints on the genocide are everywhere. The interahamwe militia that carried out the killings was a youth wing of his political party, the MNRD; he was the largest single shareholder in Radio Mille Collin that propagated genocide; his presidential guard actively aided the killings. What is morally shocking is not that someone killed Habyarimana. Rather what is shocking is that Rudasingwa now believes, like interahamwe and their allies across the world, that the death of this mass murderer was a bad thing for Rwanda.

WHY MUSEVENI NEEDS TO REFORM

2011-11-06T01:22:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 17 SEPTEMBER 2011 11:42 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Since April, Ugandans have sustained protests over many issues including wages, commodity prices and foreign exchange rates

Here is widespread discontent in most of Uganda against President Yoweri Museveni and the NRM. The mainstream opposition should, however, not think that this automatically means there is widespread support for their cause. The Ugandan opposition has been behaving like a man who has been admiring and trying to woe a beautiful girl who is dating another man. When she dumps her boyfriend, he thinks that now she has fallen for him. The fact that many Ugandans are turning against Museveni and the NRM does not automatically mean they support the opposition. On the contrary, it seems most people who are discontented with NRM are equally either frustrated with the opposition or are not inspired by it.

During the general elections early this year, many Ugandans were apathetic, a factor that led voter turnout to drop to 58 percent. In fact, many Museveni haters actually voted for the president out of despair, fear or apathy. However, since April, Ugandans seem to have found a new sense of purpose. Those who have little faith in the opposition have decided to struggle on their own within their areas of occupation – as teachers, lecturers, students, traders, lawyers, medical workers, vendors, environmentalists, journalists, etc. So we are seeing a broad-based growth of militancy among different occupational groups now sustaining pressure on the government.

Since April, Ugandans have sustained protests over many issues including wages, commodity prices, foreign exchange rates and environment. On the face of it and except for the Walk to Work campaign, each one of these subsequent protests looks small, isolated and decentralised. They are not coordinated, lack a unifying ideology or organisation and appear as blips on the national political agenda. Many observers have said these factors are evidence of the structural weakness of these protests.

However, lacking a central command and control centre makes it difficult for the government to effectively decapitate these protests. Second, they are rooted in people’s existential realities, a factor that gives them deeper meaning and solid support than if they were ideological movements. Third, and perhaps most important, they do not seek to wrestle power from Museveni and the NRM but simply to force them to be responsive to their needs. Indeed this is what confirms their democratic character; for democratic movements do not seek power but to create a power they can control.

There is a convergence of opinion among Museveni lovers and haters (who are extremists on either side) that these protests as too small and isolated to bring him down. It seems Museveni shares this view. Yet there is ample evidence to suggest that these protests, if not properly handled, may lead to Museveni’s downfall in the same style as for presidents Ben Ali of Tunisia and Hosni Mubarak of Egypt.

Of course there are some structural differences between Egypt and Tunisia on one hand and Uganda on the other. The level of urbanisation in Egypt and Tunisia was above 70 percent compared to Uganda’s below 40 percent. Indeed, many Tunisians and Egyptians in cities were second and third generation urbanites while in Uganda they are recent immigrants into cities. The militancy of second generation urbanites has historically been more pronounced than that of recent arrivals. The level of education among the youths and the diffusion of modern communication technology among the population are more developed in Arab countries than in Uganda.

Added to this is that the per capita income of Egypt (at $7,000) and that of Tunisia (at $10,000) is far above the threshold (US$ 2,800) that Prof. Paul Collier suggests is necessary for a democratic transition lest the country becomes unstable. More still, the regimes in those two countries were traditional military governments presiding over leftovers of the colonial army. Both Ben Ali and Mubarak were not “revolutionaries” who had created their own armies like Museveni. They were insiders who took power through a palace coup (Ben Ali) or inherited it after the death of the incumbent (Mubarak). And their imperial masters still have strong ties to these armies.

It would be dangerous for Museveni to infer from these structural differences that the risk for a Tunisia-like civil insurrection is impossible in Uganda. If it will not happen in the next year or two; it is possible in the next four or five years. So the structural and political conditions that make such revolutions possible, although not yet properly developed in Uganda, are growing rapidly. They are aided by the demonstration effect of the Arab spring.

Besides, such mass insurrections do not erupt and suddenly bring entrenched regimes down. Often they begin, as they are doing in Uganda today, as small, almost insignificant and isolated cases – a protest by teachers, then another by vendors etc. But they have the effect of wearing down governments, forcing them into many mistakes that cause the public to lose confidence in them. Besides, the major actors in such civil insurrections are always new social forces seeking space in national politics. However, entrenched regimes tend to always be out of date with the new reality.

Any government that has been in power for long means it has perfected its skills at manipulating traditional forces. Confronted with new social forces, it becomes paralysed. The incumbent regime suffers from the complacency that “we have seen it all before and overcome.” Yet every new protest is a new protest; how to put it down effectively may not always be derivable from previous experience. Persistent protests in Tunisia and Egypt began almost five years ago – and see where they ended.

The evidence today shows that Uganda’s economic fundamentals are better than its neighbours – Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia and Burundi and nations like Ghana, Zambia, Malawi and Senegal which are democracies. Only Rwanda and Botswana have better fundamentals than Uganda. Why are Uganda and Malawi the most hit by protests? The point is that the regimes in these two countries are suffering from political illegitimacy; economic grievances are being used to press forth a political objective.

To stem the current crisis, Museveni needs to engineer a bold move at political reform. What the contents of this reform should be is a subject I will reserve for another time.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Let the free market work.

2011-10-11T02:15:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 08 OCTOBER 2011 17:22 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The worst danger for the government in troubled times like these is to adopt a public policy position over matters it has no control over

Uganda is in bad times and almost everything seems to be going wrong. The country’s electricity supply is drying out rapidly; even areas like Kololo which never used to suffer blackouts are affected now as electricity is cut almost every other day. The country has run out of sugar; supermarkets are allowed to sell only one kilogram per person per day; now the president has directed that politicians should not trade. Finally, the dollar is appreciating rapidly against the shilling; as I write this article it has hit Shs 2850.

Many Ugandans think the country has run out of electricity, sugar and dollars. Yet it is the attempt by the government to subsidise prices of these commodities that is creating artificial shortages. If the government allowed the free market to work, demand would adjust automatically to meet supply through the price mechanism: If the quantity supplied of any commodity exceeds demand, prices will go down; and if the quantity of a commodity demanded exceeds its supply, the prices go up. The forces of demand and supply will always produce an equilibrium price that will eliminate shortages.

Subsidies actually tend to be dysfunctional because in cases of acute scarcities they make everyone not only angry but also worse-off. For example, many who would otherwise be off the grid are on it because of the subsidy; and they are angry that they are constantly suffering from blackouts. Those who can actually afford electricity at market prices and therefore should enjoy its full benefits are suffering from constant blackouts as well; and they are unhappy that in spite of their capacity, they cannot enjoy the service.

The country has blackouts because of attempts by government to disregard the principles of the price mechanism. By making electricity cheaper than it should be at market price, the government is actually encouraging bad behavior of the part of many users. You visit households and find every room lit – even when it is not being used. People forget their water heaters on, boil water unnecessarily, leave most of their electrical appliances on standby power, and use high energy consuming bulbs.

Right now, the country is in constant blackouts because the producers of thermal energy have not been paid Shs 300 billion worth of the subsidy by government. If government had not committed to this subsidy, it would owe them nothing. This would have allowed Umeme to charge the market price and pass on the needed money to Uganda Electricity Transmission Company who would promptly pay the thermal generator plants.

More critically, the beneficiaries of the electricity subsidy are only 12 percent of the population who are on the grid. These are largely, certainly not entirely, elites in urban areas. Why should government spend hundreds of billions of taxpayers’ money subsidising this minority? It is because in our distorted democracy, only this minority has voice through the various platforms of “free” expression like the press, radio and television, blogs, websites, social networking sites, civic society and political parties.

Mid this year the Walk to Work campaign put pressure on government to address the problem of increasing food prices. Traders went on strike demanding that the government intervenes to control the price of the dollar. I rejected both demands because the beneficiaries of high food prices and an appreciating dollar are the poor majority who produce food crops for domestic consumption and cash crops for export. The losers are the urban minority who buy food and depend on imported goods.

My critics accused me of having “changed” and “supporting” President Yoweri Museveni whom they claim has bribed me. As I wait for his bribe to come, I know Museveni is a politician and takes economic policy decisions on the basis of what will please the public. But what is often politically attractive to public sentiment can be economically damaging. It is Museveni who allowed the current subsidies to be built in the electricity tariff.

Although Museveni would intellectually agree with my position, he often takes his decisions on public policy politically. However, because during his campaign he spent a lot of money that contributed significantly to inflation in April, Museveni found himself in a difficult position to intervene in the market to influence food prices. Secondly, because of depleting foreign exchange reserves to buy expensive jet fighters, he found himself in a weak position to subsidise the growing cost of the dollar.

Thus, when Museveni refused to intervene in the market for food crops or the exchange rate, he was doing something uncharacteristic of his attitude of meeting public sentiments with state patronage. It is therefore Museveni who adopted my position of relying on the price mechanism rather than government manipulation of the market. Yet I know many Ugandans do not accept that the market should be allowed to work.

For example, if the price of sugar shoots to Shs 10,000, it will force many people to either stop drinking it or to try substitutes like raw cane, honey or other sweeteners. Currently, the market price of a unit of electricity is Shs 1,000 yet households pay only shs 358 and industries pay only Shs 180. The balance is paid by the government.

If government allowed the price mechanism to work, the unit cost of electricity would jump to Shs 1,000 or even shs 1500 per unit. This will force many people who cannot afford this price to get off the grid and look for alternative sources of energy like solar and gas for lighting, cooking, boiling water and refrigeration; or employ innovative energy saving strategies. Only those who can afford will remain on the grid. So without a subsidy there would be not be blackouts. There are many people on the grid who cannot afford electricity at market price causing blackouts for those who can.

The worst danger for the government in troubled times like these is to adopt a public policy position over matters it has little or no control over. Assuming the government had decided to “defend” the shilling with already drying out foreign exchange reserves, when and where would it stop – and then what? If there is advice I would give to government, it would be: Allow the price mechanism to work.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Inside Uganda's democratic contests.

2011-10-11T02:13:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 01 OCTOBER 2011 14:23 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The disastrous collapse of public services under NRM is a product of the way in which democracy has evolved rather than its absence

On Saturday September 24, I went to my old school, Busoga College Mwiri, to attend celebrations marking its 100th birthday. It was a nostalgic trip that was at once thrilling and disappointing; thrilling to be back “on the hill” but disappointing to see the physical state of the school. Most of buildings have gone without paint for years. The toilets and shower rooms don’t function anymore, the compounds are overgrown, teachers’ houses are collapsing and the pit latrines emit a horrible smell that hits your nose almost 50 meters away. A few buildings have seen some paint.

The state of Mwiri, one of the oldest and most prestigious schools in Uganda, reflects the state of most of the other schools in its league – from Nyakasura to Nabumali, Ntare to Namilyango, Kisubi to Kitovu, Layibi to Kabalega, Nabbingo to Nabisunsa, Bweranyangi to Tororo Girls. It also reflects the state of the wider public sector in Uganda – our hospitals, roads, rail lines, railway stations, ships, ports, police stations and army barracks. All this also reflects the collapse of the public spirit in the public sector as public services are characterised by rampant corruption, nepotism, negligence, absenteeism, incompetence, foot-dragging, apathy and indifference.

The collapse is despite the country having enjoyed sustained economic growth for 23 years accompanied by an equally impressive growth in government revenues. Tax collections have increased from Shs 44 billion in 1988 to Shs 7.1 trillion today. Even accounting for inflation, it is a spectacular achievement. Those who claim the Ugandan economy has not been growing should wonder where government is collecting all this money from; certainly not from trees. In fact because the rich and powerful in Uganda do not pay taxes, I suspect URA could be collecting less than 60 percent of what is due to it; suggesting that Uganda’s growth could be higher than UBOS has been able to capture.

Growth in tax revenues has been accompanied by growth in inflows of foreign aid and an equally spectacular growth in the budget for public goods and services. Aid has grown from US$ 229m in 1987/88 to US$ 1.3 billion today. Consequently, from 1999/2000 to 2010/11, the budget for roads has grown from Shs 233 billion to Shs 1.2 trillion today; health from Shs 196 to Shs 800 billion and education from Shs 373 billion to 1.4 trillion. How then do we explain the incongruence of increased funding for these public goods and services and declining results in their delivery?

Many analysts argue that this is because of lack of democratic accountability. Yet Uganda today has a stronger structural basis for democracy than ever before. It is more urbanised with a larger and more educated middle class and private sector, diverse civil society, political parties, many private FM radio stations, newspapers, televisions etc. So the social infrastructure for democracy is highly developed than in 1970 when the delivery of public goods and services was at its best. It is certainly more developed than Rwanda where the state is more responsive to its citizens’ needs.

Uganda also has a vibrant civic life – witness the growth in the technology of democracy – the amount of debate on radio, television, mobile phones, social networking sites, blogs, emails, newspapers, pamphlets and magazines. We have regular elections from the grassroots to the highest office with high levels of contestation – witness how Kizza Besigye always sets Yoweri Museveni into a panic. Except for the president, 60 percent of MPs and local councilors don’t get re-elected suggesting that Ugandans are very vigilant at removing non-performing politicians.

It is possible that liberalisation and privatization, which have fostered rapid growth of the economy, could equally have undermined the public sector. This is because the most educated and articulate sections of our society, the people who sit in high councils of state, exited public schools and hospitals and took their families into private ones – robbing public services of voice. So the needs of the poor are not heard in decision making circles.

Yet the rich, powerful and articulate groups cannot exit certain public goods and services that have equally suffered atrophy like roads and electricity. Even if they can do better with four wheel-drives and private generators and invertors, these are second best options that help them avoid the depth rather than the substance of the problem. Why then are the upper classes of Uganda silent on public sector dysfunction and why is the democratic process with its high levels of contestation not solving this problem in spite of a high turnover of MPs and local councilors during elections?

It seems that most debate on democracy in Africa tends to focus more on its procedures than its substance; thus giving disproportionate attention to contestation and ignoring participation. Africa’s poor may not be excluded from the political process. However, they are integrated into it not as rights-bearing citizens but as clients of their powerful co-ethnics. Thus a Munyoro politician is able to rally his/her Banyoro tribes-mates behind the ruling party and the president largely on tribal appeal.

It is always elites who benefit from ethnic politics, not the ordinary people who rally behind them. Ethnic appeals concentrate on a shared language or culture and in the process obscure the economic differences and even tensions between the poor and the rich. But they are also very cost effective: It is cheaper to win an election by appointing a few powerful opinion leaders from a given tribe than to build roads in their area or an effective and functional healthcare and education system.

Therefore, increasing democratic contestation in the context of an ethnically diverse society with a few rich people and many poor voters may be a sign of a vibrant civic life. But it may also belie a political pathology where a government gets continuously elected, not for serving the public good but for placating elite interests. The disastrous collapse of public services in Uganda under the NRM is therefore a product of the specific way in which democracy has evolved rather than its absence. Museveni has built legitimacy largely by co-opting powerful ethnic elites and paying only lip-service to service delivery. It has worked for a while. But is it sustainable? For how Long?

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Human Rights Watch misunderstood Gacaca.

2011-10-11T02:11:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 03 SEPTEMBER 2011 08:06 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

In the last 14 years and with US $2.1 billion spent, less than 50 cases have been heard in the Tribunal for Rwanda in Arusha

The most difficult subjects can be explained to the most slow-witted man if he has not formed any ideas of them already. But the simplest thing cannot be made clear to the most intelligent man if he is firmly persuaded that he knows already, without a shadow of doubt, what is laid before him.

Leo Tolstoy, 1897

Former Rwandan president, Pasteur Bizimungu, in the wake of inheriting a population where almost every Hutu above 14 years of age had either killed or aided in the killing during the genocide, argued strongly with the Rwanda Patriotic Forces to grant the population a complete amnesty. The RPF rejected this request, but the subsequent debates, which focussed on what was most politically and economically prudent for the country, produced a golden mean. The ringleaders of brutal acts would be jailed, while the followers would be pardoned through a system of restorative justice called gacaca or community courts.

By this time, over one and a half million people had been arrested and jailed; instead of working, they were idling in congested jails. Gacaca, it was reasoned, could speed up the handling of cases. It was not meant to be a court process to deliver justice on the basis of western criminal procedures, but a platform for communities to sit together under trees and adjudicate matters of genocide to ensure the country could heal without promoting impunity. In 1992 a census of Rwanda’s judiciary revealed there were only 39 qualified lawyers. Lawyers either became killers or were killed during the genocide, leaving the post-genocide government with only two qualified lawyers.

To compensate for the absence of a bar association, legal firms or lawyers, the Rwanda government embarked on a process of training lawyers at Butare University, even though it required importing the lecturers. Fifteen years later, Rwanda has 386 judges on its bench who are qualified lawyers; the bar association has 1,000 members; and there are more than 1,000 lawyers working in other government departments, private companies and NGOs who are not members of the bar.

But this laudable achievement is not without its imperfections: most of the judges in Rwanda are young graduates in their mid to late twenties, some of whom were required to sit as judges before they had even defended a case. Many miscarriages of justice, poor or even reckless judgements have ensued, but this is an inevitable part of an inherited quandary. Contrarily, in Uganda you cannot become a judge unless you have 13 years experience as a lawyer. This works because Uganda has a reservoir of talent from which judges can be picked.

Gacaca too is littered with imperfections. Nevertheless, in the last nine years gacaca has disposed of more than 1.2 million cases – a feat unprecedented in human history, and has undoubtedly helped the country move forward together.

Human Rights Watch’s assessment of this process, released in a report several months ago, fails to understand many of these achievements within the Rwandan context and the broader political value of gacaca. It is instead fixated on the process’ shortcomings and whether every conceivable legal protection was followed.

Perhaps HRW would have been more comfortable had Rwanda subjected its entire criminal population to the rigours of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania where in the last 14 years and US $2.1 billion spent, less than 50 cases have been heard. Indeed, going by ICTR’s speed, it would have taken Rwanda 567 years to dispose of all its cases.

Moreover, in the court’s desire to meet all the procedural protections of a western court, it has inflicted untold psychological trauma on its witnesses. Rwandan women are brought before the ICTR and made to face men who raped them in full view of their children and husbands, and who then proceeded to kill their families as these women watched helplessly. As if that is not bad enough, the defence lawyers often ask the female victims to describe in graphic detail how the rape took place.

Anyone with human decency and knowing African traditions, norms and values would understand that many ordinary and even extraordinary women on our continent cannot handle this. In fact, many women, even in the west, collapse under such interrogation.

The ICTR budget for 2006 was US$230 million and US$250 million in 2007. The beneficiaries of this money are the wig-wearing judges and the defence lawyers that play their theatrics on Tutsi victims and other UN employees who earn hefty salaries. One only needs to go on the ICTR website to see how much money is spent on travel, medical and entertainment allowances of these lords of justice. Where is HRW, Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders and all the other self-righteous international human rights groups that are supposed to “protect” the vulnerable? Why don’t they make a case of how US$2 billion can be spent on trying only 50 cases over 14 years when the Rwandan government, despite its weaknesses, spent less than US$10 million to try 1.2m people in half the time?

One needs to be either extremely prejudiced or ignorant or both not to see the fraud that is perpetrated in Arusha. Indeed, the approach of human rights groups itself disguises the problem. Across Africa, corrupt officials who inflict mass murder on our people do so with their pens. They are difficult to fight because when they are arrested they politicise the issue; they claim political persecution and form political parties to make their case. They hide behind legal procedures to defend their crimes and bribe corrupt judges to get away with murder. Ignorant of these realities, human rights groups jump into the fray to parrot their claims. Should anyone buy this?

It is in Rwanda that one can vividly witness the attempt to defend the institutional integrity of the state from particularistic pressures so that it can serve these voiceless ordinary people. But there can never be a war without collateral damage.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Democracy and Public goods and services.

2011-10-11T02:07:00.000-07:00

Gadaffi is gone, what next?

2011-10-11T02:05:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 27 AUGUST 2011 14:48 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

I hope that my prediction is wrong because future generations of Libyans will be happy that I was wrong.

I am writing this column on the morning of Monday August 22nd.

By the time it is read, Libyan leader Muammar El Gaddafi might no longer be supreme ruler of that country. He might either be dead, in jail or exile. It is one of those ironies of history that his sons and many of his apparatchik were caught in Tripoli before they could flee. It seems they did not imagine they could lose power so quickly. If absolute power corrupts absolutely, it also blinds people completely.

Gaddafi’s fall is both good and bad news for Libya. It is good news because finally, a psychopathic tyrant who had intimidated, terrorised and bullied Libyans for 42 years has been toppled. Of course this is not to say that Gaddafi did nothing good.

Stories abound of social welfare and other pro-people and pro-poor programmes under him. However, for many years he spent Libyan money on foreign wars and self aggrandisement; watching jubilant crowds in Misrata and Benghazi reveals that his fall is a big relief to many Libyans.

But it is also sad news for Libya because the effort to remove Gaddafi was largely conducted by western powers whose involvement undermined its democratic content. Initially, the Libyan uprising was a grassroots movement anchored in the people. Ordinary people took to the streets to protest his tyranny and even bring him down. When Gaddafi made his infamous speech threatening to kill everyone who challenged his rule and sent fighter bombers to kill peaceful demonstrators, he had crossed the line.

Initially, NATO intervened under a UN mandate to protect civilians from Gaddafi’s psychopathic mania. However, instead of protecting civilians and letting Libyans shape their destiny, NATO expanded this mandate to regime change. Of course regime change was not a bad idea – most democratic minded people wanted to see Gaddafi go. However, the way NATO decided to execute this plan has powerful implications on the future of democracy in Libya and the institutional integrity of the Libyan state.

For a movement to be democratic, the driving force has to be those most affected by the forces of tyranny. Secondly, the primary function of the state is to ensure basic law and order i.e. protection of persons and property. In the context of an armed struggle for power, success demands that the triumphant forces destroy the military and security infrastructure of the regime in order to seize power from the incumbents. However, such destruction leaves a power vacuum as the main infrastructure of security collapses.

In more successful experiences like the communists in China, Cuba and Vietnam or the NRA in Uganda, Frelimo in Mozambique, MPLA in Angola, RPF in Rwanda, EPLF in Eritrea and TPLF in Ethiopia, the victorious armed group had centrally directed and well developed military organisation to effectively take charge of the state and re-establish a stable and sustainable political order. This was possible because victory was a product of having developed internal capabilities. It is this initial endowment that makes post conflict reconstruction successful.

However, in cases where the victorious group was largely helped by a foreign power to capture power (UNLA in Uganda in 1979, Iraqi exiles after the fall of Saddam, Hamid Kazai after the fall of the Taliban and Lebanon during Israeli occupation), once the dictator falls, the country degenerates into anarchy. This is largely because the victorious group lacked internal organisational capabilities to ensure a stable political order while its external backers, however strong they may have been financially and militarily, lacked local knowledge and nuances that make stability possible.

Moreover, because its power-base is the strength of its external allies, the victorious group tends to have little incentive to achieve internal political and social integration. External backers tend to have a certain set of values and principles that drove them to get involved in a conflict. For example, western countries have particular principles regarding democracy, elections, free media and justice. So they tend to encourage their local auxiliaries to seek these ideals regardless of context.

Now, because the strength and legitimacy of the local group that has taken over power are derived from their external allies, the new power-holders may be encouraged to pursue such an idealistic agenda without being sensitive to local peculiarities. For example, they may seek victors’ justice to please their external patrons ignoring the tradeoffs, compromises and bargains that make internal political integration possible. For example, the UNLF may have feared to make peace with some of Idi Amin’s people for fear of being misunderstood by Julius Nyerere.

Yet Libya’s situation is worse. First, the rebels have achieved an artificial victory. It is not so much their fire power but rather the bombardment by NATO that tilted the balance of power in their favour. This means that rebels won artificially and Gaddafi lost artificially. Second, the rebels lack a unifying ideology. The only thing that unites them is hatred of Gaddafi. Now that he is gone, what else will unite them? Third, they lack a centrally organised and directed command and control centre. Fourth, they are all armed. Fifth, NATO is not sending boots on the ground to help them reestablish order.

There is nothing that tears men apart than a contest over money. Even in small companies with shares worth less than US$ 30,000, former friends turn into bitter enemies when the sharing of the benefits of such shareholding comes into play. Even in homes, when a father dies leaving a small estate, brother turns against brother, daughter against mother. Most divorces become nasty at the point of sharing property.

Now, bring this insight into post-Gaddafi Libya with all these structural problems pointed out above. The victorious rebels now have to sit down and decide who controls the billions of money from oil. Indeed, most rebel commanders will want to get access to oil proceeds immediately.

Because they are armed, it is very likely that any disagreement will be resolved militarily. And if a military confrontation begins before the political and security situation stabilises, it will be extremely difficult to build a stable political order. The road to Mogadishu will have been paved. I hope that my prediction is wrong because future generations of Libyans will be happy that I was wrong.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Why Museveni needs to reform.

2011-10-11T02:02:00.000-07:00

Why NATO over threw Gadaffi.

2011-10-11T01:59:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 10 SEPTEMBER 2011 14:27 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

MI6 was spying on Libyan dissidents in Britain and passing the information to Gaddafi

New revelations of the secret relationship between Libyan intelligence under Maummar Al Gaddafi and America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Britain’s MI6 are shocking but not surprising.

America and Britain have always worked with some of the most repressive regimes whenever it suited their interest and viciously condemned those who took an independent stance. However, the new revelations shed greater light on why NATO intervened in Libya to remove from power a man they were working closely with to suppress democratic expression in that country.

Most interesting are the intelligence documents found in the Tripoli home of Gaddafi’s former chief of intelligence and later foreign minister Moussa Koussa. Infamous for his brutality against Libya dissidents, Koussa defected to the UK at the beginning of the Libyan revolution. After being debriefed there, he was sent to the US. Today he lives comfortably in one of the Gulf States enjoying his loot. Now we know why the International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted Gaddafi and his sons but not Koussa. Even a child of six can see that the ICC is not a court of justice but a political instrument of western powers to push a particular agenda.

In some of the documents, the CIA was telling Libya’s psychopathic ruler that “we are eager to work with you and to interrogate terrorists.” In another letter to Koussa, MI6 wrote: “Dear Moussa,” (note the informal and personal use of his first name), “Thank you for the oranges you sent us. They were delicious.” Apparently, the “oranges” were terror suspects handed to MI6 and CIA for torture to extract information. Libyans had become mere oranges and torturing them was delicious. In fact MI6 was spying on Libyan dissidents in Britain and passing the information to Gaddafi for follow up. The relationship between MI6 and Gaddafi was so strong that they once even wrote a speech for the Libyan ruler.

Yet this friendship was not limited to intelligence sharing and torture of suspected terrorists. Reports also show that at the heart of this collaboration was increasing economic ties between Gaddafi and western corporations. Western oil and construction companies were getting lucrative contracts while their banks were getting huge deposits of Libya’s billions. Indeed, towards the end of his rule, Gadaffi had been rehabilitated and was now dining and wining with Barack Obama, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi, Nicolas Sarkozy, etc.

So why did the west abandon Gaddafi so quickly especially at a point when both sides appeared to be in each other’s embrace? Why was the west all of a sudden concerned about democracy in Libya and protecting innocent Libyans from Gaddafi’s terror? We don’t have the hard evidence yet. But we can infer from this a couple of lessons. The spread of the democratic revolution from Tunisia to Egypt and on to Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Bahrain shocked the western world.

Although the west has always called for democracy in the Arab world in its rhetoric, it has actually always promoted regimes that suppress democratic expression. The governance systems in that region are autocratic: power is concentrated in the hands of an autocrat who is either a monarch, an emir, a military or civilian ruler who is above the law. The local autocrat organises local elite groups behind him. They forge alliances with western economic interests to appropriate oil resources for their mutual benefit and to suppress popular demands.

However, even under this system, major structural changes have been taking place in that region which rendered this arrangement unstable. First these societies are suffering from a youth bulge. Second, there has been spread of education so that today, most citizens in many of the Arab countries have a secondary school education, many have gone to university. Third has been increasing incomes – per capita income in Egypt is $7,000, Tunisia $10,000, Libya $13,000 etc. Fourth the spread of modern communication technology – mobile phones and social networking sites like Facebook and twitter have given educated youth highly efficient tools for organisation, mobilisation and coordination.

It is in this context that the democratic revolution was born seeking to bring into place governments that serve national rather than personal interests; ones that answer to the citizens rather than their masters in Paris, London and Washington. The west was taken by surprise and had to fight rearguard action to gain control over these revolutions. In Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, where the regimes were stronger, they turned a blind eye to massive brutality used to suppress democratic aspirations. In Tunisia and Egypt where the regimes were weaker, the west helped stage military coups that on the face of it seemed to represent people’s democratic aspirations. In Jordan and Yemen, they allowed local rulers to re-establish their hold.

It seems that of all these regimes, the one that was most vulnerable was that of Gaddafi. Intelligence may have shown that the democrats in Benghazi were going to win; so Gadaffi was a liability and therefore expendable. Yet the west did not have any relationship with Libya’s military to stage a coup like they had done in Egypt and Tunisia. How then would they retain effective hold over the democratic revolution to ensure that it does not bring into power a group they could not control?

One way was to intervene militarily to support the democratic forces that had assembled in Benghazi. Military, financial and technological support would give western powers a strong say in the democratic revolution and actually hijack it. The west would be in a position to propose who should lead, what policies the new government should follow and even have considerable influence in shaping the character and ideology of the emergent institutions especially the intelligence and military services. The language of humanitarianism would be used to mask a largely imperial project.

Therefore, although the new dispensation will need to have a semblance of a democratic character, it must primarily seek to sustain western control over vital decision making power in Libya largely for the interests of the west first, Libyans last. Gaddafi was therefore fought because he was expendable, not because he was threatening to kill his people; and also because Libya, with Africa’s largest oil reserves, was too important to fall into hands over which the west had no control.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

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Give ordinary peasants a voice.

2011-10-11T01:57:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 13 AUGUST 2011 12:45 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Politics everywhere tends to be rigged in favour of the powerful. But in Uganda it has been made worse.

Last week, the mass media reported that the vast majority of rural Ugandans are at risk of malnutrition, especially in the northern region.

It was a simple footnote of a story in New Vision and did not generate much public debate. It “died” immediately after it was published. Yet a story about a verbal duel between the coordinator of intelligence services, Gen. David Tinyefuza and the executive director of Kampala City Council Authority Jennifer Musisi or one between Kampala Mayor Erias Lukwago and Musisi tends to dominate public debate in Uganda, especially in Kampala, all out of proportion to its significance in the lives of most Ugandans.

Politics and news everywhere tends to be rigged in favour of the powerful. But the democratic process in Uganda has been much more distorted in an urban-centric fashion to such a degree that rural interests do not find space in the platforms for democratic expression. Thus, the system in Uganda sustains a myth that the mass media, political parties and civil society organisations represent the interests of ordinary people when in fact they are merely forums through which elites leverage the support of the masses to acquire power, privilege and status.

One need only open a newspaper, switch on the television, or tune into a radio station to see how the news on which the Ugandan media focus and the opinions they publish are largely delinked from the interests of most Ugandans. The news and debate in the media tend to pander to the interests of a narrow elite class to the exclusion of the interests of the vast majority. Any criticism of the obsessions of this narrow elite class is attacked with venom. The democratic debate is hijacked by a small class of elites.

This is one area where the NRM has betrayed the masses. In its early days, the NRM was rooted in rural Uganda; it was a social movement seeking to represent peasant interests. Indeed, the creation of the local Resistance Councils even during the bush war was the first attempt to create an institutional mechanism through which peasants could aggregate their interests and place them on the national political agenda.

However, even before the bush war ended, NRM had begun shifting gears, making deals with elites that ultimately undermined the real interests of the peasants. For example, its early association with the Buganda kingdom administration at Mengo was an attempt to rely on identity to win over Baganda. One would have predicted that NRM wanted to be representative of both elite and monarchical interests on the one hand and peasants’ interests on the other.

However, as it won the war of liberation and consolidated itself in power, NRM decided to shift its base from rural to urban; from peasants to elites, from class to identity, from residence to ethnicity. It also tended to shift its core interest from promoting the interests of Ugandans to promoting the interests of multinational capital. The cause of the departure from the NRM’s initial revolutionary values and ideology will be discussed another day.

Rather than organise the landless in Buganda, the NRM has been involved in a series of endless discussions with absentee landlords at Mengo. Rather than the promotion of citizen ownership of the economy through the state or indigenous entrepreneurial interests, or a combination of both, the NRM has been promoting control of the economy by multinational capital allied to a small coterie of politically well-connected local elites.

President Yoweri Museveni’s critics have consistently failed to distinguish the gains of this strategy from its failures, and in the process cannot develop a coherent response to the tangled mess into which he has boxed them. The process of privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation has sustained rapid economic growth for over two decades, and in the process generated social forces with the potential to offer leadership to a movement seeking a more nationalistic – rather than ethnic or elite-driven - politics.

The opposition in Uganda has inspired the urban poor, but is delinked from the rural masses. Their failure to connect with the masses is somewhat understandable. It is extremely difficult for an opposition party to build an effective organisational infrastructure. Besides, compared to the urban dwellers, rural folks can easily be bribed and or intimidated to support the ruling party. Equally, rural folks tend to be more apathetic, more pro- government, conservative and resistant to change compared to the urbanites.

Here lies the contradiction for opposition parties in most of Africa: the most dispossessed people – the rural masses – are also equally the ones most likely to vote the government. Those who have benefited most from economic growth, education and the spread of mass media – urban elites – are the ones who are most informed, exposed and therefore most inclined to support the opposition. Therefore, the future of opposition politics lies in increasing urbanisation that can tilt the demographic balance in favour of urban areas. Until that time, the existing democratic infrastructure is built to address urban demands to the exclusion of rural masses.

If the opposition are to work with current demographics, they will need to root themselves in rural demands. In doing so, they will have to transcend their current urban base. For instance, during the last presidential campaigns, Dr Kizza Besigye made a case for low farm-gate prices of food crops which did not attract much public interest. A few months later, when food prices increased (which is certainly good for farmers but hurts urban consumers), Besigye was able to rally urban interests in nationwide protests.

To be an effective reflection of the democratic aspirations of most Ugandans, the opposition has to build a rural base, difficult though it is. Equally, for Uganda’s media and civil society to be effective platforms for democratic politics, they need to transcend their urban bias. Their current obsession with narrow and sometimes frivolous urban issues is injurious to the democratic process.

Without some degree of rural anchorage, it will be extremely difficult for the opposition to rely entirely on urban support to win elections. This is most especially because the rural areas continue to enjoy the highest concentration of population. Electoral competition is a game of numbers. But as urbanisation accelerates, the opposition can strengthen its base. Inadvertently therefore, in sustaining growth, NRM is nourishing its own enemy.

Besigye's choice on shs 20m bribe.

2011-10-11T01:53:00.001-07:00

FRIDAY, 05 AUGUST 2011 08:49 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

The only difference between our politicians is one of power, not policy; eating, not serving

Last week, the Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) held a meeting to discuss whether its members of the 8th Parliament who took the Shs20m “bribe” from President Yoweri Museveni to pass the Traditional Leaders’ Bill should return the money. Not surprisingly, the meeting ended without a resolution.

It will be difficult for FDC to decide that all its members return the money because many of those who will sit in its decision-making forum will be the Members of Parliament who took it.

But most critically, FDC leader Dr. Kizza Besigye should by now be learning that there is one thing that unites all politicians in Uganda – both of the ruling party and the opposition – money. Our politicians in government and in the opposition can quarrel bitterly and disagree even violently on nearly every issue under the sun. However, they will always cohere once money is thrown at them. For example, beginning in the 1990s, it was clear that all MPs, regardless of their political affiliation, always united when they began discussing their pay. They all always want an increment.

During the first meeting of the 9th parliament, MPs decided to increase their wages from Shs11m to Shs20m claiming they wanted to adjust them to inflation. During the debate only one opposition MP opposed this proposal and walked out, Ibrahim Ssemuju. The MPs justified their pay hike as a measure to bring their income in line with inflation. Though inflation was 15%, their wages went up 60%.

Meanwhile, both opposition and ruling party MPs said a lot about inflation but did little or nothing in parliament to help the common man – their constituent – adjust to it. It was therefore clear that even when elected, politicians possess interests that may be different from or even at conflict with the interests of their constituents. In Uganda’s case, the MPs are a constituency of their own, often representing their own group interests in the name of the people. It seems the interests of the ordinary person are rarely represented in our many democratic platforms. The lesson is that the only difference between our politicians is one of power, not policy; eating, not serving.

Many critics claim that our parliament is weak and is only used to rubber-stamp Museveni’s decisions. Yet it seems it has grown stronger. For instance, in the late 1980s and 90s, Museveni’s hand was stronger in parliament than today. Whenever he wanted to pass some important legislation, he would don his military fatigues, call a closed session of the NRC (parliament of the time) and literally bulldoze legislators to pass it. Not anymore. Today, he can only get his way by buying the support of MPs. The point is that our parliament is weak in its pursuit of a national objective not strong in the negotiating power of MPs for money and other privileges.

In every successive election since 1996, the number of MPs committed to the public good has reduced; that of those seeking personal material advancement has increased. Today we have a parliament composed largely (certainly not entirely) of self seekers. Thus, although their negotiating power has increased vis a vis the executive, it serves the individual interests of MPs rather than the collective interest of the Ugandan citizens.

That is how Museveni paid every MP Shs20m to pass the Traditional Leaders Bill through a hostile parliament. It was the only way he could get his way. Many Ugandans shout loudly that this undermines democracy. Yet actually, that is exactly how democracy works. In America, presidents or leaders of Congress give individual legislators what are called “earmarks”: allocation of money to pet projects of a given congressman/woman or senator in order to secure their vote.

The difference between how America and Uganda does it lies in form, not in substance. In America, the money is not sent directly to a legislator’s personal bank account as was done in Uganda. It is sent institutionally to their district (constituency) or state to fund a particular project there. So the legislator cannot easily (note, easily) put it into his/her own pocket. Soon, the NRM may learn this lesson. Bribery has for long been employed as an instrument of every democracy from ancient Greece and Rome to modern day Western Europe and North America. Uganda is following suit.

The FDC has been trying to find its own moral feet in Uganda’s murky waters of political corruption and now faces a tough choice. If the party holds a tough line on returning the Shs20m, it may suffer the risk of open defiance by most (should I even say 80%?) of its MPs. And it has very few MPs in the house. If such a large majority defy the party resolution, they will render it redundant. Then to keep face, FDC would be forced to discipline them; and it can only do so by throwing them out of the party. But this means they would have to resign their seats.

Strategically, it would be suicidal for FDC to take such principled action. If the party’s seats are opened up for fresh contest, it is very likely that FDC will lose nearly all of them to either the incumbents it has expelled or to the NRM. Therefore if the MPs who took the Shs20m refuse to refund it, the best option for FDC is to leave them alone. This is the only way it can retain its presence in parliament and therefore remain relevant politically.

FDC can only sustain its moral high ground only at the risk of losing even the few MPs it has. Without a presence in parliament, it would have no political bite. Alternatively it can seek to retain its political bite in parliament but at the price of sinking into NRM’s moral depravity of corruption – the very evil it is sworn to fight. The way Museveni has structured his political patronage machine and the corruption that sustains it leaves the opposition in Uganda in a quandary. The choice for FDC is tough: maintain high moral standards at the price of political irrelevance or retain political clout at the price of looking like NRM.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

who will defend the rural poor ?

2011-10-11T01:51:00.001-07:00

FRIDAY, 29 JULY 2011 11:16 BY ANDREW M MWENDA

The benefits of high food prices go to the rural poor (the majority) while the costs are incurred by urbanites, a minority.

As I write this article, food prices in Uganda are falling rapidly.

For instance, the farm-gate price of a kilogram of maize in Kiryandongo (an example of a typical village) increased from Shs500 in January to Shs1,200 in April 2011.

As July ends, it has fallen back to Shs500. If you are a maize producer, your income had increased by 120 percent and has fallen by 60 percent.

This same trend seems to be the fate of many other agricultural products in Uganda. Now, the vast majority of Ugandans (78 percent by the 2002 Housing and Population Census) depend on agriculture for a livelihood. Therefore, there should be widespread protests in our villages and heated debate in the mass media about falling food prices and even threats of regime collapse. Yet ironically, the country is becoming calm again in spite of (and in fact precisely because of) falling food prices.

Holding some factors constant, most of the benefits of high food prices go to rural farmers who are the vast majority of the population while the costs are incurred by the urban poor and middle classes with fixed incomes who are a minority in Uganda. Even assuming that urbanisation has increased from 15 to 30 percent since 2002, the demographic (and with it the democratic) dice is still tilted in favour of the rural farmer against the urban dweller. So why is it that when the majority of the population are negatively affected the country seems calm while when the minority in cities is adversely affected, the country faces a political crisis?

This is where one needs to be sceptical about the seemingly democratic nature of our politics. The political process seems to be dominated by urban demands often at the price of rural interests. Urban dwellers tend to be more educated with access to modern democratic platforms – the mass media, political parties and other civic associations. Thus they are easy to inform and to mobilise for protest, a factor that amplifies their voice within the democratic process. The opposite goes for rural farmers: they are the least educated and for the most part they are excluded from modern platforms for democratic expression – so they have little voice.

This is how the democratic process in most of Africa is structurally rigged in an urban-centric fashion. All too often, our governments continuously pander to urban (i.e. minority) demands even when often, that is done to the detriment of the interests of the rural majority. In fact, even authoritarian regimes in Africa have historically tended to suffer this urban bias – often promoting public policies and political institutions that cater for the interests of urbanites to the disadvantage of rural populations. This was more so during the 1960s, 70s and 80s and was best captured in Robert Bates’ seminal work, Markets and States in Tropical Africa.

According to Bates, farmers stand at the intersection of three markets: the market for agricultural commodities, the market for inputs into farming and the market for goods they buy from the urban industrial sector. Farmers derive their incomes from the first market; their profits are a function of the bargain between these revenues and the costs they incur in the second market – i.e. the market for inputs into farming. Given that the only industrial input into the farming process in Uganda is the hoe (Shs20,000 and lasting three years), the profit margins are high. However, the real value of farmers’ profits and therefore the real value of their incomes is determined by prices they must pay in the third market – that for consumer goods produced by the urban industrial sector.

Bates’ argument was that in seeking political survival and self enrichment, most governments in Africa adopted policies that placed the interests of urban elites above those of rural farmers. Among other reasons, this was partly because urban constituencies can easily mobilise to challenge governments. In politics, even democratic politics, it is not numbers that give you the decisive advantage. It is organisation even when you organise to maximise your nuisance value – like when unemployed youths and other urban lumpens organise to march through a city destroying property and disrupting trade.

The important issue over food price inflation is to look at the basket of goods and services an average farm-family in Uganda consumes per day. Then we can ask what percentage of this basket is devoted to consumer goods from the industrial sector. A typical household in rural Uganda largely depends on its own produce to sustain itself. Most of the food that is consumed is produced in the homestead or bartered – a chicken for bananas. Every household lives in its own house.

For most of rural Uganda, the market is an external and indeed secondary factor in their lives. Given that 68 percent of the population depend on subsistence i.e. hand-to-mouth agriculture, most people only go to the market to sell surplus food in exchange for consumer goods produced by industries in cities. These may include kerosene, salt, exercise books and soap which may not constitute even five percent of basket of goods and services for a farm-family. Most of the other industrial goods – sugar, bottled beer, clothes, cooking oil etc are things a farm-family can substitute, postpone or forego in the face of increasing prices.

From this perspective therefore, increasing food prices are good for farmers even when the cost of consumer goods from the urban industrial sector is growing. In fact taking the example of maize prices in Kiryandongo, maize farmers had gained a 120 percent increase in incomes while no industrial consumer good has witnessed such a high level of price inflation. Therefore, increasing food prices in April were a bonanza for our farmers.

This argument finds very little traction in public debate in Uganda because the beneficiaries of high food prices i.e. farmers are structurally excluded for many of our democratic platforms. They do not speak on radio, do not feature in television debates and don’t write for newspapers. A small group of urban elites shout themselves hoarse claiming they are speaking for the ordinary farmer when actually they are only representing their own interests. This is how the democratic process in Uganda tends often to produce undemocratic outcomes.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Nato- Imposed regime won't liberate Libya.

2011-10-11T01:42:00.002-07:00

It is difficult for a foreign country to dismantle the military, administrative and intelligence infrastructure of another country and establish a stable political order thereafter

Last week the French parliament voted to continue their country’s involvement in NATO airstrikes in Libya to remove Muammar Gaddafi.

I hold a strong scepticism about foreign interventions seeking to promote democracy, development, human rights etc in poor countries. However genuine their intentions, such interventions hardly produce good outcomes. I believe that the real engine of change should be local social dynamics i.e. those most affected by a problem should be the ones to structure the solution to it.

As the French parliament voted, I was watching (for the second time) a movie called Green Zone about American occupation of Iraq and the misguided and naïve idealism about introducing democracy into that country. In the early part of the movie is a conversation between a Central Intelligence Agency operative (Mattie) who has lived in Iraq for many years and a Political Officer from the Pentagon (POP) on how to manage post Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The focus of the debate is on a one Ahmed Zubaidi, an upstart politician who had been in exile for the last 30 years. POP tells Mattie that Zubaidi has emerged as the leader to bring democracy to Iraq. But Mattie feels it would be improper to have someone who has been out of the country for 30 years take over leadership in a troubled country.

POP: He is the best we have for a stable democracy right now.

Mattie: Go onto the streets and find ten people who know who he is.

POP: He is our friend, Mattie, he has been helpful and our office is satisfied with the information he has been giving us.

Mattie: This guy is not reliable, his information is not reliable. He has been selling us crack.

POP: (getting angry) This is exactly the reason people are beginning to lose confidence in the agency, Mattie. You are questioning every single piece of intelligence that is coming in to a point that we cannot make any progress.

Mattie: We cannot hand over the country to an exile nobody has ever heard of … and a bunch of interns from Washington.

POP: You are the Middle East expert. Do you have another idea?

Mattie: We need to use the Iraqi army to hold this country together. This country is a powder keg of ethnic tensions. Now that Saddam is gone, they are the only ones who can hold it together.

POP: We cannot explain that to the American people. We beat the Iraqi army.

Mattie: Well, they are still out there and they are looking for a place in the new Iraq.

POP: Then they will be waiting a long time.

Mattie: They did not all follow Saddam. There are officers out there we can work with if we can make it worth their while.

POP: Let me tell you something; we have spent too much American treasure and too many American lives for us to put a Bathist General in a position of power – Jesus!

Mattie: Do you have any idea what is going on outside of this Green Zone? It is chaos; it is revenge killings every night. People are asking why we cannot stop this. We are losing the population.

POP: Democracy is messy.

Mattie: If you dismantle this country, cut the army, you will have a civil war in six months, I guarantee it.

POP: Ok, let’s move on.

It is difficult for a foreign country to dismantle the military, administrative and intelligence infrastructure of another country and establish a stable political order thereafter. It succeeded in post war Germany and Japan – but those seem to have been exceptions. Everywhere else, including the Tanzanian occupation of Uganda in 1979-80, such interventions lead to state collapse resulting into widespread violence and impunity. As we cheer NATO’s struggle to remove Gaddafi, reminders from Iraq and Afghanistan are too vivid to ignore.

To solve the problems of any country requires making very many complicated tradeoffs, giving difficult concessions, making hardnosed compromises etc. This is the kind of negotiations that produced post apartheid South Africa. It is the kind of deal-making that made Barack Obama pass through Congress the Healthcare Bill in America last year.

You cannot build a country on the basis of abstract ideals because there is no textbook good solution. A policy or institution does not work because of its intrinsic qualities but rather how those qualities interact with other variables in the society. What is technically good as “best practice” elsewhere can produce disastrous results when implemented in a society without considering other factors and combinations in a country.

Therefore, a solution for any society cannot be based on an abstract theory. It has to evolve organically from multiple negotiations, renegotiations, concessions and compromises with many diverse groups. Of course sometimes a decision may be forced down the throat of one group by another, and this may be necessary to move on. But force alone cannot be a sustainable basis of power and problem solving. The software of rule is legitimacy and what is a politically legitimate process may be technically inefficient and slow.

As the French and NATO allies struggle to “save” the people of Libya from the tyranny of Gaddafi, this may be an important reference point. They need to let the rebels seek a solution by themselves. Left on their own, they may find more effective ways to defeat Gaddafi or creative ways to accommodate him and his entourage. In other words, the balance of forces on the ground in Libya should be the ones to shape its political trajectory, not the lofty motives of foreigners about abstract ideals.

If Gaddafi is defeated by rebels who are being propped by NATO and his military and security infrastructure is destroyed, NATO will be required to put boots on the ground to ensure a stable political order. Yet even with NATO on the ground we would see Libya become a breeding ground for terrorists. From this perspective, therefore, external assistance should be marginal and secondary to the equation. NATO should allow sufficient space within Libya for domestic forces to find an agreeable solution. Trying to impose a solution on the country is not a formula for success.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

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Why we need to focus on results.

2011-10-11T01:42:00.001-07:00

FRIDAY, 01 JULY 2011 09:34 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

Forgive a public servant who delivers a quality product even if he violated 100% procedural rules but punish one who follows every rule and gives a bad product.

In this column last week, I argued that the various institutions mandated to exercise oversight functions on the executive actually tend to do the opposite – encourage more corruption. This is especially so in public procurement where institutions like the Auditor General’s office, the Inspectorate of Government, parliamentary oversight committees and the mass media are supposed to hold public officials to account.

Whenever there is a big public procurement scandal, all these institutions jump into the fray with investigations. Hearings are held, witnesses summoned and grilled before excited journalists and reports are issued. Newspapers make headlines, television and radio talk-shows get super saturated with arguments in favour or against the accused. Civil society organisations call press conferences and sometimes organise demonstrations.

On the face of it, all this seems to be a sign of vibrant civic life in the country – and in a way it is. However, it also disguises a fundamental political pathology in Uganda i.e. that actually most of this debate is not so much aimed at holding government to account as it is aimed at increasing the number and price of bribes paid. Every institution seeks to leverage its constitutional powers to make bidders to appear before it in order to extract bribes from them. This way, graft in Uganda has been democratised.

This lesson sank into me during my work as an investigative reporter on public procurement in Uganda during the late 1990s. I noticed that every time there was a big public procurement deal, different institutions got deeply involved in investigating whether it “followed the right procedures.” Initially, like all other Ugandans, I was excited by the heated contests over procurement mistaking them to be a democratic way through which these institutions were seeking to hold government to account.

With time, however, I realised that quite often (if not always) these contests were the very instrument influential groups in our nation’s body politic were using to capture the state and then divert public resources to serve private purposes. Previously the most ardent supporter of these “anti corruption” efforts, by 2002, I had become their strongest critic rejecting almost every attempt to investigate corruption – not just as a sham – but also as its very manifestation.

However, my article last week ended prematurely because it did not propose an alternative. My view is that public management in Uganda needs to shift away from its current obsession with inputs (procedures) and place greater emphasis on outputs (results). Let me make myself clear: I am not against “all” procedure in public procurement. Even Independent Publications Limited has such rules. However, I am against a system where procedures are an end in themselves.

The problem with most discussions on practically everything in Uganda (and indeed all of Africa) is that it does not begin with our context in order to drive the debate towards a solution. Although the problem will be local, the solution will be an imported institutional model from Western Europe or North America. Many people assume that because such an institutional model has worked well in its mother country, it can be transplanted unto our society and it produces similar results.

This copy and paste approach ignores the traditions, norms, values, beliefs, habits, shared cultural understandings and political struggles that produced such a system and therefore contributed to its success in the country of origin but which may be missing in Uganda. Thus, if you superimpose institutional models on a society with different social dynamics they can actually produce the opposite result.

Many public spirited Ugandans genuinely (but naively) believe that institutions like the IGG, Auditor General, parliament and the press actually serve the purposes that are officially stated in statutes creating them or theoretically articulated in political science books. This belief is strong precisely because all too often we do not question received wisdom. Our education system teaches us to memorise ideas, not to critique them. Consequently, there is an almost total disregard of learning by empirical observation.

Almost every Ugandan I have discussed this with, including my very brilliant internet friend Omeros, keeps stating and restating the theoretically stated objective of our inherited institutions. And of course in western countries there is some degree of consistence between the theory and practice of institutional innovations largely because they evolved organically from their experience.

My frustration, however, is that few people in Uganda (and Africa) actually focus on what these inherited institutional models are delivering in our countries – whether the practice lives up to the theory. Indeed, because the practice is often inconsistent with the theory, we turn the debate into a moral argument i.e. that we have bad leaders who are not respecting institutional rules. We forget that institutional models create specific incentives for actors. Depending on the social context, “good” institutions can deliver bad outcomes. An institution is good only relative to its social context i.e. how it interacts with other variables in society.

Indeed, from my empirical observation of how the public procurement system in Uganda works, I have realised that procedures cannot stop anyone from theft if public officials want to. On the contrary, procedures in our specific context create many opportunities for corruption. A civil servant can use procedures to delay the payment of a supplier, thus inducing the supplier to bribe him in order to quicken the process.

One of the pathologies produced by a mindless adherence to procedure is the Northern Bypass. It is only 21km long yet it lasted seven years to build and three times the comparable price with similar projects elsewhere and is shoddy work. Yet all procedures were followed. So no one has been punished for this failure.

Lesson: we should be clear about the quality of the road we want, the average price of constructing it and the timeframe for finishing it. If a public servant delivers the right quality at the best cost within the best timeframe, he should be forgiven even if he violated 100 procedural rules in the procurement book. We should equally punish a public servant who follows every procedure to the book and delivers a bad road, at a high price and over an unnecessarily long period of time.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

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The price of Besigye - Museveni rivalry .

2011-10-11T01:39:00.000-07:00

Since 1996, it has become hard for the government to initiate and implement a big development project because of power struggles.

The contest for political power in Uganda between President Yoweri Museveni and the opposition largely led by Dr Kizza Besigye has become so intense that it has crowded out debate on policy alternatives. The struggle for power seems like an end in itself, rather than a means to an end i.e. serving the public good. The result is that since both sides have dug into this fight for supremacy there is little space for promoting the public interest. Journalists have inadvertently been sucked into this partisan struggle to argue for either side, only whipping up sentiments and seeking to score political points rather than to expose the selfishness of the actors.

Since 1996, it has become increasingly difficult for the government of Uganda to initiate a big development project and see it implemented. The initiative to develop a large electricity dam at Bujagali was fought and frustrated from 1998 until 2006 when an agreement was signed. Even then, the contract would have fallen through had the investor behind it not been the Aga Khan, owner of Daily Monitor where the self-righteous pursuit of government procedure is largely promoted. A dam that should have been completed in 2002 is not yet finished in 2011 i.e. nine years later.

In 1998 I was a central participant in resisting AES Corporation getting a power purchase agreement with the government of Uganda. Our reasons at the time were not procedural but actually of a strategic nature and included the pricing of electricity (which was reduced), the alternative uses of the water where the dam was being built (water rafting and the potential tourist income it would generate in the long term), the security concern of having three dams within short distance of each other, a hydraulic clause that had tied government to guarantee water levels in Lake Victoria, the opportunity cost of Bujagali which was Karuma and which would cost almost half the price to produce almost the same amount of electricity etc.

While our subjective motivations were noble, the objective outcome was to actually paralyse government and keep the country in darkness for another ten years. Between 1998 and 2002, I was an investigative reporter on government procurement. I witnessed how investors, especially big multi nationals were manipulating public institutions to paralyse government. If the Central Tender Board gave a contract to company A instead of company B, the loser would petition the Inspector General of Government and bribe officials there to write a report that the process was fraudulent and recommend cancelling it. It is easy to find fault even with the most transparent procurement process because there will always be a T that was not crossed.

Then company B would retaliate by petitioning Parliament. Finding cash-starved MPs, it would buy off the majority on the committee investigating the matter in order to get its way. These companies and their local auxiliaries would leak all these details to journalists for a story and I suspect even pay some of them to advance their cause. I remember one company offered me a first class ticket with 5-star hotel accommodation and per diem apparently to go to Europe to interview its CEO, an offer I turned down because it was clearly an attempt to co-opt me.

I made my career as an investigative reporter exposing failures in procurement procedures. I learnt that institutions meant to offer oversight on government procurement – the IGG, Parliament and even the courts – can and had actually been compromised. So each of them was trying to leverage its constitutional power to be involved in investigating a particular deal; the aim was not to hold the government to account, but to force bidders to go before it for a hearing so that it can extract bribes from them.

The second lesson I learnt was that often, any bidder is almost as good as the other in offering the service. The differences are never in substance but only in detail. I realised that these pretentious investigations to get a clean deal would take so long and cost so much in bribes that if ever the contract was finally awarded, it would be twice or even three times the original price. Bujagali rose from US$ 650m to US$ 980m by the time it was signed. The result of all these investigations, counter-investigations and all the drama it generated in the media was not a better deal for the public but rather it was to line the pockets of a few people and sell newspapers.

In 2002 I became General Manager of Monitor FM (later KFM) and was able to see the cost of these contestations. Uganda was riddled with limited electricity supply and we were spending millions of shillings per month on a thermal power generator, a factor that was inflicting unbearable damage to our profitability. It became clear to me that the opportunity cost of resisting Bujagali, regardless of our legitimate concerns, was too high. It is in this context that when in 2008 a friend brought me a detailed account of the unfair financial deals between the Aga Khan’s company and government of Uganda on Bujagali, I shelved the story.

I knew New Vision would not run it either because President Yoweri Museveni was keen on the deal and Robert Kabushenga would not antagonise him. Daily Monitor would not run it either because the Aga Khan was the beneficiary of government financial generosity. With the press quiet, the opposition to the dam at Bujagali had no public platform to amplify its voice. The project has thus proceeded because it has not been turned into a public scandal by the leading public moralists of our nation.

The lesson is that given entrenched corruption in Uganda (which I don’t think even the opposition can end), the best way forward is to build a consensus around promoting some public goods while accepting less costly violations of procurement rules. Since 2002, I have opposed every self righteous crusade to resist a big public investment deal because its tendering was not perfect. So I supported the Temangalo land transaction, Nsimbe and the redevelopment of the government’s Lugogo and Nakawa housing estates; and I have equally opposed every commission of inquiry and parliamentary investigation into such public investments.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

S

NATO- Imposed regime won't liberate Libya.

2011-10-11T01:37:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 22 JULY 2011 11:34 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

It is difficult for a foreign country to dismantle the military, administrative and intelligence infrastructure of another country and establish a stable political order thereafter

Last week the French parliament voted to continue their country’s involvement in NATO airstrikes in Libya to remove Muammar Gaddafi.

I hold a strong scepticism about foreign interventions seeking to promote democracy, development, human rights etc in poor countries. However genuine their intentions, such interventions hardly produce good outcomes. I believe that the real engine of change should be local social dynamics i.e. those most affected by a problem should be the ones to structure the solution to it.

As the French parliament voted, I was watching (for the second time) a movie called Green Zone about American occupation of Iraq and the misguided and naïve idealism about introducing democracy into that country. In the early part of the movie is a conversation between a Central Intelligence Agency operative (Mattie) who has lived in Iraq for many years and a Political Officer from the Pentagon (POP) on how to manage post Saddam Hussein’s Iraq.

The focus of the debate is on a one Ahmed Zubaidi, an upstart politician who had been in exile for the last 30 years. POP tells Mattie that Zubaidi has emerged as the leader to bring democracy to Iraq. But Mattie feels it would be improper to have someone who has been out of the country for 30 years take over leadership in a troubled country.

POP: He is the best we have for a stable democracy right now.

Mattie: Go onto the streets and find ten people who know who he is.

POP: He is our friend, Mattie, he has been helpful and our office is satisfied with the information he has been giving us.

Mattie: This guy is not reliable, his information is not reliable. He has been selling us crack.

POP: (getting angry) This is exactly the reason people are beginning to lose confidence in the agency, Mattie. You are questioning every single piece of intelligence that is coming in to a point that we cannot make any progress.

Mattie: We cannot hand over the country to an exile nobody has ever heard of … and a bunch of interns from Washington.

POP: You are the Middle East expert. Do you have another idea?

Mattie: We need to use the Iraqi army to hold this country together. This country is a powder keg of ethnic tensions. Now that Saddam is gone, they are the only ones who can hold it together.

POP: We cannot explain that to the American people. We beat the Iraqi army.

Mattie: Well, they are still out there and they are looking for a place in the new Iraq.

POP: Then they will be waiting a long time.

Mattie: They did not all follow Saddam. There are officers out there we can work with if we can make it worth their while.

POP: Let me tell you something; we have spent too much American treasure and too many American lives for us to put a Bathist General in a position of power – Jesus!

Mattie: Do you have any idea what is going on outside of this Green Zone? It is chaos; it is revenge killings every night. People are asking why we cannot stop this. We are losing the population.

POP: Democracy is messy.

Mattie: If you dismantle this country, cut the army, you will have a civil war in six months, I guarantee it.

POP: Ok, let’s move on.

It is difficult for a foreign country to dismantle the military, administrative and intelligence infrastructure of another country and establish a stable political order thereafter. It succeeded in post war Germany and Japan – but those seem to have been exceptions. Everywhere else, including the Tanzanian occupation of Uganda in 1979-80, such interventions lead to state collapse resulting into widespread violence and impunity. As we cheer NATO’s struggle to remove Gaddafi, reminders from Iraq and Afghanistan are too vivid to ignore.

To solve the problems of any country requires making very many complicated tradeoffs, giving difficult concessions, making hardnosed compromises etc. This is the kind of negotiations that produced post apartheid South Africa. It is the kind of deal-making that made Barack Obama pass through Congress the Healthcare Bill in America last year.

You cannot build a country on the basis of abstract ideals because there is no textbook good solution. A policy or institution does not work because of its intrinsic qualities but rather how those qualities interact with other variables in the society. What is technically good as “best practice” elsewhere can produce disastrous results when implemented in a society without considering other factors and combinations in a country.

Therefore, a solution for any society cannot be based on an abstract theory. It has to evolve organically from multiple negotiations, renegotiations, concessions and compromises with many diverse groups. Of course sometimes a decision may be forced down the throat of one group by another, and this may be necessary to move on. But force alone cannot be a sustainable basis of power and problem solving. The software of rule is legitimacy and what is a politically legitimate process may be technically inefficient and slow.

As the French and NATO allies struggle to “save” the people of Libya from the tyranny of Gaddafi, this may be an important reference point. They need to let the rebels seek a solution by themselves. Left on their own, they may find more effective ways to defeat Gaddafi or creative ways to accommodate him and his entourage. In other words, the balance of forces on the ground in Libya should be the ones to shape its political trajectory, not the lofty motives of foreigners about abstract ideals.

If Gaddafi is defeated by rebels who are being propped by NATO and his military and security infrastructure is destroyed, NATO will be required to put boots on the ground to ensure a stable political order. Yet even with NATO on the ground we would see Libya become a breeding ground for terrorists. From this perspective, therefore, external assistance should be marginal and secondary to the equation. NATO should allow sufficient space within Libya for domestic forces to find an agreeable solution. Trying to impose a solution on the country is not a formula for success.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Watch out South Sudan Independence.

2011-07-16T11:02:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 15 JULY 2011 09:16 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

Because the CPA did not define borders clearly, Khartoum will not want to see the evolution of an effective state and stable government in South Sudan

Last Saturday, South Sudan became the newest nation in the world. Yet beyond the celebrations in Juba that featured President Omar Al Bashir, there is a real risk to the security of this region with the coming into existence of this new nation. Can Khartoum really accept this passively? Khartoum may accept this secession as a fait accompli because of the international forces at play. Yet, it seems likely that it may not want to see the evolution of an effective state and stable government in South Sudan.

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) did not clearly define the borders. And around these border areas lies the oil wells. Who controls the territory where oil is found is a strategic issue for both Khartoum and Juba. And this ambiguity is laced with potential for conflict. Khartoum will need a weak and divided South Sudan as that may give it legroom to postpone the demarcation of borders so that oil remains in northern control. Any strategist would be looking at the machinations Khartoum is likely to indulge in to achieve this objective.

Yet whatever Khartoum will do to undermine the evolution of a stable regime in the south will inevitably drag Uganda, a major ally of South Sudan, into the conflict. For example, it can decide to attack the south directly (which it seems to be doing in Abyei). Yet this will bring the wrath of the international community on its head. So the best option for Khartoum is to ferment conflict between the different factions within the SPLA – like pitting President Salva Kiir against Vice President Riek Machar.

Given the ambitions of Machar, this is a real possibility. Besides, Machar has worked with Khartoum against the SPLA before. If Khartoum succeeds in stimulating or simulating conflict within the SPLA, it may actually set in motion an ethnic conflict in the south pitting the Dinka (supporting Kiir) against the Nuer (behind Machar). Such ethnically organised wars tend to take a fanatical tinge. If this projection comes to reality, Machar may need the services of an experienced fighter in that region – Joseph Kony and his Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). If Kony joins the conflict in South Sudan, Uganda will be dragged into it too.

In fact it is very likely that whatever machinations Khartoum decides to use against the south, Kony will most likely be a major player. For example, if Khartoum fails to divide the SPLA, it may need LRA to destabilise the government in Juba – just like Machar may need him in the event of a conflict within SPLA between him and Kiir. Therefore whichever option Khartoum chooses, save for the unlikely one of accepting South independence without any attempt to undermine the consolidation of the regime there, has powerful security implications for Uganda.

Therefore Kampala needs to project a military posture that can deter Khartoum from any undertaking that threatens Uganda. The essence of any military strategy is never to fight a war but to deter or scare potential adversaries from begging a fight against you. I suspect that this may have been Museveni’s (and his advisors if they really advise him) thinking when he went on an expensive jet shopping spree. It would be silly at best, irresponsible at worst, to either ignore this potential threat or to assume it does not exist.

Yet I find it difficult to agree with the choice of military posture the government of Uganda has decided to adopt amidst these threats i.e. purchasing six fighter jets, however sophisticated they may be. Given Uganda’s financial means, one wonders whether spending US$ 1 billion on six jets – even at the price of bankrupting the country and rendering future purchases difficult – was the most cost-efficient and cost-effective strategy of posturing to Khartoum. I believe that government could have used less money and still project greater capability to resist any designs that Khartoum may have in mind.

For example, I hear Khartoum has more than 50 planes of equal or near equal capacity. It has much more revenues than Uganda. Therefore, an effective yet cost efficient posture by Uganda cannot be an arms race where the dice is clearly tilted in favour of Khartoum. It has to be investing in military hardware – like anti aircraft guns capability – that can threaten Khartoum without being so expensive as to drain our resources.

It seems therefore that there were silent considerations other than the manifest ones that shaped the decision to purchase these jets. Like in all arms purchases around the world, this deal may have offered fat kickbacks to those involved. Apparently, the jets were paid for in cash. This is unusual since a country can buy arms on credit and pay over years. There are creative ways of doing this even without approval from IMF (which would most likely veto such a decision because of its inability to appreciate third world security needs) without having to withdraw huge sums of cash from our reserves.

It seems the jets were purchased to satisfy President Yoweri Museveni’s personal obsession with military grandeur. This is very likely the reason for purchasing the jets because decision making in the UPDF is personalised. So Museveni’s personal idiosyncrasies could have played a disproportionate role. Therefore, the choice of equipment suggests Museveni’s personal considerations; the use of cash suggests kickbacks for his handlers.

I accept that if Uganda needed a particular military posture to counter Khartoum, it could not be done for free. It had to come at a price. If it demanded that foreign exchange reserves be drawn down, that’s reasonable. The problem is that the government of Uganda has made no effort to demonstrate that this purchase was the best option of all available options.

I had thought that people like Kizza Besigye (a former chief of logistics and engineering in UPDF), Mugisha Muntu (a former army commander) and John Kazoora (a former deputy head of national security) would come together to produce a paper on an alternative national security strategy in view of the threat from Khartoum. Nothing has come of them yet. This makes me wonder whether the opposition are really making any effort to demonstrate that they take national security seriously.

amwenda@independent.co. ug

Uganda bigger than Museveni or Besigye !

2011-07-16T10:59:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 08 JULY 2011 12:51 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

If you criticise the opposition about their lack of an alternative policy, they do not present it, they instead accuse you of having been bought by the President.

A striking feature of intellectual life in Uganda is the paradox of political debate; the country is at once highly polarised and yet unified: Polarised in the sense that debate between government and the opposition never seems to have a common ground – each side speaks of the other as the devil incarnate; yet in this very polarisation lies the similarity of our political and intellectual class – both sides carry an angelic image of themselves and are thereby extremely intolerant of any view that contradicts this self image.

It therefore becomes costly for anyone to refuse to take a side and defend an entrenched position. Because then you become a subject of attack from both sides. Yet this is what independent journalism is about – to hold all sides to account for their public postures. The space for this independence is shrinking as journalists have been dragged into this partisan fight. Alternative conceptions of the problems of Uganda are being actively suppressed most especially by opposition supporters who want to blackmail everyone who disagrees with them by labelling him/her a sympathiser of or to have been bribed by President Yoweri Museveni.

Many people in Uganda may not have realised how this polarisation and the response by threats, false accusations and attempts at blackmail by opposition supporters are the most insidious threat to free thought. Museveni has constructed one of the most corrupt political systems in contemporary Africa. Over the years, he has compromised many politicians, journalists and other intellectuals to join him in his government of national loot. Opposition supporters now use it as an instrument of blackmail to silence anyone who disagrees with them. This is most pronounced in the FDC wing that supports Besigye. If anyone disagrees with them, they immediately claim Museveni has bought that person.

Thus when Beti Kamya disagreed with FDC, they accused her of being a Museveni ally. When Mugisha Muntu ran against Besigye for the presidency of FDC, he was accused of being a Museveni mole. When Norbert Mao refused to join FDC-led Interparty Political Cooperation (IPC), he was accused of working with and for Museveni. And when Olara Otunnu pulled out of IPC, he was accused of being Museveni’s agent provocateur. This fanatical wing of the FDC is even a bigger threat to free thought than Museveni. This is because it is not easy to expose their influence given that they do not control the instruments of coercion like the army and police. But their instrument of blackmail is more dangerous.

During the Walk-to-Work campaign, I met many FDC leaders who thought strongly that Besigye was misleading the struggle. They disagreed with his belligerent stand of attacking, shouting tantrums at and kicking policemen instead of wooing them. They also felt that they needed skilful appeal, not confrontational means to sustain the image of non-angry opponents of the regime. However, they were unwilling to speak openly for fear of “being misunderstood” or being accused of having been bought.

For example, Uganda’s economy recently hit bad times, largely because during the last general elections, government printed money to finance a large supplementary budget. Government also raided foreign exchange reserves for US$ 900m to buy sophisticated fighter jets. The result has been monetary and imported inflation as the dollar price increased by over 20%.

In such a crisis, one would expect the opposition to put forth a sound analysis of the problem and offer a convincing alternative policy response. They have done neither. However, the opposition (especially the pro-Besigye faction of the FDC) demands that everyone agrees with it because it criticises government. But merely shouting “wolf” at Museveni’s scarecrow is not enough.

Since the economic crisis set in, the only person who has spoken openly about the mismanagement of economic policy by government is Emmanuel Tumusiime Mutebile, governor of the central bank. The opposition jumped onto his remarks as if to prove their views on economic policy were right. Yet Mutebile’s point was that mismanagement has come from failure to adhere to government’s otherwise prudent fiscal and monetary policies i.e. keeping public expenditure and money supply consistent with the level of economic activity in the economy. So what is ailing Uganda is not policy failure as the opposition has been saying, but failure to adhere to existing policy and practice.

In response to inflation, the opposition had demanded that government intervenes to reduce prices. This could only be achieved either by cutting taxes or directly subsidising prices. Reducing taxes would reduce the revenues available to meet government’s other public expenditure requirements. So government would have to print money to finance lost revenue or directly subsidize prices – both of which would again drive up inflation.

Secondly, when the Uganda shilling suffered a dramatic depreciation, the opposition wanted government to intervene to control the price i.e. to subsidize consumption. I am sure Museveni would have welcomed such a move given his tendency towards populist policies. Yet the central bank had little capacity to intervene effectively (as opposed to symbolically) because government had drawn down foreign exchange reserves by more than one third, reducing Uganda’s foreign exchange import cover from six to four months.

The aim of the central bank is not (and should not be) to control the price of the dollar. Rather it is (and should be) to smoothen its fluctuation in whichever direction market forces send it. Such strategic intervention is meant to control the animal instincts of human beings: When people hear the shilling is going down rapidly, they buy dollars in panic; a factor that accentuates the problem. Central bank intervention to control the pace at which the dollar appreciates is aimed at avoiding this stampede. This is where free markets need some limited but smart state action to function well; such intervention manages irrational fears. Sadly, when you listen to public debate in Uganda, you hardly hear any serious policy debate on such matters of the national economy.

However, when anyone criticises the opposition about their lack of an alternative, they do not present it, they simply hit back accusing that person of having been bought by Museveni. Ugandans are getting sick and tired of this opportunistic and blackmailing behaviour.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Why we need to focus on results.

2011-07-16T10:58:00.000-07:00

The Price Of Besigye Museveni Rivalry.

2011-07-01T07:28:00.000-07:00

THURSDAY, 23 JUNE 2011 11:17 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Since 1996, it has become hard for the government to initiate and implement a big development project because of power struggles.

The contest for political power in Uganda between President Yoweri Museveni and the opposition largely led by Dr Kizza Besigye has become so intense that it has crowded out debate on policy alternatives. The struggle for power seems like an end in itself, rather than a means to an end i.e. serving the public good. The result is that since both sides have dug into this fight for supremacy there is little space for promoting the public interest. Journalists have inadvertently been sucked into this partisan struggle to argue for either side, only whipping up sentiments and seeking to score political points rather than to expose the selfishness of the actors.

Since 1996, it has become increasingly difficult for the government of Uganda to initiate a big development project and see it implemented. The initiative to develop a large electricity dam at Bujagali was fought and frustrated from 1998 until 2006 when an agreement was signed. Even then, the contract would have fallen through had the investor behind it not been the Aga Khan, owner of Daily Monitor where the self-righteous pursuit of government procedure is largely promoted. A dam that should have been completed in 2002 is not yet finished in 2011 i.e. nine years later.

In 1998 I was a central participant in resisting AES Corporation getting a power purchase agreement with the government of Uganda. Our reasons at the time were not procedural but actually of a strategic nature and included the pricing of electricity (which was reduced), the alternative uses of the water where the dam was being built (water rafting and the potential tourist income it would generate in the long term), the security concern of having three dams within short distance of each other, a hydraulic clause that had tied government to guarantee water levels in Lake Victoria, the opportunity cost of Bujagali which was Karuma and which would cost almost half the price to produce almost the same amount of electricity etc.

While our subjective motivations were noble, the objective outcome was to actually paralyse government and keep the country in darkness for another ten years. Between 1998 and 2002, I was an investigative reporter on government procurement. I witnessed how investors, especially big multi nationals were manipulating public institutions to paralyse government. If the Central Tender Board gave a contract to company A instead of company B, the loser would petition the Inspector General of Government and bribe officials there to write a report that the process was fraudulent and recommend cancelling it. It is easy to find fault even with the most transparent procurement process because there will always be a T that was not crossed.

Then company B would retaliate by petitioning Parliament. Finding cash-starved MPs, it would buy off the majority on the committee investigating the matter in order to get its way. These companies and their local auxiliaries would leak all these details to journalists for a story and I suspect even pay some of them to advance their cause. I remember one company offered me a first class ticket with 5-star hotel accommodation and per diem apparently to go to Europe to interview its CEO, an offer I turned down because it was clearly an attempt to co-opt me.

I made my career as an investigative reporter exposing failures in procurement procedures. I learnt that institutions meant to offer oversight on government procurement – the IGG, Parliament and even the courts – can and had actually been compromised. So each of them was trying to leverage its constitutional power to be involved in investigating a particular deal; the aim was not to hold the government to account, but to force bidders to go before it for a hearing so that it can extract bribes from them.

The second lesson I learnt was that often, any bidder is almost as good as the other in offering the service. The differences are never in substance but only in detail. I realised that these pretentious investigations to get a clean deal would take so long and cost so much in bribes that if ever the contract was finally awarded, it would be twice or even three times the original price. Bujagali rose from US$ 650m to US$ 980m by the time it was signed. The result of all these investigations, counter-investigations and all the drama it generated in the media was not a better deal for the public but rather it was to line the pockets of a few people and sell newspapers.

In 2002 I became General Manager of Monitor FM (later KFM) and was able to see the cost of these contestations. Uganda was riddled with limited electricity supply and we were spending millions of shillings per month on a thermal power generator, a factor that was inflicting unbearable damage to our profitability. It became clear to me that the opportunity cost of resisting Bujagali, regardless of our legitimate concerns, was too high. It is in this context that when in 2008 a friend brought me a detailed account of the unfair financial deals between the Aga Khan’s company and government of Uganda on Bujagali, I shelved the story.

I knew New Vision would not run it either because President Yoweri Museveni was keen on the deal and Robert Kabushenga would not antagonise him. Daily Monitor would not run it either because the Aga Khan was the beneficiary of government financial generosity. With the press quiet, the opposition to the dam at Bujagali had no public platform to amplify its voice. The project has thus proceeded because it has not been turned into a public scandal by the leading public moralists of our nation.

The lesson is that given entrenched corruption in Uganda (which I don’t think even the opposition can end), the best way forward is to build a consensus around promoting some public goods while accepting less costly violations of procurement rules. Since 2002, I have opposed every self righteous crusade to resist a big public investment deal because its tendering was not perfect. So I supported the Temangalo land transaction, Nsimbe and the redevelopment of the government’s Lugogo and Nakawa housing estates; and I have equally opposed every commission of inquiry and parliamentary investigation into such public investments.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

How Democracy is Breeding Crooks.

2011-06-20T15:27:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 17 JUNE 2011 07:20 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

In 2005 Museveni gave Shs5m to each MP to remove presidential term limits; in 2010, he paid Shs20m per MP to pass the Cultural Leaders Bill.

Last week, I was in Johannesburg to attend a World Bank conference on the South-South dialogue on natural resources. I sat there listening to Bank officials speak with confidence and cocksureness about the various solutions to Africa’s problems. Yet most of the proposed solutions were largely copy and paste ideas that ignore the real African context.

Indeed, the most frustrating thing about most discussion on Africa is the lack of linkage between the identified problems and the proposed solutions. Always, the solution does not evolve organically from the problem. Instead, it is handpicked from a theory developed in a textbook at Harvard or Cambridge based on the experience of North America or Western Europe. The source of Africa’s persistent failure seems to be this disconnect between the existing problems and proposed solutions.

One of the problems identified was the mismanagement of the continent’s rich natural resources. The answer was that this is because citizens do not have many ways of holding leaders to account. The solution to this was that Africa needs to strengthen parliaments and civil society to perform oversight functions. But is this really the necessary solution?

Since the mid to late 1990s, Africa has made commendable progress towards greater democratisation: the press is freer, political parties very vocal and “civil society” is vibrant. Indeed, the citizens of Africa show incredible capacity to hold their elected leaders to account. For example, in the United States, over 90 percent of incumbent members of congress are assured of re-election at every election. In Uganda and Kenya, over 65 percent of all MPs get voted out of office at every election.

Therefore, we can hypothesise that reform should be more possible in Uganda or Kenya than the US because there are no deeply entrenched legislators. Indeed, this constant threat of electoral punishment should cause our parliamentarians to deliver public goods and services to retain their seats. Thus, using conventional models, every new parliament in Uganda and Kenya should be dynamic and more oriented towards public service.

Yet, as many Ugandans (and indeed Kenyans) would attest, since 1996 we have witnessed a steady deterioration in the quality of individual MPs and the output of our parliaments generally. The reason is not that our people are not holding MPs to account. They are doing so differently i.e. during election campaigns. Thus, across our nation, voters insist that candidates pay them there and then – with beer, alcohol, sugar, salt, soap, rice, meat or cash – hence the increasing commercialisation of politics.

This form of holding politicians to account has powerful implications on public service. For example, once elected, every MP will try to make as much money as possible in order to survive the next campaign. Since they cannot rise such money from their official income and our political parties do little to fund them, they have to generate it through unofficial means i.e. corruption. It also means that honest and public spirited politicians increasingly find it hard to survive in our electoral politics.

As we have seen in Uganda, one by one – Amanya Mushega, Eriya Kategaya, Ruhakana Rugunda, Bidandi Ssali, Mathew Rukikaire – have progressively quit electoral politics. Meanwhile, the more corrupt, seeking personal profit began to join. Every election has reduced the number of honest, public spirited candidates and increased that of crooks. By the time Uganda had gone through four election cycles, the balance of power between the honest and the crooks favoured the latter i.e. a genuinely democratic process has led us to a very undemocratic outcome.

It therefore naïve to suggest “strengthening parliament” because as currently constituted the crooks outnumber the honest legislators. The bribe-price of an MP has also gone up. In the early 1990s, President Yoweri Museveni encountered parliamentary resistance whenever he sought to pass some progressive agenda like privatisation, liberalisation, deregulation or return of Asian properties. He would wear military fatigues, call a closed session of the NRC and literally bulldoze members to pass it. Here, authoritarian tactics were used to promote progressive change.

But as Museveni moved from seeking legitimacy based on progressive change to one based on “democratic consensus”, his authoritarian tendencies declined at the same pace as the increase in his corruption. Where he once bulldozed now he bribed! As bribery consolidated as the vehicle for managing our politics so did the quality of parliament decline. Today, every new parliament has a higher bribery rate compared to the previous one. In 2005 Museveni needed Shs5m to buy each MP to amend the constitution and remove term limits. In 2010, it cost him Shs20m to bribe each MP to pass the Cultural Leaders Bill – a 400 percent increase over five years.

Many Ugandans (and indeed many African elites, scholars on Africa etc) miss this very important nuance i.e. that the peculiar way in which democracy is evolving in our country (and continent) actually promotes increasing corruption and abuse of office. Uganda (and Africa generally) needs to begin a serious conversation on how to restructure our institutional and electoral rules with a view to minimising the tendency of electoral competition to create the forms of perversions that we see today.

This same perversion also applies for what we call civil society in Africa. Over 90 percent of what goes for civil society in Africa are NGOs most of which are foreign funded. Except for a few, many NGOs are set up largely to foster income streams for those who founded them. This has powerful implications on “civil society” as a vehicle for democratic accountability. The beneficiaries of the work of these NGOs are not rights-bearing members but clients who receive charity. They cannot hold NGO leaders to account via elections. NGOs do more to account to their donors than their “constituents”.

Therefore, the debate on democratic accountability in Africa cannot begin from an abstract theory of what parliaments and civil society do in North America or Western Europe. It has to begin with an appreciation of the unique and concrete constitution of our societies and political systems. Based on that understanding, we can debate how to foster institutional and electoral systems of accountability that minimise the risks of crooks and opportunities taking over our countries in the name of democracy.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

Foreign Policy names Andrew Mwenda as one ofthe top 100 most influential users on Twitter.

2011-06-20T15:13:00.000-07:00

THE LIST PRINT | TEXT SIZE | EMAIL | SINGLE PAGE
The FP Twitterati 100
A who's who of the foreign-policy Twitterverse in 2011.

BY FOREIGN POLICY | JUNE 20, 2011

These days, everyone from the Dalai Lama to Bill Gates is on Twitter, the microblogging platform founded in 2006. During breaking news events like the death of Osama bin Laden or for following the Arab uprisings, it's become an invaluable tool for keeping up to speed. But for many, it's still just another place to promote their own work, rather than engaging in a more natural give-and-take. So how do you tell who's really worth following? FP's got you covered. Here are 100 Twitter users from around the world who will make you smarter, infuriate you, and delight you -- 140 characters at a time.

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POLITICIANS AND DIPLOMATS

Danny Ayalon (@DannyAyalon) — Deputy foreign minister of Israel.

Carl Bildt (@carlbildt) — Swedish foreign minister and one of the most candid diplomats around.

Husain Haqqani (@husainhaqqani) — Pakistani ambassador to the United States; fierce advocate of tolerance and healthy bilateral relations.

Stephen Harper (@pmharper) — Prime minister of Canada; prefers overtime to shootouts when breaking an ice-hockey stalemate.

Boris Johnson (@MayorOfLondon) — London's outspoken and colorful mayor; Telegraph columnist.

Birgitta Jónsdóttir (@birgittaj) — Member of the Icelandic parliament; outspoken WikiLeaks supporter.

Paul Kagame (@PaulKagame) — President of Rwanda and Twitter fanatic.

Khalid Al Khalifa (@khalidalkhalifa) — Foreign minister of Bahrain.

Anders Fogh Rasmussen (@AndersFoghR) — Secretary-general of NATO.

Dmitry Rogozin (@DRogozin) — Russian ambassador to NATO; says the darnedest things.

Alec Ross (@AlecJRoss) — Senior advisor for innovation in the office of U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.

Alexander Stubb (@alexstubb) — Finnish minister for Europe and trade; peace enthusiast.

Shashi Tharoor (@ShashiTharoor) — Indian politician and former undersecretary-general at the United Nations.

SOUTH ASIA

C. Christine Fair (@CChristineFair) — Georgetown University assistant professor, dog lover, and sharp-tongued South Asia expert.

Henry Foy (@HenryJFoy) — New Delhi-based correspondent for Reuters.

Mohammed Hanif (@mohammedhanif) — Brilliant Pakistani novelist.

Huma Imtiaz (@HumaImtiaz) — Pakistani journalist based in Washington, D.C.

Saad Mohseni (@saadmohseni) — Afghan-Australian media tycoon based in Dubai.

Nitin Pai (@acorn) — Indian blogger and editor of Pragati -- the Indian National Interest Review.

Arif Rafiq (@pakistanpolicy) — Pakistani-American analyst, consultant, and blogger based in New York.

Nahal Toosi (@nahaltoosi) — Associated Press correspondent in Islamabad.

Declan Walsh (@declanwalsh) — AfPak correspondent for the Guardian.

Omar Waraich (@OmarWaraich) — Freelance journalist based in Islamabad.

Mosharraf Zaidi (@mosharrafzaidi) — Pakistani newspaper columnist and development consultant; Maple Leafs fanatic.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Issandr El Amrani (@arabist) — Writer and analyst based in Cairo.

Aluf Benn (@alufbenn) — Editor and columnist for Haaretz.

Andy Carvin (@acarvin) — Senior strategist at NPR and curator par excellence of the Arab Spring.

Martin Chulov (@martinchulov) — Middle East correspondent for the Guardian.

Golnaz Esfandiari (@GEsfandiari) — Iran reporter and blogger for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, based in Washington, D.C.

Kevin Flower (@KMFlower) — Jerusalem bureau chief for CNN.

Amira Al Husseini (@JustAmira) — Cat-loving Middle East editor for Global Voices, based in Bahrain.

Hussein Ibish (@Ibishblog) — Blogger and senior research fellow for the American Task Force on Palestine.

Gregory D. Johnsen (@gregorydjohnsen) — Yemen expert at Princeton University.

Dalia Mogahed (@DMogahed) — Cairo-born director of the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center and Gallup Center for Muslim Studies.

Eman Al Nafjan (@Saudiwoman) — Saudi Arabia's most prominent female blogger.

Ahmed Al Omran (@ahmed) — The original Saudi blogger; recent Columbia School of Journalism graduate.

Mina Al-Oraibi (@AlOraibi) — Reporter for the pan-Arab daily Asharq Al-Awsat.

Sultan Al Qassemi (@SultanAlQassemi) — Prominent Emirati columnist, investor, and art aficionado; go-to source for breaking news from the Arab world.

Shmuel Rosner (@rosnersdomain) — Editor and columnist for the Jerusalem Post.

Mahmoud Salem (@Sandmonkey) — Foul-mouthed Egyptian revolutionary blogger and son of a former ruling-party parliamentarian, based in Cairo.

Yigal Schleifer (@YigalSchleifer) — Turkey correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor.

Lara Setrakian (@Lara) — Reporter for Bloomberg and ABC News. Currently based in Dubai.

Brian Whitaker (@Brian_Whit) — Middle East editor for the Guardian and a keen analyst of regional politics and trends.

Ben Wedeman (@bencnn) — Roving Middle East correspondent for CNN; first Western reporter to enter Libya during the uprising.

AFRICA

Scott Baldauf (@baldaufji) — Africa bureau chief for the Christian Science Monitor.

Ian Birrell (@ianbirrell) — Former deputy editor at the Independent and David Cameron speechwriter; now a columnist and the co-founder of Africa Express music project.

Howard French (@hofrench) — Former New York Times correspondent in Africa and China.

Rebecca Hamilton (@bechamilton) — Sudan correspondent and author of Fighting for Darfur.

Andrew Mwenda (@AndrewMwenda) — Managing editor of Uganda's Independent magazine; aid critic.

WHAT MAKES A GREAT LEADER?

2011-06-13T01:21:00.001-07:00

SATURDAY, 11 JUNE 2011 09:01 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

If individual ability and the right circumstances are necessary but not sufficient for success, what else is needed?

Recently, I chanced upon a documentary on Discovery Channel titled “Altered Statesmen” and featuring British World War II hero, Winston Churchill. It is a story of alternative history. Good old Winston was a restless man and a war monger. He could not easily cope with peacetime because he would have nowhere to offload his enormous energy – so he became manic depressive. He would try to cure this by resorting to heavy drinking, which made him an alcoholic. When the Second World War broke out, he came to life again – telling his wife that he felt happy for the first time in years.

During the inter war years (1919 to 1939), Churchill was in the political wilderness – moody, grumbling and alcoholic. When Adolf Hitler came to power in Germany in 1933 and began rearmament, Churchill’s instincts and desires were aroused. So he began talking of a war to stop the German dictator’s ambitions before they grew out of control. But Europe, exhausted by the First World War, did not want war. So Churchill seemed out of place. Instead, popular opinion favored Neville Chamberlin, a gentleman who believed in doing anything to avert war. But when Chamberlin’s policy of appeasement (actually seen as the most reasonable thing at the time) failed to stop Europe’s descent to war his star fell alongside his government.

So as the Second World War began, Churchill was recalled and made First Lord of the Admiralty i.e. in charge of the British navy, the strongest in the world at the time. In May 1940, Chamberlin was forced out of office under shouts “You have been too long for any good you have done. In the name of God, GO! Churchill became Prime Minister just as the Germans were about to overrun France and the surviving British troops about to escape from Dunkirk. Then Hitler launched the Battle of Britain – sustained aerial bombardment of London and other cities. It seemed there was no chance that Britain would withstand the onslaught. Then Hitler offered an armistice.

Given the precarious position in which Britain was (Italy was fighting alongside Germany, Japan was Hitler’s ally, the Soviet Union had a non aggression pact with the German dictator, and the USA was totally against involvement in the war) no reasonable leader would have turned down Hitler’s offer. Churchill did. It was a big gamble but it paid off. This raises a fundamental question: was Churchill’s firm stand against Hitler a result of his strategic vision or his belligerent character? Yet Britain triumphed over Germany because of the many blunders Hitler made. What would have been the alternative history if Hitler had not made those blunders?

This begs the question of what makes some leaders successful and others failures. Those who believe in individual ability (agency) argue that it is the inherent qualities embedded in the personality of a leader. It is the theory advanced by Thomas Carlyle about the importance of the “great man” in history. For example, Timothy Kalyegira attributes all the failures of Uganda under President Yoweri Museveni almost entirely to the president’s personality. Others, like Charles Onyango-Obbo, take almost the opposite position attributing almost everything to the structural circumstances in which Museveni operates.

“Men make their own history,” Karl Marx wrote while commenting on the coup d’état by Louis Napoleon in France in his 1852 classic, The Eighteenth Brumaire, “but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past.” Those who believe in predestination may attribute success or failure in leadership to fate, the stars or the gods; the ones more interested in science can call it luck.

The American historian William Durant was asked this question and he said that circumstances make demands on a leader’s ability, character and temperament. It is the leader’s ability to raise to the occasion, Durant reasoned, that determines whether he will succeed (and become great) or fail (and fall into the dustbin of history).

Human beings have different skills, values, personalities and temperaments. All these in and of themselves don’t make a great leader. Rather, it is how they are called upon by circumstances at a particular time. However, as the quote from Marx above shows, no leader determines the circumstance that will call upon his/her ability. That is decided by history (or fate). So it seems that great leaders don’t make themselves great. That is done by circumstances – circumstances that are chosen randomly. So the gods or stars or fate or luck – whatever you call it – is the ultimate decider.

This means that a leader is not a good leader per se but only good in relation to how his personality meets the right circumstances. A person who would have made a good leader during a period of prosperity may not be a good leader during periods of scarcity. Some leaders are good in inspiring people to fight, others to be peaceful. Possibly Mahatma Gandhi would have made a disastrous general and Alexander the Great would never have negotiated the unity of all Greece against the Persians by peaceful means.

Even in business, circumstances are just as good as one’s skills. And luck plays a central role in defining that. For example, there are CEOs who are good at managing start-ups but poor at running established businesses. There are those who are good at managing turnarounds but disastrous in managing thriving ones. There are people who make excellent CEOs only when managing big resources and others while managing meager resources. Again, leadership ability is a combination of the right interaction between structural imperatives and personal qualities.

Leaders are always at the mercy of chance because what they do has to interact with so many other complex and diverse variables many of which are beyond their control. As seen above, a lot of the achievements we attribute to Churchill were actually only possible because of blunders by Hitler. The Second World War could have gone either way. This shows that one’s legacy is shaped possibly more by forces beyond their control as by their own vision. This makes it important to study alternative history i.e. the “what if?”

amwenda@independent.co.ug

THE CHALLENGE AMAMA MBABAZI FACES.

2011-06-13T01:19:00.000-07:00

THURSDAY, 02 JUNE 2011 12:16 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

While it is political choices that have fostered poor service delivery, it is reconfiguration of the civil service that will make service delivery possible

Finally, President Yoweri Museveni has ended the anxiety that was eating up the ruling classes – politicians, business persons, civil servants, prelates, journalists, etc by announcing his long awaited new old-cabinet. The politicians were expecting ministerial jobs from which they derive money and status. The journalists were hungry for a good story to go on the covers. Business people were anxious to know whom they now need to ingratiate themselves to, to gain advantage.

Their mutual anxiety provided considerable grist to the Kampala rumour mills. The newspapers speculated, politicians waited with excruciating pain, business hedged their bets while the public watched. Politicians were visiting churches and shrines seeking divine intervention in their quest for cabinet jobs. All this only shows that in spite of privatisation and liberalisation, the state in Uganda (i.e. politics) remains the central fulcrum through which economic and career opportunities are organised. That is why a cabinet reshuffle is bigger news than the rise and fall in the price of the dollar or of shares on our struggling stock exchange.

Over the last 25 years, Museveni has reshuffled cabinet 16 times: January 1986, February 1988, April 1989 (after expansion of NRC), June 1990, February 1992, November 1994, July 1996, December 1998, June 1999, June 2001, October 2002, July 2003, October 2004, August 2005, June 2006, January 2009 and May 2011. Only once has a reshuffle signalled a major shift in our national direction.

In February 1992, the president merged the ministry of finance with that of economic planning; removed Crispus Kiyonga as minister and replaced him with Mayanja Nkangi and appointed Tumusime Mutebile Permanent Secretary in the new enlarged ministry and Secretary to the Treasury. This marked a bold shift from state planning to reliance on free markets. From thence henceforth, government initiated a series of macroeconomic policy reforms – liberalisation, privatisation, deregulation, fiscal discipline and tight monetary control that launched the country on a trajectory of sustained economic growth of the last 24 years.

Since then, all other reshuffles have been largely political aimed at placating historical, ethnic, religious and clan interests within our body politic. Yet every time there is a reshuffle, the elite classes in Uganda debate, discuss and talk about what it means for the ordinary citizen, how it will deliver this and that public good. Yet cabinet in Uganda is not designed to deliver public goods and services but primarily to build a political coalition that can deliver an electoral majority.

During the last presidential election campaign, something happened that may (please note the use of the word “may”) signal a shift in Museveni’s thinking. Across the country, the population complained that public goods and services were not working. The president was forced to campaign as an opposition candidate, positioning himself as a critic of local authorities unto whom he deflected blame for government failures. The population largely agreed with him on the understanding that he must clamp down on the corruption of local officials.

It seems Museveni is acutely aware that unless he does something about service delivery, the population is going to lose patience with him. And if that happens, no amount of intimidation, vote rigging and bribery is likely to save NRM from the wrath of angry voters. Already, public discontent over food and fuel prices is giving the opposition popular appeal. Museveni therefore must be aware of the need to address the concerns of the voters. The recent cabinet reshuffle therefore can be seen in this light.

At its root is the appointment of Amama Mbabazi as Prime Minister. Mbabazi may be a polarising and dogged politician. But those who have worked closely with him find Mbabazi a performance oriented and results seeking manager. He may not be a good politician but he seems to be an effective manager. My brother who worked with him on security in eastern Uganda was impressed by his personal discipline, hard work and strategic focus. It is these qualities that make a good manager.

Given that Mbabazi has the confidence of the president, he is the man who can bring a performance based ethnic in government work. He can decide on goals and push ministers and permanent secretaries to deliver on agreed targets. If any minister fails, Mbabazi has the political clout to get them fired. If Museveni gives him power to do this, it is very likely that Mbabazi will begin to address lethargy in the civil service and get government to perform. If my intuition is right, Museveni, in appointing Mbabazi as Prime Minister, may be trying to shift his strategy of political coalition-building from overarching reliance on elite patronage to performance based legitimacy through the delivery of public goods and services.

The appointment of Mrs Maria Kiwanuka also gives some indicators that the president may be shifting to a more business friendly and results oriented leadership. I think Syda Bumba was excellent as bureaucrats in finance and donors were happy with her. However, Mrs Kiwanuka brings a private sector ethic into government. Her husband, Mohan, is one of the richest people in Uganda who built a large empire without much reliance on state patronage. She has worked with World Bank and been managing a private enterprise for years.

It seems Museveni felt the anger and frustration of his supporters about government service during his campaign. He came across as both shocked by and concerned about popular demands for public goods and services. He made promises that he may find difficult to renege on without high political costs. Yet save for Mbabazi and Kiwanuka and a few others, most of the other cabinet appointments seem aimed at placating political interests rather than driving performance by government agencies.

There is a lot of absenteeism, foot-dragging, corruption, incompetence, false compliance, apathy etc in our civil service. Yet success of any government programme can only be possible if the civil service is ideologically and ethically oriented to service to the citizen, not serving its own interests. Mbabazi’s challenge is to recognise that while it is political choices that have fostered poor service delivery, it is the reconfiguration of the civil service that will make service delivery possible; his primary objective is to reform the civil service, not to fire ministers.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

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Rwanda and prejudices towards Africa.

2011-05-30T00:51:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 27 MAY 2011 07:28 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Without placing allegations of human rights abuses in context, it is easy to call Obama or Cameron delusional despots.

Last week, President Paul Kagame of Rwanda, while on twitter, got into a heated exchange with a British journalist, one Ian Birrell. The journalist was accusing him of human rights violations, insisting the Rwandan president should account to him (as who?)for these abuses. Then Birrell shifted from accusations to insults and called Kagame a “delusional despot.” Meanwhile, the Rwandan president remained calm and continued to explain to Birrell that he does not know much about Rwanda and has therefore no right to judge him.

Over the years, human rights activists, end-poverty evangelists, politicians, rock stars, journalists and diplomats from the western world have become extremely vocal in affairs that concern the people of Africa. They carry a near-cultural arrogance that makes them feel qualified to judge and dictate affairs on the continent. One wonders why this British journalist (like many of his ilk) feels he cares about the human rights of the people of Rwanda than its elected president and government. Why does he think he is more humane (or human) than Kagame?

Later in the week the police in London warned two Rwandan exiles – Rene Mugyenzi and Jonathan Musonera – that Kigali had sent a hit squad to kill them. The British media hyped it equating it to Alexander Litvinenko, the Russian ex-spy who was allegedly killed in London by Russian intelligence in 2007.

I do not put it past the Rwandan government to try to kill those it considers dangerous to its security. All governments, democratic or otherwise do. Bin Laden has just met his fate as many enemies of America including presidents of sovereign nations have. This is not to say such actions are morally right. Rather, it shows that states kill to promote their interests; if Kagame tried it, it would not be an aberration by a “delusional despot”.

My interest however is how western media cover these issues when it comes to Africa – and how Africans parrot it. Many western journalists begin from the assumption that African leaders are barbaric tyrants. Therefore, any negative story they hear about an African leader only confirms this prejudice. So they make little or no effort to crosscheck and confirm the authenticity of the accusations. Cognitive scientists call this “confirmation bias”; even ridiculous allegations are taken as ipso facto true.

For example, I believe there have been many instances when the government of Rwanda under Kagame has committed human rights abuses. This was true most especially immediately after the genocide. I do not share RPF’s self-image as a holy organisation. I take it that the state was still fragile. However, the intensity of such abuses has greatly diminished as the regime has consolidated.

Anyone with the most basic knowledge of post conflict political consolidation would not be surprised by this. RPF inherited a collapsed state, its own military and administrative structures were in infancy. Therefore, human rights abuses were inevitable results of state weakness, not blood-thirsty leadership. What is surprising is not that these abuses took place at all but rather the effectiveness and speed with which RPF has been able to consolidate power and establish a stable political order.

Just compare poverty-stricken Rwanda to Great Britain and the United States – nations that have existed for centuries and have developed enormous and rich intellectual, financial, technological and institutional resources and capabilities. When Al Qaeda, an external enemy, killed 3,000 people on 9/11, they began to detain suspects without trial, torture them and invade other countries. There, their armies have committed atrocities against ordinary civilians. Does this make President Barak Obama and Prime Minister David Cameron, “delusional despots”?

Post genocide Rwanda confronted mass murderers who had killed one million people. The killers were not foreigners from distant lands. They were resident citizens. Although the genocide had been planned by the state, it was executed by society – so RPF inherited a criminal population. A young and fragile army had to pacify a country where the enemy lurked everywhere. How anyone would expect zero human rights abuses in such context is beyond me.

Morally, Kagame shines far above George Bush and Tony Blair or Cameron and Obama. The leaders of these democracies have proceeded to jail, torture and kill suspected Al Qaeda sympathisers without any due process – including small people like taxi drivers, idlers and hawkers. In Rwanda, Kagame has promoted restorative justice where only the ringleaders of genocide were prosecuted while the masses who implemented it have been forgiven and re-integrated in society.

The scale of the challenge RPF faced was such that hardly anyone would have predicted success. One would have expected a counter genocide. There were only isolated human rights abuses. Within 17 years, RPF has been able to reconstruct the state and economy and institutionalise power so rapidly that human rights abuses are increasingly becoming a thing of the past. The speed and effectiveness of this achievement is a feat without precedent in human history.

Today, poor Rwanda has 98% of its people on medical insurance, 100% of its mothers give birth with the assistance of a medical professional, 97% of its pregnant mothers receive antenatal care, 100% of its malnourished kids get milk and cereal from government clinics daily etc. Kagame has been the driver of this, a factor that demonstrates his commitment to humanity, not a cruel, human rights-abusing delusional despot that Birrell presents. This journalist may wish to join a human rights campaign for Osama Bin Laden who has been killed “without trial by Obama.”

The issue of hired Rwandan hit-men is a joke except that the allegation is made by the British police. The influence of Western prejudices has penetrated our (African) social consciousness. So we also easily believe that we are as barbaric as western media and scholar have constructed us. We are more inclined to believe that when the British police say something, it is true. We forget that the British police are as prejudiced as its journalists.

This prejudice led western intelligence to believe wild stories by Iraqi exiles that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction even without pausing to question the credibility of their sources. I find it hard to believe that the government of Rwanda is so reckless as to jeopardise its relations with UK by attempting to kill Musonera and Mugyenzi – the two are too insignificant in the wider challenges Rwanda government faces to risk everything to kill them. These accusations are therefore bought because of deeply entrenched western prejudices about Africa.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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Will Besigye Rise To Challenge?

2011-05-30T00:48:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 20 MAY 2011 06:28 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

Peaceful protest cannot be an end in itself; it must have an objective. The tactics must seek to persuade not to intimidate

Over the last one month, opposition leader Dr Kizza Besigye has made one of the most dramatic political comebacks in history. Having been humiliatingly defeated by his archrival, President Yoweri Museveni in the February 18th 2011 elections, Besigye looked like a lost cause. Save for a few of his fanatical supporters, most people had written him off as a spent force. Today, even Besigye sceptics are awed by his political re-invention.

Yet Besigye is leading a struggle whose strategy he does not seem to understand. Consequently, and save for gross government mistakes, he can only score political points but can hardly mobilise a broad coalition for real reform. Peaceful protest cannot be an end in itself; it must have an objective. In Uganda’s specific case the strategic objective should be political and electoral reform; the tactics can include promoting this through a national dialogue as happened in most of Africa in the early 1990s through national conferences or precipitating regime collapse as has happened in Egypt and Tunisia.

From the above therefore, the tactics of peaceful protest must seek to persuade or seduce, not to intimidate or threaten. This is because you have to ensure that the people you are protesting against see you as a partner in future negotiations, not an enemy to be destroyed. Of course initially you will be perceived as a threat and the knee jerk reaction of those within the state is to crack down on you and your supporters. But governments are never homogeneous; so there are always many moderate forces within the system who would argue that you should be listened to and that there should be negotiations. We can call such persons your “internal surrogates.”

Therefore you need a message that is conciliatory, not confrontational; a struggle that has a clear purpose and that embraces all the constituencies that stand to benefit from protest. These are assets that help your internal surrogates to make the case for dialogue within the system. Thus, while the first objective of such a peaceful struggle is to organise opposition elements into a coalition to protest, the second and more important objective would be to simulate dissent within the ruling establishment against violent crackdown.

Besigye has been fairly successful in the first objective but seems uninterested in the second. He does not seem to realise that there are many people within NRM and in the armed forces who believe there should be dialogue on political and electoral reform in Uganda and that these people are an important constituency he needs to cultivate. Instead Besigye seems to be pursuing a war against anyone and everyone associated with the government and makes no effort to broaden his appeal beyond his core base.

The problem with Besigye is that he gets carried away by events and misses the broader political objective of his struggle, a factor that reflects a critical weakness in his leadership ability. Thus, when he is stopped by the police, he gets angry at the ordinary constables implementing an order they cannot defy. So he raves at them, mocks and shows contempt for them. Yet these ordinary police officers suffer the brunt of inflation most; so they should be seen as potential allies to seduce, not enemies to berate.

These factors show that Besigye’s courage is necessary but his strategy and tactics are ill-suited for the kind of struggle he is involved in. He is, I think, one of the most principled politicians in contemporary Uganda. His courage and principles make him a good candidate to lead an armed struggle but a shabby one to lead a peaceful protest. In armed struggle, you need to inspire the most passionate to destroy; in peaceful struggle you need to convince the most destructive to preserve. While the enemy in an armed struggle is obvious and is a target for destruction, your enemy in a peaceful movement is a potential ally; he needs to be seduced, not confronted; cajoled not intimidated.

While armed struggles succeed by heightening people’s passions and polarising political positions, peaceful struggles succeed by moderating political positions and accommodating conflicting view points. In an armed struggle you need an alliance of the likeminded, in a peaceful protest you harness the diversity of viewpoints into a unity of purpose. While armed struggles are disciplined with a clear leader and chain of command, peaceful protests are chaotic, conflict-ridden and decentralised.

These differences can also be read in the speeches and writings of leaders like Samora Machel, Che Guevara, Amilcar Cabral and Mao Tse Tung against those of Martin Luther King, Mahatma Ghandi and the post-1990 Nelson Mandela. The former talk about “them” (i.e. the other), the latter talk of “we” (all of us are in this together). The armed revolutionary’s tone is belligerent and the language is full of words like defeat, kill and destroy. The peaceful protester’s tone is moderate, the language has words like understanding, forgiveness, work together, tolerate one another etc.

Besigye has demonstrated one of the most important credentials of leadership – sacrifice. The price he and his family have paid for his political position has been extremely high. He has lost a brother, his wife and her siblings have been sent to exile, his sisters too. His supporters have been jailed, tortured and on occasion some have been killed. His friends have lost their businesses and much more. He carries this burden on his head. He has endured all this and remained true to his beliefs, however wrong or lofty they may be. This has given him the highest trust a people can have in their leader; he has demonstrated that he is dependable and reliable.

Besigye’s challenge is to transform from a belligerent, angry and polarising figure into a skilful political manipulator; to learn the skill set he needs for this new type of peaceful struggle. If he continues with his belligerent tone, he will appeal to his fanatical base but will find it difficult to broaden his appeal. This base will furnish his Walk to Work campaign with hundreds of stone wielding youths but will not convince other groups within Uganda to join in to create a broad front for protest.

amwenda@Independent.co.ug

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The futility and dangers of a NATO-installed regime in Libya

2011-05-30T00:46:00.001-07:00

FRIDAY, 13 MAY 2011 09:18 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

The incentive structure created by NATO’s commitment to the rebels will breed a movement of opportunists, not democrats.

Recently, NATO airstrikes killed the son of Libyan leader Maummar Al Gaddafi and his three children. Officially, NATO’s role in the ongoing conflict in Libya is to protect that nation’s civilians. However, quite often one has to worry why (or whether) western powers care more about the welfare of Libyans than Libyan leaders! Besides, how does this deliberate targeted killing of innocent babies constitute “protecting” civilians?

Gaddafi is certainly an intolerant despot who has dominated Libya for 42 years. During this time, he has done a couple of good things for Libyans. However, he has also oppressed his people, tortured and killed many of them, abused and misused their resources, despoiled their common patrimony and much more. There is a broad consensus that he should be kicked out. However, there is a real challenge on how to organise his exit in a manner that protects Libyans from jumping from the frying pan into the fire. Yet most commentary on Libya today ignores the possibility and even the probability of the risk of such an outcome in the country.

There has been an international outcry in support of the rebels fighting him. But opposing Gaddafi does not make the rebels democrats; they could be worse. Those intervening to save Libya need to pause and reflect on what credibility these rebels have demonstrated to win anyone’s trust. Fighting Gadaffi in and of itself does not make anyone and everyone a democrat; even a psychopath can join resistance against him. This simplistic embrace of everyone and anyone who shouts “wolf” at a sitting tyrant has produced many pseudo liberators in Africa.

Our continent is full of them. Gaddafi came as a liberator. The fallen Ivorian leader Laurent Bagbo, Uganda’s brutal tyrant Idi Amin, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, etc all came as liberators. It is therefore very frustrating that many African elites who have gone through these experiences of liberators turning into tormentors of our people are also the same elites to jump on the bandwagon of change before considering the real possibility that change of leaders may not mean change in leadership style. There is little reason yet to believe that Libyan rebels are genuine democrats other than the fact that they resist Gaddafi.

Initially, NATO intervened in the conflict in Libya because Gaddafi was using air force planes to bomb unarmed civilian demonstrators. However, the struggle has since transformed into an armed conflict; peaceful protest has given way to a violent struggle for power. This gives the government a legitimate right to use military power against the rebels. At this point, NATO should have left since its role was to “protect civilians” Gaddafi was bombing. It has instead stayed, thus transforming its mission into one of helping armed rebels to depose a government of a member state of the UN. This new self-arrogated NATO mandate goes against the spirit and letter of UN Resolution creating a no-fly zone.

Yet many observers have argued that left on their own, the anti-Gaddafi rebels would be wiped out by his superior firepower. This argument is inadequate. There is no evidence to suggest that indiscriminate bombing by a powerful military always succeeds against a defenceless people. The US spent 12 years bombing the people of Vietnam. It lost! A similar experience was suffered by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Today, the US and her NATO allies have been bombing the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan for nine years. By 2009, US military assessment was that the Taliban were winning the war. Gaddafi does not even have 1% of NATO’s bombing power.

Other people argue that the international community should not sit idly and watch another Rwanda in Libya. Yet the international community intervened in Rwanda. There was a UN force called UNAMIR. The international community was trying to impose a standard solution on Rwanda – a ceasefire, followed by a government of “national unity” and then general elections. These standard solutions were ignoring the intricacies of the problem. The result would have been an unstable government of conflicting parties characterised by a low intensity conflict in which millions would have died over several years leaving the country in a mess.

This scheme failed, the country degenerated into genocide and one million people died in three months. However, out of that catastrophe, a more enlightened group – the RPF – captured power. It has been able to stabilise the political dispensation and build one of the most effective states in post-colonial Africa. Rwandan teaches us that Africa does not need external saviours, however well intentioned, because they do not understand the complexity of our problems. They try to impose solutions that have worked elsewhere but are not suited to our specific experiences.

Even where Africa fails, it should never justify us submitting to foreign control. We need to organise our own social movements to overcome tyranny. And this is not because the outside world is ill-intentioned. Rather it is because even when noble in their intentions, they do not understand our intricacies. Foreign solutions often fail to take into consideration the uniqueness of our problems. The people of Egypt and Tunisia have shown that our societies have capacity to bring down entrenched tyrants.

NATO’s particular approach to the Libyan problem will undermine the democratic content of the current struggle. By guaranteeing rebel victory and babysitting them all the way to power, it is actually encouraging opportunists without strong commitment to reform to join. Many former Gaddafi handlers are now joining the rebellion in order to be on the winning side, not because they believe in the objectives of the struggle. With time, the opportunists will crowd out the genuine democrats.

We have to distinguish the need for Gaddafi to go from the way he goes and the people who replace him. It is possible to jump from the frying pan into the fire. The incentive structure created by NATO’s commitment to the rebels is going to produce a movement of opportunists, not democrats. Look at how many people received Idi Amin in Uganda thinking he was liberating them from Milton Obote’s tyranny! Being frustrated by a tyrant should not lead us to believe that any and every alternative is better.

This is not to say that foreign support is bad per se. However, such support must be minimal, aimed at building the capacity of local actors to prosecute the war on their own. Rebels should be willing to pay the price of such an undertaking. They must be the drivers. They must demonstrate they can mobilise resources, build an organisation and inspire people. They must also demonstrate a willingness to pay the price of freedom. Many have already done part of this, and they should be given space to build that capacity over a period of time. The form of support by NATO today is decisive; it will decide who wins and who loses.

Besides, NATO is setting a standard for how Gaddafi should behave towards rebels that goes against its own practice. For example, US bombing raids have been killing innocent civilians in Afghanistan for nine year. US troops have been partly responsible for the death of many innocent civilians in Iraq. All that former US secretary of defence, Donald Rumsfeld, had to say about this was that “stuff happens.” Why is it that when the same crime is committed by NATO or the US, it is “collateral damage”; when done by Gaddafi, it is called mass slaughter of the innocents?

It seems therefore that the wider concept of international criminal justice and its body, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is merely an instrument for western powers to impose their wishes on leaders in poor countries. Yet the problem is not merely the targeting of leaders of poor countries who commit atrocities. Rather it focuses on those leaders who commit crimes and also threaten the interests of the western powers. There seems to be an attempt by the western powers to regain control over the management of affairs of poor countries that was lost through decolonisation.

Africa is coming under increasing pressure to surrender key decision making powers to the international community, the west. Today, international financial institutions like IMF and World Bank, international human rights groups, the global humanitarian effort to fight poverty and impunity in poor countries are trying to wrestle control of the management of African affairs from African decisions makers to themselves. The most effective instrument of this process, however, is intellectual; because elites in poor countries actually see these trends as legitimate. This movement is driven by a discourse on democracy and human rights that is actually disarticulated from the peculiar challenges our nations face.

Many of the criticisms raised by the international community in advancing the cause of Western control over our affairs are often correct. They also resonate with public opinion among a section of elites in our countries. However, my issue is not with the analysis of the problems but the solutions suggested. Many elites in Africa are frustrated by the forms of corruption, nepotism and incompetence of our rulers. But this frustration should not lead us to believe that external interventions are the solution, however well intentioned. Indeed, it is wrong to let one’s frustrations guide their vision. Not every/any alternative is better.

Thus, across a broad spectrum of our lives, someone else is claiming to be acting on our behalf and for our own good; our role is to be spectators. The people of Libya are protected by NATO, the hungry in Ethiopia are fed by World Food Programme, the sick in Congo are treated by Doctors Without Borders, Ivory Coast is liberated by French Special Forces, war in Sierra Leone is ended by British troops, Liberia is held together by US marines, at G8 summits it is Bono who represents the views of the poor.

In every effort aimed at our emancipation, someone else is doing it for us, on our behalf. We are victims to be “helped”; our role is to be passive spectators not active participants in efforts aimed at our own liberation. What we get are not hard won rights of a self determined people; it is charity from a caring and benevolent international community, the western world. So groups of activists have assembled on almost every single issue that affects our lives. They raise money, organise campaigns, speak on television, write in newspapers, organise seminars and lobby their parliaments in our name.

Yet this trend is not new. In the 19th century many high minded Europeans argued that colonialism was necessary to liberate us from the tyranny of our customs and the despotism of our chiefs. These were genuine ills in our societies and many African elites like Sir. Apollo Kagwa and Semei Kakungulu in Uganda joined the British to promote the colonial project. Colonialism was also meant to promote commerce, Christianity and civilisation but what we got was a regime of racial discrimination, exploitation and injustice.

Today, the situation is not very different. Every day I am watching on television Europeans and Americans discussing the liberation of Libya, not Libyans. I read newspaper articles written by the same people about freedom and democracy in Libya. The voice of Libyans is missing in this debate about their destiny, their future.

The lesson we learnt from colonialism was that although we face fundamental internal problems, foreigners are ill equipped to liberate us regardless of the nobility of their intentions. We need space to shape our destiny not because foreigners are bad but because they cannot understand the complexity of our problems. The problems our countries face are much more complex to be solved by a single stroke of removing one leader. We have seen many changes of government in Africa with little change in governance. Many tyrants have gone and worse have come into their stead.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

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How Bin-Laden Was Killed In Cairo.

2011-05-09T03:39:00.001-07:00

Bin Laden argued that to end local tyranny, Muslims should fight American first; Cairo and Tunis proved him wrong

On Monday, I walked into the studios of Capital FM for my morning radio show only to see breaking news on television that Osama Bin Laden had been killed. I just wept with joy. Coincidentally, on Sunday evening I had been arguing with a friend that Osama was going to get killed or captured because the raison detre for his terrorism had been eliminated by the success of democratic revolutions in the Middle East.

That Bin Laden has been killed after the success of democratic revolutions in the Middle East is not a coincidence. I suspect the two are linked. These revolutions have exposed the hollowness of his vision to the Islamic world – that Muslims can rid themselves of local tyrants through civil protests without fighting America and killing and maiming innocent civilians. The success of civil protests to overcome tyranny undermined the religious and ideological appeal of Al Qaeda’s vision and rendered it inevitable and even necessary for some Muslims to betray him to the Americans.

As is always its wont, the American government took full credit for the killing of Bin Laden. Of course tactically, it was an American victory especially because the forces involved in the operation were American. However, looked at strategically, the killing of Bin Laden was largely (not entirely) possible because those educated youths who brought down Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ben Ali in Tunisia and are threatening so many other despots in Syria, Yemen, etc had rendered Bin Laden’s message of fighting America as rearguard action against local tyranny irrelevant and misguided.

Many Arabs had always believed, and correctly so, that the success of entrenched autocrats in their countries was largely because of American patronage. Bin Laden tapped into this belief and used it as a justification for his war. He dressed it in the language of identity arguing it was a conspiracy of the Christian West to cripple Islam. But when American propped dictators began falling one by one, the air was sucked out of Bin Laden’s ideological balloon.

Bin Laden had argued that the existence of local tyranny in the Arab world was because of American support. That was of course true. He then argued that to local tyranny Arabs and Muslims needed to fight American first; and the mode of struggle was to be indiscriminate violence. That is where his vision became not only misleading but also disempowering.

As the events in Egypt, Tunisia and increasingly Yemen are demonstrating, local tyrants can be brought down in spite of American support for them. In fact, America had no idea that a widespread democratic revolution was in the making in the region. American “experts” had been writing books and academic papers on how Arab or even Islamic culture was inherently anti-democratic. Now we know they were wrong!

Bin Laden’s message was misdirecting the anger of Arab youth from the primary enemy (local tyranny) to a secondary one (the foreign patron). Secondly, his message was misleading Arab youths to fight an enemy they could not defeat instead of focusing on the one over whom they could prevail. Therefore, although subjectively an opponent of American propped despots in the Middle East, Bin Laden was objectively their ally. By focusing the mind of Arab youth on an enemy they could not defeat, he allowed local tyrants to consolidate their positions by exploiting US fears to get American money and support to crack down on dissent. When youth in Tunisia and Egypt brought America’s allies down, it was clear that Bin Laden’s vision had hit a dead end.

Therefore, the death of Bin Laden brings two important developments; it destroys the symbol of global terrorism thus sucking vital energy out of the movement. Of course Bin Laden had long been crippled organisationally. His role was primarily to be a source of inspiration. That is now gone. The most important development, however, has been the fact that the democratic movements in the Middle East are turning youths’ attention from the vision of Al Qaeda to one of civil protest in shaping their destiny.

There is the danger that Bin Laden’s death will invigorate Al Qaeda especially in its search for revenge. This can only work in the short term. The long term basis of Al Qaeda has cut down on the streets of Cairo and Tunis. It is not America that is the biggest threat to Al Qaeda and its cousin, political Islam; instead it is the success of democratic movements in the Middle East.

The frustrated youths who always sought inspiration in Al Qaeda can now get it from their own efforts on the streets. Cairo and Tunis demonstrated that terror is not the weapon of choice and Bin Laden is not the messiah of the Arab or Islamic world. Education, technology and the willingness to employ them civically is the way to go. Therefore, Bin Laden was politically dead before he was physically killed. It was therefore saddening that Obama did not say anything about this development in his speech.

Al Qaeda was surviving on a specific ideology, a specific set of domestic and global factors which have changed. Events in the Arab world have shown young people there that their destiny is in their hands and they can shape the political future of their countries without the support of America. People are feeling empowered and are now optimistic about the future.

Having been unable to predict, support or even stop the democratic movement in the Arab world, America, France and Britain have now jumped on the bandwagon to claim some victory – in Libya. As is their wont, they are pretending that the salvation of the people of that sorry country from the tyranny of Col. Muammar El Gaddafi will come from London, Paris and Washington. They are thus bombing Libyans to democracy.

American and Britain have been trying to impose democracy on Iraq with disastrous consequences – over 650,000 innocent civilians have died in this vain effort. Iraq remains a patchwork of sectarian warfare. Although less violence, it is certainly not democratic. The people of Egypt and Tunisia who decided to act for themselves are laying a better foundation for their countries. American has only accepted a faint accompli.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYA'S FUTURE.

2011-04-25T23:17:00.000-07:00

THURSDAY, 21 APRIL 2011 12:48 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Given Libya’s tribal cleavages, the contours of conflict will deepen ethnic tensions and threaten the institutional integrity of the state

Now, the complexity of the political problems of Libya is becoming apparent. There is a lot of back and forth shift in fortunes between rebels and forces loyal to Libya’s psychopathic tyrant, Muammar El Gaddafi; one day the rebels are advancing on some “strategic” town, on another they are in full retreat. The naive optimism of the early days of this insurgency is beginning to wane even among the ever-simplistic journalists as the real face of the rebels is becoming apparent.

What began as a peaceful demonstration has degenerated into an armed insurrection; and that is where the problem lies. Civil protests may seek to bring down a despot, but they do not seek to take over power themselves. Often, they seek to create a self-limiting authority; a government subject to popular control with checks and balances on how power is exercised. However, armed groups seek to take full control of government and enforce their will on the subject population.

This distinction is very important: everyone who holds power would not want to be controlled by popular pressure. Thus, when street protestors bring down a tyrant, the resultant government becomes aware that a state armed with tanks cannot defeat an enlightened population armed with tongues. Such a government will be responsive to popular demands well knowing the power of speech. However, when the winner secures victory through armed struggle, he can always use the state’s coercive apparatus to suppress popular demands on him.

Libya’s case is even worse. The rebels are an assortment of disparate groups of disorganised and undisciplined militias – some former soldiers, others ordinary civilians. They have no unifying political organisation held together by a shared ideology and political objectives except to remove Gaddafi. But if they remove him: so what? It seems rebel victory has the least potential to produce a stable political order, leave alone a democracy. The fact that rebels have been using the words; “freedom” and “democracy” in their battle cry does not mean much – all rebels do.

If the rebels succeed in removing Gaddafi, the most immediate result will be to bring to the fore the underlying structural tensions in their coalition. Because they do not belong to a common political organisation or share an ideology, and also because they have no shared economic and political objectives, the Libyan rebels (whom Western media and Al Jezeera naively or for propaganda reasons refer to as pro democracy fighters) will immediately begin to squabble. The most likely scenario will be the emergence of a bitter power struggle for control of the Libyan state.

Because of its vast oil wealth, the different rebel factions will find many willing patrons in the international oil industry seeking a share of the spoils. And since they are armed, the resultant power struggle will be violent and bloody. As the anti Gaddafi coalition fractures, it will confront and some of them even allay with pro Gaddafi (or merely former Gaddafi) militias seeking to regain political advantage. Given Libya’s tribal cleavages, the contours of division will deepen ethnic tensions and threaten the institutional integrity of the state and the unity of the country. It is very likely that in such ensuing chaos, even Iraq of 2005 will look like a haven for stability.

What will the international community do with its “allies” (the rebels) if they began to fight and target civilians in orgies of inter-tribal massacres? Well the “international community” largely (although not entirely) refers to the western powers led by the United States. As democracies subject to popular pressure, their response to humanitarian crises tends to be driven by emotions rather than sober deliberation. Thus, when images of barbaric massacres hit Western television screens, the knee jerk reaction of citizens is that their governments should intervene “to save lives”.

Although most Western intervention is often initiated by obvious (and overt) humanitarian considerations, the underlying driver is often geostrategic and economic. This is largely because a purely humanitarian intervention cannot be sustained through the rough waters of conflict especially when there is loss of precious Western blood. This explains the speed with which the US withdrew from Somalia after losing 18 soldiers in 1993 but could not retreat from Iraq even after losing 5,000. It also explains why NATO has intervened in Libya and not in Ivory Coast.

Assuming the rebels don’t defeat Gaddafi but stalemate him; what is likely to happen? True to form, the international community has one set of solutions to every conflict regardless of its context and dynamics: first, secure a cease fire between the fighting groups; second, cajole or coerce them to form an interim government of national unity; third, push them to hold multi party elections. The hope always is that elections are a magic bullet. In many cases, as in Ivory Coast since 2002, it is this naive faith in elections (which are often equated to democracy) as the solution to every political problem that has been the source of problems.

Thus, when elections are called, the different factions, already armed, will begin to scheme on how to win them – by hook or crook. In such a tense situation with every tribe owning its own militias, inter-ethnic violence will begin to border on genocide. International peace-keeping forces will be called in. But like in Ivory Coast, they will be postponing the inevitable. After years of low intensity conflict and skirmishes during which many will have been killed and displaced, the war will resume, UN peace keepers pull out and either Libya will turn into Somalia or Rwanda.

It is not the faith in democracy per se but rather its naive application to every problem in poor countries that should be questioned. In the case of a possible post Gaddafi Libya, the first objective should not be (because it cannot be) to build a democracy but rather to secure a stable political order. Democracy and its accompanying electoral competition does not end anarchy, it accentuates it. This is even worse when the society is militarised and factionalised along tribal and ethnic lines as Libya is. One hopes that those from outside trying to shape the destiny of Libya learn from history.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

WHY BESIGYE'S PROTEST RESONATES WITH THE PEOPLE OF UGANDA.

2011-04-23T08:10:00.000-07:00

ANDREW MWENDA.

After the February 18 presidential election, Uganda's opposition leader Kizza Besigye looked like a spent force.
He had obtained a paltry 26 per cent of the vote, down from a high of 38 per cent in 2006.
When he rejected the results, claiming they had been rigged, he sounded like a bad loser unwilling to accept the reality of his electoral defeat.
To add insult to the injury of his diminished appeal, he called for countrywide anti-government protests against alleged electoral theft.
No one showed up on the streets. By the beginning of April, analysts were thinking of how to write his political obituary.
However, within just the past week, Besigye has bounced back from possible political oblivion as the most potent threat -- yet again -- to President Yoweri Museveni and the ruling National Resistance Movement.
Apparently, a combination of good timing and government misjudgment colluded to reinvent Besigye's magic.
The fount and matrix of his comeback are the escalating fuel and food prices that have left many people across the political spectrum of the country feeling the pinch.
Since January, prices of essential commodities in Uganda have been escalating at an astronomical rate, driven by the rising price of fuel and the appreciation of the US dollar against the Uganda shilling.
This combined with a prolonged drought from December 2010 to March 2011 and excessive spending during elections -- the government passed a supplementary budget worth Ush600 billion ($260 million) and pumped it into the economy -- has pushed inflation from under 5 per cent in January to over 11 per cent in April.
These developments have led to growing discontent across the country.
People have been demanding that the government do something. But the government has been silent about the problem.
Consequently, it comes across as indifferent to people's plight or out of touch with their concerns.
Secondly, it has been in the news all for the wrong reasons -- for spending Ush1.8 trillion ($740 million) on sophisticated fighter jets and debating whether to spend Ush4 billion ($1.3 million) on the swearing in ceremony of the president.In the eyes of many, including the staunchest supporters of Museveni, this highhandedness was uncalled for.
Besigye came across a man fighting for the people's interest and paying the price for it.
On the other hand, because of the complete silence on the growing concern over prices, the government comes across as indifferent to people's interests.
Instead, it is involved in expensive and unnecessary expenditure plans like to shower billions on the president's swearing-in. Instead of responding to people's demands, the government is seen as seeking to suppress those who are voicing them.
Even among the most ardent supports of the NRM, Besigye is being seen as a victim of highhandedness.
On Thursday, the second day of the campaign, the protests spread across the country into six districts. The possibilities are open.
An avalanche does not begin with a big bang -- but as small and isolated pieces of snow breaking up here and there.
But when they coalesce and gain momentum, they become a force that destroys everything in its wake.
What is beginning as a small consumer protest in Uganda is now spreading across the country.
If the opposition can sustain the momentum, they have the potential to force a critical situation.
If the government delays announcing ameliorative measures, the demands may grow from food prices to regime change.
The morale booster impact of the Egyptian and Tunisian examples cannot be ignored.
Museveni has always positioned himself as a generous patron who takes care of the needy. His absence from the scene during people's suffering has not gone unnoticed.
It is in this context that Besigye and his allies plotted the "Walk to Work" campaign.
They claimed that their aim was to pressure government to do something about the food and transport costs. It has been a masterstroke.
Because previously, the opposition had always sought to mobilise people in its struggle to wrest power from Musveni and thereby came across as selfish, power-seeking politicians.
This time, however, it is mobilising them around a grievance that touches their wallets and stomachs. The appeal is powerful.
Initially, the opposition led by Besigye called upon government to do something about the food and transport costs.
When government ignored their call, Besigye declared that all opposition parties would launch the "Walk to Work" campaign to force the government to do something.
On the morning of Monday April 11, the campaign began in earnest.
The government was caught up in a Catch-22 situation; the opposition was holding it by the short and curlies, every option it chose was wrought with high risks.
If the government allowed the leaders of opposition to walk to work, they would attract large crowds into the city.
What if the crowds became bigger? Then what? Is it not possible that Uganda can catch Tunisia and Egypt's cold?
If they stopped them from walking, that would seem a stupid thing to do. Would it not generate mass hysteria and resistance?
How long would the government keep stopping them? Should it arrest them indefinitely?
If it agreed to do something, would it not seem as if it were weak, being pushed around by the opposition? All these challenges came within a particular context.
Over the past 20 years, the Museveni government has set in motion policies that have fostered rapid economic growth.

The economy was liberalised, thus creating space for free market competition.
This has generated a get-rich-quick culture. A few people are making pots of money, reflected in fancy cars, magnificent homes, modern shopping malls and high-rise office blocks.
This has attracted large numbers of youth from rural areas seeking opportunities in cities.
However, the number of immigrants into towns far exceeds available opportunities, hence slums, unemployment and crime.
Uganda's growth has ignited a boom in education from both public and private institutions.
In January, the Daily Monitor reported that Uganda produces 400,000 graduates from tertiary institutions every year but the public sector can only take in 20,000.
Both education and urbanisation are liberating forces: Beneficiaries gain access to local and international media.
This expands their horizons, which in turn increases their expectations.
However, the growth in their aspirations tends to be faster than the growth in opportunities.
The mismatch between expectations and available opportunities leads to social frustration.
This context has changed the dynamics of Uganda. The free market and its accompanying get-rich-quick culture have made Ugandans increasingly tolerant of corruption.
On the other hand, increased education and urbanisation have made people hostile to violence.
Therefore, while people are willing to accept financial bribes from Museveni in exchange for political support, they do not accept him beating or killing them to secure political loyalty; they are willing to accept Museveni the corrupter, not the killer!
For example, in 2006, Museveni employed unprecedented violence against Besigye -- throwing him in jail, charging him with rape, treason and terrorism and killing a few of his supporters.
This demoralised the president's supporters while energising his opponents.
The result was that Museveni's vote fell by one million from five million in 2001 to four million in 2006.
Meanwhile, the opposition voters were so energised that Besigye's votes grew from two million to 2.6 million votes.
In fact, opinion polls had showed Museveni at 47 per cent of the vote, Besigye at 43.
The Daily Monitor tally centre had tallied 3.6 million votes and Museveni had 47 per cent against Besigye's 43 per cent when the army intervened and shut it down.
Some time late last year and early this year, it seemed Museveni had learnt this lesson: That violence works against him while bribery does the magic.
Where he had always sent the military, police and other hooligans to attack opposition politicians during presidential campaigns, this time he used money.

The absence of violence in the campaigns sucked the air out of Besigye's campaign while the infusion of cash in Museveni's campaign put the president on a rollercoaster ride to victory.
When Museveni employed violence in Sironko district against Nandala Mafabi, people turned out in large numbers to vote for the opposition candidate. The message was clear.
It seemed that Besigye, who had always attracted public attention and sympathy for being flogged, was on the losing end of the political process -- until Monday.
On that day, the government responded to the "Walk to Work" campaign with extreme violence and brutality.
Besigye and other opposition leaders were manhandled, pushed like chicken thieves onto police pick-up trucks and arraigned before courts and charged with fictitious crimes -- all in front of the television cameras.

FINALLY THE OPPOSITION HAS A CHANCE .

2011-04-18T00:32:00.000-07:00

THURSDAY, 14 APRIL 2011 08:29 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

Uganda is now caught up in the contradiction of extreme wealth alongside excessive poverty and extreme luxury alongside mass deprivation

After a long period without any public issue around which to galvanise popular discontent in their favour, the opposition in Uganda has finally found one in the escalating food and transport costs. For the first time, the opposition is rallying the public on a grievance that touches the stomachs and wallets of millions and not one where it is merely fighting for power. Therefore the cat and mouse fight between them and the police has only begun and has potential to open the road to Tunisia and Egypt.

Over the last 20 years, President Yoweri Museveni has set in motion policies that have fostered rapid economic growth and thereby laid the foundation for the structural transformation of Uganda. A few people are making large sums of cash reflected in fancy cars, magnificent homes, modern shopping malls and high rise office blocks. This has attracted large numbers of youth from rural areas seeking to take advantage of opportunities in towns. However, the number of immigrants into towns far exceeds available opportunities hence slums, unemployment and crime.

Uganda’s growth has ignited a boom in education from both public and private institutions. In January, Daily Monitor reported that Uganda produces 400,000 graduates from tertiary institutions every year but the public sector can only take 20,000. Both education and urbanisation are liberating forces: beneficiaries gain access to local and international media. This expands their horizons which in turn increases their expectations. However, the growth in their aspirations tends to be faster than the growth in opportunities. The mismatch between expectations and available opportunities leads to social frustration.

Human talent for innovation is not evenly distributed in any society; only a few tend to be exceptionally good. Thus, when governments liberalise the economy to allow for market competition and efficiency, those who reap the largest share of benefits are the ingenious; and in the case of a patronage system like ours, those who are politically well connected. The simple tend to lose out thus generating envy among them. Economic envy and social frustration are the stuff out of which revolutions are incubated.

Therefore, Uganda is now caught up in the contradiction that characterises most rapidly growing economies of poor countries – the production of extreme wealth alongside excessive poverty and extreme luxury alongside mass deprivation. Since those who enjoy the high benefits of growth are few and those who are deprived are many, the political terrain tends to get charged. This is the common risk of all capitalist societies.

In the 19th century, the uneven distribution of the material benefits of economic growth led to the development of ideologies such as socialism, communism and nihilism. These ideologies challenged the legitimacy of capitalism as a system of organising human affairs. Their political strength combined with the inherent structural instability of capitalism forced the Western world to create welfare states. Social welfare was a redistributive mechanism intended to make everyone a beneficiary of growth without making everyone’s benefits equal as communism had promised.

Many people who support free market systems fail to understand the political and social value of some level of redistributive policies. For capitalism to survive, it needs to have a spirit – not just an abstract ideology of the inalienable right to the fruits of one’s innovation – but also the sense that everyone gains by the free market system. It is this value that is missing in Uganda because the system is too elite driven. There are hardly any successful social welfare programmes to make an ordinary person feel the benefits of growth.

It is in this context that fuel and food prices have colluded to give the opposition an opportunity to challenge the status quo. Uganda’s opposition has consistently been opportunistic, always only coming out to struggle for access to power and privilege rather than to fight for the interests of the ordinary person. Now for the first time, they have got their act right. They have announced their determination to sustain a campaign to boycott motorised transport and walk to and from work daily. Symbolically, it shows their concern for the urban workers, unemployed and poor, not their desire for power.

The rising cost of living, especially in Kampala is social dynamite waiting for a detonator. Even the most ardent supporters of NRM are feeling the pinch. It is going to be extremely difficult for NRM to ask Ugandans to tighten their belts when it is indulging in extravagant spending on sophisticated fighter jets worth over Shs 1.8 trillion. How can an economy that cannot feed its own people buy such expensive military-ware?

To make matters worse, Uganda may not avoid the morale booster impact of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions. Events in the Middle East have shown many that peaceful protest can bring down even the strongest government. Although the political system in Uganda is more open and competitive compared to Egypt and Tunisia before their revolution, we still suffer the sense that people cannot change government through elections. President Museveni has been in power forever and gives no indication of leaving.

Museveni is in a catch 22 situation. If he allows the opposition leaders to walk to Kampala, they may attract large crowds. How far will they grow? Can the regime contain masses of discontented demonstrators? If it blocks them and holds them at police stations, for how long will it keep them: for a day, a week, a month? If it releases them and they try to walk again, it may be forced to jail them indefinitely thus turning them into martyrs and heroes.

The future is always indeterminate. How the current political stand-off plays out will depend on how the opposition exploits every opportunity to put government on the defensive and how the regime addresses popular discontent in order to disconnect the masses from the opposition leaders. One measure may be to indulge in public acts that cast the government in the light of a caring patron. For instance, it can suspend buying fighter jets and claim that the money will be used to subsidize food and fuel prices. Then it can jail those accused of stealing CHOGM funds. It can also offer some relief bread to a few.

Which way will it go? Stay tuned!

amwenda@independent.co.ug

HOW BANKS CAN SUPPORT BUSINESS GROWTH.

2011-04-18T00:31:00.000-07:00

THURSDAY, 07 APRIL 2011 12:45 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

A great business can close in infancy, not because it is loss making but because it cannot get credit to overcome its initial cash flow constraints.

Here is the performance of Uganda’s banks in 2010: Out of the 22 registered banks, 14 made profits, two broke even and six made losses. All the six that made losses are newly registered banks – so that is understandable. And five had their losses significantly reduced compared to 2009 – so they performed better in 2010. Most importantly, non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets in the banking sector are only 1.02 percent – one of the best records in the world (see cover story).

The 2010 results only reflect a trend over the last decade. For example, while in 2000 there were only 17 banks with 122 branches, today there are 22 banks with 394 branches; and while total assets of banks were Shs1.8 trillion, by 2010 they had reached Shs11.3 trillion. In fact, the total assets of Stanbic Bank alone stood at Shs2.4 trillion by December 2010 – higher than the total assets of all banks in the country in 2000. Total deposits have increased from Shs1.3 trillion in 2000 to Shs8.0 trillion in 2010 and profits in the industry from Shs72 billion to Shs270 billion over the same period.

This trend has been driven by three major factors. First, the privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank removed the dead hand of the state and its corrupt politics from the banking sector, thus opening the way to competition and product innovation. Second, the lessons learned from the bank failures of 1997-1999 led to improved regulation most epitomised by Bank of Uganda’s director of supervision, Justine Bagyenda, nicknamed the “Iron Lady” by commercial bankers. Third, the banking sector reflects the robust growth of the Ugandan economy.

However, not everything is rosy in Uganda’s commercial banking sector. Interest rates have remained high (18 to 24 percent) in spite of the fall in interest on treasury bills. Bank charges are high, constituting a significant part of bank profits. Although the number of employees has grown from 1,099 in 2000 to 8,700 in 2010; and although the total wage bill has also grown from Shs47 billion to Shs330 billion over the same period, per capital earnings of bank staff have declined over this same period from Shs42m to Shs37m – meaning that banks are employing more people but paying them less in real wages.

The market is still dominated by three international banks – Stanbic, Standard Chartered and Barclays. These banks rely on rules designed in Johannesburg, London and Dubai to lend to local Ugandans – rules that make it extremely difficult for many ordinary Ugandans doing business to borrow and invest. It is the presence of the fourth and fifth largest banks in Uganda i.e. Centenary and Crane banks that has made it possible for many Ugandan entrepreneurs to do business.

Indeed, a huge percentage of the business that the three leading international banks get is a result of their brand than their product innovation. This suggests that the dominance of multinational banks has actually repressed the banking sector. I have a friend who holds an account with one of the multinational banks and whose business has a gross turnover of more than Shs1.5 billion per year in the same bank. Yet the bank could not give him an overdraft facility of Shs200m.

The result of rigid banking rules designed in London, Dubai and Johannesburg for the local branches of these multinational banks is to stifle business growth. This lesson came vividly to me when we set up The Independent as a business. Most of our advertisers asked for 75 days of credit yet our suppliers wanted to be paid in advance since we were a new business. Although we were able to make an operating profit with the first five months, the mismatch between our revenue collections and our expenditure placed us is continuous cash flow shortages.

At the time, we were banking with Stanchart, Stanbic and Barclays. However, in spite of a rapid growth of our business almost every month which was giving us large volumes of revenue turnover, these banks could not give us an overdraft to roll over our cash flow shortages. We turned to Crane Bank and they gave us the facility because it believes in its customers and responds to their needs on the basis of its knowledge of them personally and the information it has on the performance of their business and not because of some rigid rules designed in London or Dubai.

I learnt from this experience that even an excellent business can close in infancy, not because it is loss making but simply because it cannot get short term credit to roll over its initial cash flow constraints. But I also learnt that for an economy to achieve its full potential, it needs banks that are rooted in its people’s business realities – not one whose rules are based on ignorance or prejudice of some bankers in distant lands dictating by remote control how a market should operate.

Looking back both as a journalist and as a business person, I believe that although Uganda’s banking sector has registered rapid growth over the last ten years, it could actually have done better for itself and for the country’s people if priority was given to local banks. I agree that local banks misbehaved in the mid 1990s leading to their collapse. But the lesson Uganda took from this experience was the wrong one. Rather than seek to improve central bank supervision of local banks, Uganda decided to discriminate against them in licensing of new banks.

The result has been a safe banking sector most of which is delinked from our business realities. This, I suspect, may have reduced our economic growth by anything between one and two percent. Going forward, Uganda should seriously think of encouraging the growth of local banks as the major drivers of lending. During its early industrialisation, 90 percent of the total banking sector in South Korea was controlled by the government. In China today, government controls over 70 percent of banking. We do not need Uganda government to control the sector. But it can encourage local banks to do so through smart policies.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

A great business can close in infancy, not because it is loss making but because it cannot get credit to overcome its initial cash flow constraints.

Here is the performance of Uganda’s banks in 2010: Out of the 22 registered banks, 14 made profits, two broke even and six made losses. All the six that made losses are newly registered banks – so that is understandable. And five had their losses significantly reduced compared to 2009 – so they performed better in 2010. Most importantly, non-performing assets as a percentage of total assets in the banking sector are only 1.02 percent – one of the best records in the world (see cover story).

The 2010 results only reflect a trend over the last decade. For example, while in 2000 there were only 17 banks with 122 branches, today there are 22 banks with 394 branches; and while total assets of banks were Shs1.8 trillion, by 2010 they had reached Shs11.3 trillion. In fact, the total assets of Stanbic Bank alone stood at Shs2.4 trillion by December 2010 – higher than the total assets of all banks in the country in 2000. Total deposits have increased from Shs1.3 trillion in 2000 to Shs8.0 trillion in 2010 and profits in the industry from Shs72 billion to Shs270 billion over the same period.

This trend has been driven by three major factors. First, the privatisation of Uganda Commercial Bank removed the dead hand of the state and its corrupt politics from the banking sector, thus opening the way to competition and product innovation. Second, the lessons learned from the bank failures of 1997-1999 led to improved regulation most epitomised by Bank of Uganda’s director of supervision, Justine Bagyenda, nicknamed the “Iron Lady” by commercial bankers. Third, the banking sector reflects the robust growth of the Ugandan economy.

However, not everything is rosy in Uganda’s commercial banking sector. Interest rates have remained high (18 to 24 percent) in spite of the fall in interest on treasury bills. Bank charges are high, constituting a significant part of bank profits. Although the number of employees has grown from 1,099 in 2000 to 8,700 in 2010; and although the total wage bill has also grown from Shs47 billion to Shs330 billion over the same period, per capital earnings of bank staff have declined over this same period from Shs42m to Shs37m – meaning that banks are employing more people but paying them less in real wages.

The market is still dominated by three international banks – Stanbic, Standard Chartered and Barclays. These banks rely on rules designed in Johannesburg, London and Dubai to lend to local Ugandans – rules that make it extremely difficult for many ordinary Ugandans doing business to borrow and invest. It is the presence of the fourth and fifth largest banks in Uganda i.e. Centenary and Crane banks that has made it possible for many Ugandan entrepreneurs to do business.

Indeed, a huge percentage of the business that the three leading international banks get is a result of their brand than their product innovation. This suggests that the dominance of multinational banks has actually repressed the banking sector. I have a friend who holds an account with one of the multinational banks and whose business has a gross turnover of more than Shs1.5 billion per year in the same bank. Yet the bank could not give him an overdraft facility of Shs200m.

The result of rigid banking rules designed in London, Dubai and Johannesburg for the local branches of these multinational banks is to stifle business growth. This lesson came vividly to me when we set up The Independent as a business. Most of our advertisers asked for 75 days of credit yet our suppliers wanted to be paid in advance since we were a new business. Although we were able to make an operating profit with the first five months, the mismatch between our revenue collections and our expenditure placed us is continuous cash flow shortages.

At the time, we were banking with Stanchart, Stanbic and Barclays. However, in spite of a rapid growth of our business almost every month which was giving us large volumes of revenue turnover, these banks could not give us an overdraft to roll over our cash flow shortages. We turned to Crane Bank and they gave us the facility because it believes in its customers and responds to their needs on the basis of its knowledge of them personally and the information it has on the performance of their business and not because of some rigid rules designed in London or Dubai.

I learnt from this experience that even an excellent business can close in infancy, not because it is loss making but simply because it cannot get short term credit to roll over its initial cash flow constraints. But I also learnt that for an economy to achieve its full potential, it needs banks that are rooted in its people’s business realities – not one whose rules are based on ignorance or prejudice of some bankers in distant lands dictating by remote control how a market should operate.

Looking back both as a journalist and as a business person, I believe that although Uganda’s banking sector has registered rapid growth over the last ten years, it could actually have done better for itself and for the country’s people if priority was given to local banks. I agree that local banks misbehaved in the mid 1990s leading to their collapse. But the lesson Uganda took from this experience was the wrong one. Rather than seek to improve central bank supervision of local banks, Uganda decided to discriminate against them in licensing of new banks.

The result has been a safe banking sector most of which is delinked from our business realities. This, I suspect, may have reduced our economic growth by anything between one and two percent. Going forward, Uganda should seriously think of encouraging the growth of local banks as the major drivers of lending. During its early industrialisation, 90 percent of the total banking sector in South Korea was controlled by the government. In China today, government controls over 70 percent of banking. We do not need Uganda government to control the sector. But it can encourage local banks to do so through smart policies.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

FDC NEEDS TO CHANGE OR IT WILL DIE.

2011-04-18T00:30:00.000-07:00

MONDAY, 14 MARCH 2011 05:34 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Thus like many millenarian cults, many people supporting Besigye believed in their own self-righteousness and assumed everyone shared their outrage

Last week, opposition leader Kizza Besigye, claimed to have won the February presidential election. He claimed that by the time his own party’s tally centre was ‘sabotaged’, he was leading with 47 percent against President Yoweri Museveni’s 43 percent, from results of about 30% of all polling stations. He says that because this tally excluded the votes from his strongholds of the north, it means he won the election. I find his position absurd.

I hold Besigye in high esteem because of his demonstrated courage, firmness and commitment to the public good in Uganda. He has sustained his struggle against Museveni even in the face of one million and one violent attacks on him and his family members by the president and his apparatchik.

Yet the traits that make Besigye a strong personality in resisting Museveni’s dictatorial tendencies are the same traits that make him look like a carbon copy of the president – the tendency to dig into a position and refuse to listen to alternative view points. Indeed, one of the reasons Besigye’s support declined in the last election is his tendency to listen too much to himself rather than to the people of Uganda.

For example, I followed both Museveni and Besigye on the campaign trail and immediately noticed how Museveni was getting an upper hand. Besigye would go to the rallies with a script. From a purely moral and national perspective, it was a great script written in statesmanlike fashion – a powerful statement of the ills that have bedeviled our nation. He was consistent on his message. But it was an ineffective message in many areas of rural Uganda because Besigye was speaking to the voters, not for them.

Museveni had a message but he was not consistent with it. He was always able to adapt his message to the mood of his audience. Everywhere he went, he was accosted by local complaints most of which revolved around the issue of service delivery. Realising that his government had failed the people, Museveni adopted an opposition posture; his adversaries were the local government officials. He riled them for corruption, incompetence and theft and even threatened or ordered the arrest of some of them. He was thus able to speak for the people, not to speak to them.

As the campaign progressed, it was clear that the Besigye camp had placed itself on a very high moral pedestal, a factor that gave them extraordinary hubris. Thus like many millenarian cults, many people supporting Besigye got consumed by a sense of their own self-righteousness and assumed that everyone shared their outrage at Museveni’s failures. Worse they even thought that most voters viewed them as they viewed of themselves i.e. as messiahs to save our nation from a despot.

Nothing could have been more damaging to Besigye and his most passionate supporters than this hubris. Rather than try to convince people that the country needed change, the Besigye campaign simply assumed that people were ready for change. Hence it promised them that “change is coming”. Thus, the strategy was not to mobilise for change but rather to “protect the vote” – a vote they took for granted to be there waiting for them. Although there was a nation-wide constituency convinced about change, it was wrong to assume that it constituted an electoral majority. Indeed, among the many Ugandans convinced about the need for change was a large section which was afraid of the consequences of change. Such people voted Museveni.

But moral hubris also led the Besigye camp into assumptions that undermined their capacity to respond to Museveni’s initiatives. It seems Besigye believed his own hype and that of the circle around him that there were masses of people across the country who felt like him, who shared his view of Museveni as a corrupt despot. It was a fatal era because Besigye ended up preaching to the converted and in some cases talking to himself and listening to his own echoes instead of listening to the people.

This tendency of Besigye to think that his disagreements with Museveni are similar to the disagreement most people have with the president is not new. In 2001, his campaign posters said “vote for a president who will listen.” Why? In his battles with the president, Besigye had noticed, and correctly so, that Museveni was not listening to him and other senior leaders of the Movement. But was this really the view of ordinary voters about Museveni – i.e. did ordinary people believe that the president does not listen?

I have attended a number of meetings at State House between Museveni and ordinary people from districts involving women’s and youth groups, local councilors etc. I was struck by how patient and attentive he would be when in meetings with them. Sometimes Museveni would be speaking, and a peasant would stand up, rudely interrupt him and just begin to give his own speech. Museveni would stop and begin taking notes. I would spend minutes almost collapsing with impatience as the president listened attentively as this ordinary person made his case, often a list of small local problems that a president should not deal with.

After this ordinary person had stopped, the president would answer each of the issues that person had raised, yielding to many of their parochial demands upon the state such as to appoint someone from their village a minister, an ambassador or RDC or to build a clinic or school in their sub-county, restock their cows or give them a district.

It was clear to me that while Museveni was not listening to his colleagues in cabinet, he was doing the exact opposite with local people. In structuring his 2001 campaign message as “vote for a president who will listen” Besigye was addressing himself and his colleagues in the high echelons of power, not to the ordinary voter. This approach has not changed.

I hold very strong anti-Museveni views politically although I support the broad thrust of his liberal economic policies. But I am always conscious of the fact that I should not assume that everyone else in Uganda shares my point of view. During the campaign, I met many young, well educated, modernist and ambitious Ugandans in their mid to late 20s or early 30s on Museveni’s campaign team, passionately campaigning for the president – a demographic one would expect to be hostile to the president.

I was always struck by this and would ask why they supported a president who has presided over gross corruption, nepotism and incompetence; and the utter collapse of the public spirit in our public service, leave alone having stayed in power for decades. I would ask them whether they did not know what is happening to our healthcare and education system and our roads. Many actually agreed with these but argued that there were other attributes of Museveni like freedom, stability and sustained economic growth which I was ignoring.

These interactions humbled me. I was able to see that there are many and diverse perspectives among people. It was clear that if I want others to see my point of view, I should try to win them over through persuasion. But Besigye and some elements around him thought everyone agreed with his view of Museveni and shared his vision of change; hence, he needed no persuasion but motivation. So he went around trying to motivate people to turn out and vote for change, instead of trying to convince them about the need for change.

Besigye is not alone. Across almost the entire spectrum of the anti-Museveni intellectual and political elite in Uganda, there is a consensus that based purely on Museveni’s failures in service delivery there is widespread opposition to the president. Worse still, they believe that the discontented are yarning for change. There is no doubt that across our nation many people are disenchanted with the government. The fatal era is the hubris to believe that all of them are therefore ready for change.
There is significant fear among many Ugandans in regard to change. In a country that has never seen peaceful change of government the fear of the unknown is strong. People need reassurance that change will not bring instability. He who ignores this does so at a big risk.

A section of people who give Besigye’s opposition intellectual justification are both naive and intolerant. They reject every realistic caution against their obsessive over-optimism and dismiss it as pro-Museveni. They have thus alienated many centrists who would prefer a more pragmatic and realistic campaign; a campaign that will despise Museveni strategically but take him seriously tactically.

This intolerance by the groups around Besigye is a reflection of their major intellectual weakness. It was also one of the critical factors behind the failed efforts towards opposition unity before the election, a failure that gave Museveni a strategic advantage in the election. In fact every democratic minded Ugandan would be more scared by Besigye’s apparatchik than by Museveni. The Besigye crowd dismissed anyone who tried to point out Museveni’s strengths as having been bought. They denied and rejected the legitimacy of any view seen as favourable to Museveni – including views that while disagreeing with the president tended to recognise his core strengths.

The tendency to dismiss all contrary opinion as being treacherous, of having been bought by Museveni has taken air out of the bubble of Besigye’s claims to be a champion of democracy. He and his cohorts came across as intolerant and suspicious of alternative view points. For example, I was told by those close to him that he said he cannot read The Independent because we had sold out to Museveni.

Now, anyone reading The Independent would have considered it a very balanced newspaper in its coverage of the election but leaning in favour of the opposition. Although we did not do a thorough job covering the election, most of our articles and opinions were largely critical of Museveni. Where Besigye was covered, it was largely in positive terms – even though I admit that we did not give him enough coverage. One reason was market dynamics – the truth is that he was not selling newspapers.

That Besigye could not see how favourably disposed to him we were in our limited coverage of his campaign tells a lot about the man. It shows that you either agree with him entirely i.e. on every coma and full-stop or you are labelled a Museveni supporter. Thus Norbert Mao, whom I proudly voted for in full view of everyone at my polling station, was labelled a Museveni 5th column because he did not share Besigye’s view.

At some point even Olara Otunnu was suspected of working with and for Museveni. Bidandi Ssali suffered a similar fate. No one escaped their cobra bite.

The Besigye group seeks to win over people in similar fashion as the Museveni group - via blackmail and scare mongering. The Museveni group was scaring people that if they voted the opposition, the country would fall into chaos. The Besigye group was saying if anyone does not support them, then he had been bought by Museveni. For a person passionately committed to independence of opinion, this “either or” attitude on both sides convinced me that Museveni and Besigye are the same and should be rejected.

By accusing anyone who disagrees with them as having been bought by Museveni, the Besigye group was actually hoping to force those who don’t agree with them to support them in order to be seen as not having been bought by Museveni. It is called blackmail. Many people kept away from the polls because while they were disenchanted with Museveni, they could not put up with this intolerance in FDC.

As the tide of history turned against them, the Besigye group even began to reject science in favour of their own assumptions. They rejected all opinion polls saying Museveni had bought them. Even when their own opinion poll showed they were trailing far behind Museveni, they were too consumed by their own sense of destiny to listen to the feelings of Ugandans. They could not believe that the people of Uganda could not share their messianic view of themselves or even their message for change.

Besigye thought that every anti-Museveni opinion was a pro-Besigye opinion; and that every opinion that was not pro him was a pro Museveni opinion. In his view, one was either with him or with Museveni. There was no independent position. Ultimately, Besigye lost this election because he took the people of this country too much for granted and sought to force all of us to think like him or to agree with him. Up to now he is unable to accept this reality hence his recent claim that he won the election.

There are many good people among Besigye supporters: honourable men like Augustine Ruzindana and Mugisha Muntu; tolerant ones like Wafula Oguttu and Morris Latigo; thoughtful ones like Conrad Nkutu and David Mpanga. But they do not form the mainstream of Besigye’s intellectual base. FDC needs to liberate itself from extremist control, move to the centre, listen keenly to Ugandans even those who don’t agree with its message and construct a vision that is democratic. Short of this, Museveni’s base will grow or a new and more enlightened force will emerge and take FDC’s place.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

THE CHALLENGE AFRICA REFORMERS FACE.

2011-04-18T00:29:00.000-07:00

FRIDAY, 01 APRIL 2011 07:30 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

An African leader who fights corruption will face resistance from powerful vested interests using democracy to subvert his reforms

Next month, Rwanda commemorates 17 years since the genocide. Most of its citizens look back at what they have achieved with both pride and humility. The society that had been torn asunder by genocide has been reconstituted, the state that had disintegrated has been reconfigured and the economy that had collapsed has been reconstructed.

The RPF was born of three critical grievances which were all official policies of the government: keeping a section of the population as perpetual refugees, denying them equal treatment before the law and denying them equal access to available opportunities. The aim of the RPF was to create a nation where all its citizens would have a right to live inside Rwanda with equal rights before the law and with equal access to opportunities.

Today, all these objectives have been achieved. There is not one single Rwandan living abroad because government policy refuses them the right to return home “because the country is full.” I admit there are many Rwandans in exile afraid to return home for one reason or another – some criminal, others political. But they are the exception, not the rule. Second, in almost all spheres of life, all Rwandans have equal access to available opportunities in education, healthcare, agricultural extension services, civil service, the army, politics etc. Third, today all Rwandans are equal before the law.

I admit that post genocide Rwanda is not a paradise; it has one million and one iniquities. But no society can be perfect, not even Norway and Finland. The rich and powerful in Rwanda may evade justice, get unfair advantage over others or go unpunished for transgressions. However, even accounting for these divergences, post genocide Rwanda has by and large constructed the most fair and equitable society in post colonial Africa.

For example, it is most likely in Rwanda, more than any other country in Africa or even the world that the poorest and least educated citizen in the remotest village can have almost the same opportunity as a cabinet minister to be evacuated for medical treatment abroad if his/her condition so demanded. It is also most likely in Rwanda, more than any other country in Africa or the world that a child born in an extremely poor family with no political connections whatsoever can on its merit get a government scholarship to Harvard. No wonder Rwanda has just been rated the fourth best country in the entire British Commonwealth for a girl child to be born.

While in all Africa a malnourished child is a statistic in government records, it is only in Rwanda in the whole of Africa that every malnourished child has a name, a home and gets milk and cereal at the local government clinic daily. It is only in Rwanda of the 27 African countries I have visited that I have seen government build a hospital equipped with most sophisticated equipment and medical staff in the remotest village to serve ordinary people. And all this in a country with a very low income per capita, a poorly developed human resource base and a country without strong institutional traditions.

The experience I have witnessed in Rwanda over the last seven years has both inspired and humbled me. I had spent most of my career berating governments in Africa for their disinterest in the needs of ordinary people, thinking that this was because of lack of democracy as we conventionally understand it. Over the years, Africa has “democratised” – elections are regular, political parties vibrant, media are loud. But this has not translated into governments that serve the ordinary citizen. Instead, crooks have taken over. In Rwanda I have seen the evolution of a government committed to serving ordinary people.

Yet international human rights groups, sections of the international and regional press and a significant section of Africa’s intellectual class have been relentless and ferocious in their attacks on the Rwanda government generally and President Paul Kagame personally, accusing him of running a Stalinist government. They have forced some enlightened but insecure people in the West to rethink their support for Kagame.

Critics have ignored or failed to see the democratic nature of many of Rwanda’s reforms. For example, Kagame has expanded political participation to ordinary Rwandans, integrated ordinary people in the politics as rights-bearing citizens and not as clients of powerful individuals as is the case in most of Africa. He has also empowered ordinary Rwandans to manage their own affairs through their local councils. This has not been achieved by guesswork but has been a key tenet of his strategy of political consolidation.

This reordering of power has attracted a lot of resistance from vested elite interests who were benefiting from the corruption and patronage. Trying to give ordinary people a voice in politics and make them beneficiaries of government policy and action demands the destabilisation of the status quo. You cannot transform a country’s politics without changing the power structure. And you cannot change the power structure without generating resistance from vested interests. And you cannot defeat that resistance without attacking the instruments vested interests use to dominate the political process.

For example, to deliver services to ordinary people demands that one has to fight corruption and personalised patronage. Yet the corrupt are always the most educated, rich, articulate and influential sections of the society. They speak to BBC and CNN, they have access to human rights groups, they write in local newspapers and they form political parties. They will deploy all these instruments in their struggle to retain their privileges.

Thus, when a reformer seeks to fight corruption and patronage, he is actually taking away the source of power, wealth and status from powerful elites. For we must remember that for every pothole in a road in Africa, someone has built a mansion; for every ghost school, someone has sent their child to Harvard; for every ghost hospital, someone has evacuated their child to Germany for treatment; and for almost every indignity suffered by the ordinary people, someone powerful has made money reaping off the state.

So when a reformer like Kagame attacks their privileges, the thieves hide behind the language of rights to defend their interests – the right to free speech, the right to property and the right to due process. They mobilise human rights groups and the media. Given deeply entrenched prejudices about African leaders – themselves generated by our history – international media and human rights groups mistake thieves to be democrats. So they join the forces of resistance. The reformer realises that the platforms for democracy are not defending the interests of ordinary people but the theft and privileges of a few elites.

Here is the challenge reformers like Kagame face: those who suffer from his anti corruption drive are few but rich, educated and powerful with access to media. So they have a voice. Those who benefit from his anti corruption drive are the least educated and poorest sections of the society. They do not speak on CNN and BBC. They do not have access to Human Rights Watch or Amnesty International. So they have no voice. Sadly, in Africa those with voice are less than 10 percent of the population. The rest are ordinary rural masses who cannot defend their interests using our inherited democratic platforms.

It is this reality that has forced some of the most promising democracies in Africa – Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, Ghana, Mali and Senegal to shy away from confronting the beast of personalised patronage. Instead they have become hostage to a few powerful individuals and groups. In western nations, largely because the median voter is well educated, middle class and has voice in the mass media, corruption is fought through the democratic process. In Africa, because the median voter is semi literate, poor with no voice in the media; and because his/her own traditional values do not treat patronage as abuse of office, the democratic process tends to incubate and reproduce corruption.

In Africa, the elite want power and privilege and they use the press, civil society organisations, political parties, etc. to advance their interests. They even mobilise the masses based on shared identity (religious or ethnic) behind them. Uganda presents the most vivid cases of this perversion of democracy. Except for a few exceptions like Kizza Besigye, all the articulate critics of Yoweri Museveni have over the years joined him in his government – Basoga Nsandu, Tamale Mirundi, Omara Atubo, Aggrey Awori, Nasser Sebaggala, – I can list 1,000 of them off my head.

Museveni has been smart (or opportunistic) enough to learn that rather than fight these powerful elites, he does better by co-opting them. He has thus turned critics into allies. Kagame’s major failure (and equally his biggest achievement) has been to resist these particularistic demands for power and privileges. By doing little to placate the interests of the powerful, he has turned real and potential allies into bitter enemies – hence the virulence of their criticism of him. Most African leaders adopt Museveni’s strategy; it is cheaper and efficient but ordinary people gain little from it. Kagame has gone for the costly route; it has delivered for ordinary people but attracted the hostility of the powerful.

The lesson is simple but powerful: elites in Africa use the democratic process – not to promote the interests of the ordinary person – but to acquire positions of power and privilege. Thus, in spite of its apparent freedoms of speech and press, its vibrant political parties and civic organisations, ordinary Ugandans have gained little in form of public goods and services. Every year 80,000 children of ordinary people die of preventable diseases; in ten years you have a massacre equal to the genocide in Rwanda. Today, 2.3m children are malnourished in Uganda and 16 mothers die in child birth every day.

The above figures are mere anecdotes in our mass media. Yet human rights groups, media and all other democratic platforms of the world will be concerned about one corrupt official running away to exile before he is arrested – because he was a General in the army, a minister in cabinet, etc. Our so-called democratic platforms are so concerned about the privileges of a few powerful elites and so blind to the gross abuses against the vast majority of our people that I wonder whether Africa is thinking at all.

Any leader in Africa who seeks to fight corruption as relentlessly as Kagame is doing, and to deliver public goods and services to ordinary people as Kagame is doing will come face to face with this contradiction: that resistance to his reforms will be built and defended through the very democratic structures we cherish. As I have observed the failure of democratic governments across Africa, I realised that ordinary people actually have limited voice through the press, civic associations and political parties.

To change politics from a contest over the privileges of a few to be a contest over service to the citizen, a genuine reformer will find it almost inevitable – or even necessary – to put restraints on many conventional platforms of democracy. But this also demands that he/she mobilises ordinary people to be active participants in the political process, integrate them in decision making and empower them to manage their own affairs. Rwanda has achieved this, not through political parties and mass media but largely through local councils.

The results show. In the 2010 Gallup Poll, 95 percent of Rwandans said they had confidence in their government; 86 percent said their electoral process is fair and honest; 98 percent have confidence in their military; 84 percent in their judiciary as being independent; 77 percent were satisfied with their freedom of expression, belief, association, and personal autonomy. In all these, Rwanda ranks among the top ten democracies in the world alongside Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Austria, New Zeeland and Australia. This cannot be on account of repression for the same distortion would have placed Saudi Arabia, North Korea, Zimbabwe and Burma in the top league.

Yet human rights groups and sections of the media call Rwanda a police state. Is repression an objective standard or a subjective feeling? How come human rights groups claim Rwandans are enslaved when Rwandans feel free? It is because freedom has been stripped of context. The result is that Africa has spent decades obsessing about procedures of democracy instead of its substance. By trying to look at democracy indicators based on western societies – mass media, political parties etc – we have ignored the fact that most Africans (80 percent) are not represented in these platforms.

We have a clear incongruence between abstract notions (the index of Freedom House) and the feelings of ordinary Rwandans. Karl Marx encountered this dilemma 160 years ago. In his Labour Theory of Value, he argued that capitalists exploit workers by making them work more hours (Surplus Labour Time) than was needed to produce their own wages (Necessary Labour Time). When workers did not feel exploited, Marx propounded a new theory of “false consciousness”; that they are unaware of their “actual” situation. He then called for a vanguard party to unmask the “social myths” and “religious doctrines” that prevent people from seeing things as they are.

This tendency to think people are ignorant ignores the real possibility that they may have a different basis of judging their reality based on their experience. Most of us who travel by air and have to go through rigorous security checks do not accuse our airports of being Stalinist. We know the context that has demanded we be checked up to our underwear. Human rights groups and sections of the media should not usurp the sovereignty of the people of Rwanda and claim to speak on their behalf. Let Rwandans speak for themselves – which they are already doing through regular elections and opinion polls by some of the world’s most respected polling agencies.

amwenda@independent.co.ug
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A GLIMPSE AT THE NEXT FIVE YEARS.

2011-04-18T00:28:00.001-07:00

THURSDAY, 03 MARCH 2011 06:35 BY ANDREW M. MWENDA

Will Museveni use his 2011 national victory to retire gracefully like Mandela and Nyerere or entrench himself in power like Fidel Castro and Gaddafi?

Now that President Yoweri Museveni has won re-election with an increased mandate, what should he do? This election has been important for Museveni because he won in all regions of the country, most especially in the north that had previously rejected him. This national victory has allowed him to emerge as a national figure, not merely as a warlord or president of the south against the north.

If Museveni were to use this new national profile profitably, it is time for him to cut the image of an elder statesman – a Nelson Mandela or Julius Nyerere and organise a peaceful transition of power to a successor that he trusts – someone like Amama Mbabazi. Such act will win him not only iconic status nationally and internationally, but it will also remove the rug from under the feet of his critics who accuse him of seeking a presidency for life followed by a family succession.

But will Museveni rise up to this challenge? This can only be possible if he seeks historic greatness beyond merely being president. Yet Museveni’s search for greatness is intimately linked to his stay in power; he is a Fidel Castrol, a Muammar Gaddafi or a Robert Mugabe but not a Mandela or a Nyerere. Therefore, he is likely to look at his victory NOT as an opportunity to retire gracefully but rather a reason to stay on believing that “the country still needs me”.

Beyond this grand and historic posture, Museveni needs to fix a number of things over the next five years. Across the country, the president was accosted by complaints from his supporters about the poor state of public goods and services like water, education, health, roads, schools, hospitals and electricity. He was able to deflect blame from himself to local officials. But he knows these problems to be systemic (system-wide) and cannot therefore be caused merely by local officials.

Over the last ten years, government of Uganda has increased the allocations of the budgets to key service ministries like education, health, infrastructure and agricultural extension services. In all of them, the budgets have increased by more than 400 percent. Yet there has not been a corresponding improvement in the results from this expenditure. The challenge Museveni faces is therefore not one of prioritisation but of value for money i.e. to increase implementation efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector.

There are many ghost health centres and schools as there are myriads of ghost medical staff, teachers and pupils. Many existing hospitals have few medical workers, essential drugs often run out and critical equipment is either missing or outdated. A similar experience bedevils education as there are limited textbooks and teacher absenteeism is high. During the campaigns, Museveni listened to complaints across the country about how most voters had never seen agricultural extension services.

Technically, the answer is that Museveni should try to improve the institutional ability of the state to deliver on its promises and to get value for money. He would have to ensure that public institutions enjoy a degree of autonomy from private pressures of ethno-regional and religious elites who seek to wrestle resources from their public purposes to serve personal interests. To do this would be in direct contradiction to the very mechanisms that Museveni has employed to consolidate his power.

Many public spirited Ugandans do not appreciate how Museveni’s strength lies in the destruction his political strategies have wrought on our nation’s political institutions. Museveni understands the psychology, pretensions and ambitions of our middle and upper classes for power, status, influence and material aggrandisement. He has thus fathomed a political system where these needs of the political class have actually been addressed through the diversion of public resources to private pockets.

What was significant in this election, however, is that Museveni has introduced the lower middle class to the culture of personal allocation of public resources – and with impressive results. During the campaigns, he fostered the creation of associations for semi employed urban youth-groups from informal sector activities like hair dressers, barbers, salon owners, boda boda riders, traditional healers, singers, vendors, hawkers, taxi drivers and touts, etc. The associations were akin to cooperatives.

These groups would be driven to State House, have dinner with Museveni and present their concerns directly to him. He would then promise them money – often in billions – saying he will put it in the coming budget. But Museveni knows most Ugandans don’t trust his promises anyway. So he would give the visiting group cash of about Shs 400,000 per person as “transport refund” even though State House would have transported them to the meeting. Then, he would also allocate another Shs 400m to their association to “open a bank account”. In all cases, it was delivered the next day. And all this was done before election-day.

These political strategies by Museveni – of selective and personal allocation of state funds to individuals and groups in order to literary buy their support – have powerful implications on our governance. Most critically, they cripple the ability of state to deliver public goods and services to anonymous citizens generally and impersonally. In fact, they tend to destroy public services. Yet they have equally powerful political dividends, at least in the short term as they increase his votes.

What is frustrating about the opposition in Uganda is their apparent inability to appreciate this fact. Rather than treat it as a strategic threat to their political strength, they throw their hands up and criticise its moral significance. Yet this is not a morality contest. To continue hacking at Museveni’s corruption and incompetence as the issues that mark his political vulnerability is naive. It is futile because his political survival is actually based on destroying these very public services.

The recent ride on the treasury to buy political support has strengthened the president’s belief in money as a vehicle to political success. This marks a major shift in his political strategies – for Museveni had all along believed that it is violence and intimidation that had the upper hand. Over the next five years, with oil resources looming, we are going to see money flow. Museveni will out-Mobutu Mobutu himself.

amwenda@independent.co.ug

MADONNA,BONO,CLOONEY CANNOT SAVE AFRICA ONLY AFRICANS CAN !

2011-04-18T00:26:00.000-07:00

SATURDAY, 26 MARCH 2011 09:23 BY ANDREW M.MWENDA

We need to take responsibility for ourselves, to empower our people. External assistance is okay. But we need to begin with our own solutions.

And so it was that on my flight from Amsterdam to Dubai I stumbled upon a documentary on poverty in Malawi by singer Madonna. Like most Western movies, documentaries and news about our continent, this too was a story of Africa’s persistent failure and the efforts of the West to save us from the vagaries of nature and the “rapacity” of our rulers.

The script had the usual suspects; children with mucus filled noses and jigger infested feet, orphans without food or shelter, the poor living in grass thatched huts, a miserable-looking mother with a malnourished child tied to her back as she stretched her emaciated hands to receive charity from a white aid worker. Against the backdrop of these images are interviews with those trying to save the people of Malawi – Bill Clinton, Jeffrey Sachs, Paul Farmer, Erick Borgstein and Victoria Keelan.

There are a few Malawians brought in to tell the story of course; a member of parliament, a church leader, the deputy minister of local government, a civil society activist, the minister of foreign affairs and a Malawian PhD holder. As expected, the people of Malawi are presented as passive victims of nature and bad government; with their story to tame and harness nature for their survival, and their political struggles to change their reality, conspicuously absent. Their emancipation from misery, Sachs and Farmer tell us, is the responsibility of the rich people of the Western world.

“The West has a duty,” Sachs says with confidence and certainty, “to help these people have a future.” Clinton agrees entirely. In short, the people of Malawi are not supposed to be active participants in their own emancipation. They are supposed to be passive recipients of international charity.

As I watched the Madonna documentary, I remembered that some months back I had watched actor George Clooney and activist John Prendergast on Larry King Live talking about Darfur. The story of Darfur was not being told by those who suffer the costs of the crisis. It was Clooney and Prendergast who were speaking for and on behalf of the suffering people of that region. This suffering has now become an opportunity for celebrities living in opulence to show off their humanity.

Clooney was hopelessly out of depth on the problems of Darfur – coming across as someone who had been hastily mobilised to support a cause he did not know much about. Yet Larry King was more interested in interviewing him. Prendergast seemed better informed, yet King was disinterested in what he had to say.

But both Clooney and Prendergast shared one narrative; that the salvation of the people of Darfur will not come from their own struggles. It would come from the charitable actions of an abstract entity called the “international community” through its obligation “to protect”; oh, and of course the great and most benevolent of all – the altruistic and exceptional people of America without whose kindness the world would not exist, at least not as we know it today.

In spite of knowing the facts, Prendergast was superficial; he seemed ignorant of the structural and historical processes that are shaping politics and conflict in that region. He did not seem to understand the complexity of the problem. Yet he still would have shed more light on it had Larry King cared more about the people of Darfur than about giving Clooney airtime to exhibit his humanity.

Many Western interventions to save Africa are rarely about the supposed victims. Instead, they are platforms for Western people to exhibit their altruism. Evolutionary psychology tells us that women tend to fall in love with men who exhibit kindness and generosity, attributes that gave our ancestors decisive advantage in the dating market and therefore made them successful reproductively.

The Larry King show featuring Clooney and Prendergast was not intended to highlight the suffering of the people of Darfur; their daily struggles to overcome adversity, their aspirations and their hopes. It sought to promote the narrative of America as saviour of the world.

So this brings me back to Madonna and her struggle to save Malawi. That central African country is a democracy – at least as Washington, Paris and London would prefer – with a free press, an elected parliament and elites alternating in power from ruling to opposition party etc. Yet as the story unfolds, the deputy minister for local government complains that children of her constituents regularly come begging her for fees. “I try to help,” she says, “But I cannot help everyone.” And what is the cost of fees? It is only $ 12 per term.

The minister of foreign affairs, Joyce Banda, also features in the documentary explaining the lack of vision, poor leadership at the local level (as if the central government is better) and the increasing spread of superstition in the country. She seems unable to see that people are increasingly turning to traditional healers (whom she calls “witch doctors”, a colonial categorisation) because public hospitals are malfunctioning.

So, the failure of Malawi’s democracy to serve ordinary people was obvious. Why should a minister pay fees for her constituents from her personal income? Why isn’t Malawi’s democratic process fostering an impersonal application of public policy? Clearly the people of Malawi are not rights-bearing citizens. They are clients of these powerful politicians. That is why they do not demand rights from the state but beg for favours from their MPs.

As I write this article, there are more Malawian doctors trained at government expense living and working in Britain than there are in Malawi itself. Malawian professionals have voted with their feet and left. Yet the world may remain happy with Malawi because it meets the conventional models of a democracy. Africa needs to begin a conversation about how its people are integrated into the emerging democratic structures.

Throughout the documentary, Malawi and through it Africa is stripped of self initiative. The story of persistent failure and misery makes you think that there is nothing positive that happens in that country – except of course Madonna’s apparent wonderment that in spite of their poverty, Malawians are still happy: The children play, the youths smile and cheer, the elderly laugh and hug each other in mutual affection.

What is missing is the story of innovation in Malawi; the business people who are creating new ways to make money and therefore employing hundreds of thousands; the farmers who are improving their wellbeing through adoption of modern farming technologies; young professionals like those in Kenya who created mobile money that is changing life on our continent without foreign aid; and small traders and craftsmen and women who are creating many things out of nothing.

Even in rural Malawi, it is not only a story of misery; there is innovation: That is the story of the great William Kakamba whom I met at the TED Conference in Arusha in June 2007. Coming from a poor home, with his parents living in a grass thatched house, Kakamba read in a local library about how to generate electricity using windmills. He went home and created one using rudimentary tools and there it was – electricity.

Kakamba is not alone; similar stories abound across this continent. There is the story of Victor Mugai, a young Kenyan I taught at Yale University. His father and mother died when he was seven, his sisters married in their early teens and he had to raise himself and his young brother. At eight, he built his own clock; at 10, he built a television set and at 14, he built a rocket – all out of his grass thatched hut in rural Kenya. Yet he had the audacity to dream of studying in America. Without the help or knowledge of his government, he struggled and was helped to get a scholarship to Yale where he is studying nuclear physics.

But it is also the story of Fred Balagadde; best student in O levels in Uganda in 1998: He struggled, went to the US, paid his own fees and finally did his PhD in bio technology at California Institute of Technology and Stanford University. He invented a micro chemostat, a first-of-its-kind microfabricated fluidic chip that mimics a biological cell culture environment in a highly complex web of tiny pumps and human hair-sized water hoses, all controlled by a multitasking computer. This pioneering research, that has left many in the Silicon Valley scratching their heads, can diagnose 98 percent of all diseases without help of a doctor.

There are a million and one Africans doing these things – in villages, in towns, on the continent and abroad. But this story of innovation is often disarticulated from political life in Africa because we have a perverted democracy where the political process seeks to enhance the privileges of a few at the expense of the many.

There are many people from the West who genuinely believe Africans can be helped to help themselves. Often, this section of Western interest in Africa finds talented people like Mugai, Kakamba and Balagadde and helps them to achieve their dreams clearly recognising that these are the continent’s change agents. But such help is the exception, not the rule. For most Westerners, the attraction is in helping where the television cameras are watching and hence gain worldwide publicity.

I admit that our governments have been abysmal in promoting our innovative youths. One of the few countries in Africa hungrily looking for its best brains to serve it is Rwanda; for if Kakamba, Mugai and Balagadde were Rwandan, they would be the focus of government policy and action. And it is not a surprise that human rights groups hate Rwanda calling it a police state; and a section of Africa’s ill informed intellectual class agrees. Good enough Rwandans tell their story differently in opinion polls by such institutions as Gallup Poll – 95% say they have confidence in their public institutions, making the country 4th in the entire world.

Yet Madonna’s documentary was not without good insights. The PhD Mathew Chikoanda says “the problem we have, not just in Malawi but across Africa is this victim mentality – the tendency to shift blame for our problems from ourselves to other people.” I agreed entirely. However, I would add that while our problems are largely domestically generated and the demands to solve them are locally articulated, the framework of discussing the solution is always a textbook theory developed out of the experience of other countries. Part of Africa’s predicament is born of this persistent mismatch between demands and solutions.

Chikoanda went on quoting a Malawi proverb that “No one can share your head in your absence.” So we need to take responsibility for ourselves. We need to empower our people. External assistance is okay. But we need to begin with our own solutions. Chikoanda was touching on something I feel passionately about. And it is in Rwanda that I have seen this begin to happen. And this could be largely because in their moment of national catastrophe, the people of Rwanda saw the international community cut and run. They learnt self reliance the hard way.

Towards the end, Clinton comes back with a comment – “Africans are ready to tackle their own problems,” he says, “but they are looking for someone to help them, to empower them.” Possibly, but why can’t we empower ourselves and only let others help us on our own terms? Besides, who are these helpers? What are their interests and motivations? Well, Africa has been involved in years of parroting the view of others about who we are, what we are and what we need. It is time for us to compose our own song and sing it. Madonna and all the kind people of this world cannot save Africa. Only Africans can save themselves.

amwenda@independent.co,u